Blair

The appellants, representing former Barbados participating policyholders of Manulife, brought a class action for negligence.

They claimed Manulife owed them a duty of care to protect their interests when it transferred their policies to another insurer in 1996, three years before Manulife demutualized and distributed $9 billion to its participating policyholders.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while harm was foreseeable, policy reasons negated a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claim was for pure economic loss and did not fall within established categories.

The Court found no prima facie duty of care because the relationship lacked sufficient proximity, as the policyholders had no legally recognized right to share in a future demutualization at the time of the transfer, and the governing legislation permitted Manulife to terminate the relationship.

The appellant appealed his convictions relating to a home invasion and an assault.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence on the assault count, failed to consider an alternate suspect for the home invasion, and inadequately scrutinized unsavoury witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, entering an acquittal on the assault count because the trial judge mistakenly believed the identifying witnesses had prior knowledge of the appellant.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, as the alternate suspect was physically incapable of the crime and the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles.

The Republic of France sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged role in a 1980 terrorist bombing in Paris.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based primarily on a French handwriting analysis linking him to the bombing, finding the report was not manifestly unreliable despite methodological criticisms.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender, rejecting arguments that France had not yet decided to put him on trial and that the case relied on intelligence reports potentially derived from torture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal from the committal order and his application for judicial review of the surrender order, upholding the extradition judge's application of the test for committal and finding the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting three utterances he made to officers at the scene and in failing to properly instruct the jury on how his limited English proficiency might affect the interpretation of those utterances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the utterances were voluntary and made before the appellant was detained, and that the trial judge's jury instructions adequately addressed the language barrier issue.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the conclusion that the offence occurred in 1999 as alleged in the information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the date of the offence is not an essential element unless it is critical and the accused is misled or prejudiced.

The court found the appellant knew the case he had to meet and the date played no part in his defence.

The appellant insurer appealed a Superior Court judgment ordering it to indemnify the respondent for costs incurred in defending a slip and fall lawsuit.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding that issue estoppel did not bar the claim and that the underlying lawsuit triggered a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

Following a major appellate decision regarding the tolling of limitation periods in securities class actions, the successful parties in two of the appeals sought their costs.

The opposing parties argued for reduced costs on the basis of public interest, over-lawyering, and the fact that the court had overruled its own prior jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and significance of the proceedings.

Costs of $151,250 and $100,000 were awarded to the respective successful parties on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence that an Easement and Lake Water Supply Agreement had been conveyed to the appellant through an Assignment and Assumption of Contracts Agreement and a vesting order.

The motion judge erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the agreement had not been transferred.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and partial summary judgment granted declaring the agreement was conveyed to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.

The moving party, Prince Edward County Field Naturalists, sought to stay an order of the Divisional Court that reinstated a renewable energy approval for a wind energy project.

The project overlapped with the habitat of the endangered Blanding's turtle.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the proposed appeal raised serious issues of first impression in environmental law.

The Court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm if the habitat was destroyed before the appeal could be heard, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.