L.B. Roberts

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that his discussions with co-conspirators amounted to a concluded agreement, and that the trial judge misapplied the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had agreed to join the conspiracy to import cocaine by airplane.

The court also held that the trial judge properly applied the Carter framework and did not improperly rely on hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking in carfentanil and fentanyl found in a bedroom linked to a suspected drug operation, arguing that the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that a former co-accused possessed the drugs.

Applying the circumstantial evidence principles in Villaroman and appellate deference to a trial judge’s inference drawing, the court held that the alternative theory was speculative because the appellant had keys to the building and unit, had been seen repeatedly in the bedroom, and had been linked to a debt list found there, while the former co-accused had none of those connections.

The appellant also sought to reduce a fit 10-year sentence through fresh evidence of extensive post-sentence rehabilitation.

Applying the Palmer criteria and sentence appeal principles concerning changed circumstances, the court refused the fresh evidence and held the sentence remained fit because rehabilitation had already been recognized as a major mitigating factor and ongoing custodial progress was better addressed by correctional and parole authorities.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed, although leave to appeal sentence was granted.

The moving parties sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned a permanent injunction requiring them to clean up their property in compliance with a municipal property standards by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the delay was inadequately explained, the proposed appeal was frivolous and without merit, and the ongoing delay prejudiced the municipality and the public interest.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, transferred $400,000 to herself from her late stepfather's estate, claiming it was an inter vivos gift.

The respondent successfully challenged the transfer at first instance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred by excluding the stepfather's investment advisor's notes as hearsay and by finding the gift was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the exclusion of the notes as double hearsay under the Evidence Act and affirming the finding that the stepfather lacked a continuing intention to make the specific gift.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from a family law judgment.

The delay in filing was only one day, but the moving party had a history of unreasonable conduct, delay, and non-compliance with court orders throughout the proceedings.

The motion judge reviewed the merits of the proposed appeal, which challenged the striking of pleadings, occupation rent, and post-separation adjustments, and found them to be completely devoid of merit.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed as it was not in the interests of justice to allow the meritless appeal to proceed.

The moving parties sought to quash the responding party's appeal of an order validating service of an application record.

The responding party, a foreign state, argued the order was final because it determined substantive rights regarding state sovereignty and the Hague Convention.

The Court of Appeal held that the order validating service was procedural and interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the dispute or deprive the responding party of substantive defences.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant Ministry of Transportation appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against a contractor as statute-barred.

The parties' standard form construction contract required a notice of protest and alternative dispute resolution to be completed within two years of contract completion.

However, the referee's decision was not released until after this two-year period expired.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in interpreting the contract; it is commercially absurd to require a party to protest a decision before it is released.

Because the contractual limitation period could not apply, the statutory two-year limitation period governed, and the appellant's action was commenced in time.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eleven charges arising from an armed robbery of a cryptocurrency exchange business.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing circumstantial evidence and failed to consider reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Villaroman principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant's participation in the robbery was the only plausible inference based on the totality of the evidence, including DNA on clothing used in the robbery.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred by not excluding the firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach from a facially invalid search warrant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework, noting the breach was deemed the product of sloppiness rather than bad faith.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court deferring to the trial judge's balancing of the factors.

The appellant purchased a commercial condominium unit under power of sale proceedings.

The respondents, who operated a Hindu temple in the unit, sought to enforce an unregistered option to purchase contained in their lease with the previous mortgagee in possession.

The motion judge granted specific performance, allowing the respondents to purchase the unit for $350,000.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under the Land Titles Act.

The matter was remitted for a trial on this issue.

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment setting aside her mother's 2016 will and a related property transfer on the grounds of diminished capacity and undue influence.

The trial judge had found that the appellant exerted undue influence over her mother and failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence regarding the property transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the legal principles or her application of those principles to the factual findings, which were fully supported by the record.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The moving party sought to have an unpaid Superior Court costs order of $9,000 paid out of monies the responding party had previously paid into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the moving party's original intent in seeking security for costs included the costs of the underlying application, and awarded $2,000 in costs for the motion.

The appellants contracted with the respondent to repair fire damage to their property.

The project was overseen by a third party who fraudulently requested and retained personal payments from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondent for the outstanding contract amount, concluding the third party lacked actual or ostensible authority to receive personal payments on the respondent's behalf.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the governing principles of ostensible authority.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder of his intimate partner, arguing he lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent due to a cocaine-induced psychosis.

The trial judge rejected the defence psychiatric expert's opinion, finding it lacked objectivity and was inconsistent with the appellant's purposeful actions before, during, and after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the expert evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant property owner appealed a judgment granting the City's application to enforce a Heritage Easement Agreement.

The appellant had made unauthorized alterations to his property, including cutting down trees and building a hockey rink and cabana.

The application judge found the appellant breached the Agreement and granted a permanent injunction.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge misinterpreted the Agreement and that the City's enforcement was motivated by bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's decision and concluding that the City had exercised its contractual discretion in good faith.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after 3.7 kilograms of the drug were found concealed in spice packages in his luggage upon arrival from Jamaica.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong standard for wilful blindness, ignored after-the-fact conduct, and improperly took judicial notice of restaurant spice requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the wilful blindness standard as an alternative to her primary finding of actual knowledge, and made no reversible errors in her assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the election of the respondents' board of directors and officers at an annual general meeting.

The appellant argued that as the incumbent Vice-Chair, he was automatically entitled to become Chair, and that the election of the respondent Chair was irregular due to nomination and membership admission procedures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge's holistic interpretation of the poorly drafted bylaws and historical governance practices was reasonable and free from palpable and overriding error.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Monitor sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that funds swept into a UK bank account were subject to a statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The CCAA judge had found the funds were irreconcilably commingled and could not be traced.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and the decision was fact-specific and consistent with established jurisprudence regarding tracing.

The parties agreed not to seek any costs of the appeal motions or the appeals.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement reflecting this agreement, with no costs awarded.