Gavin Tighe

In a receivership proceeding, the Receiver brought a motion for declaratory relief regarding amounts owed under a loan and mortgage by the respondents.

The respondents brought a cross-motion arguing the Receiver's claim was barred by the two-year limitation period under the British Columbia Limitation Act.

The court found that while the respondents had not acknowledged liability to extend the limitation period, a prior petition commenced by the respondents in British Columbia within the limitation period preserved the claim.

The court held the Receiver's motion was not statute-barred and could proceed to be determined on its merits.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her husband's children and the lawyers who acted for him in prior divorce proceedings, alleging conspiracy, abuse of process, and other torts.

The defendants moved to strike or dismiss the claims under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the claims against the adverse lawyers, finding no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff.

The court also dismissed the tort claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, and intentional interference with economic relations as an abuse of process by relitigation, as they sought to undermine the final settlement reached in the divorce proceedings.

The defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering claims were struck with leave to amend.

The defendant in a solicitor's negligence action appealed a master's order requiring him to answer five questions refused at his examination for discovery.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal in part.

The court held that the defendant did not have to answer questions asking him to identify primary and secondary legal sources regarding testamentary capacity, as this improperly required a fact witness to conduct legal research and provide an expert opinion on the standard of care.

However, the court upheld the master's order requiring the defendant to answer questions about his understanding of his duty to ascertain testamentary capacity and regarding his professional liability insurance coverage.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 21, arguing it was an abuse of process and barred by issue estoppel.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued the defendants for allegedly breaching solicitor-client privilege during a previous proceeding.

The court found that the issue of privilege and waiver had already been decided against the plaintiff in the prior proceeding by a Master.

Applying the test for issue estoppel, the court concluded the action was an impermissible collateral attack and struck the claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs, individual unit owners in a retirement condominium, brought a motion for summary judgment claiming the defendants acted oppressively.

The defendants, who owned the majority of the units, managed the condominium, and provided services, were not requiring their own tenants to pay the mandatory service fees that the plaintiffs were required to pay under the condominium declaration and bylaws.

The court found that the defendants' conduct was unfairly prejudicial and unfairly disregarded the plaintiffs' interests, as it violated their reasonable expectation that all occupants would be treated equally.

The court ordered that the declaration and bylaws be enforced, requiring all occupants to enter into the same services agreement, but declined to award damages or alter the board's composition.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $187,500 in commission from the defendant for an alleged breach of a Buyer Representation Agreement.

The defendant opposed the motion and maintained a counterclaim for damages, alleging the agreement was incomplete when signed and backdated.

The court found significant contradictory evidence regarding the execution and terms of the agreement, concluding there were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, as the use of enhanced fact-finding powers would not be in the interests of justice.

The applicant wife alleged that her former husband and his family (the third-party respondents) engaged in a complex civil conspiracy to hide his income and assets through corporate restructuring and family trusts, thereby defeating her claims for child and spousal support.

The third-party respondents brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the conspiracy claims, while the applicant brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The husband also brought a motion to retroactively reduce his interim support obligations, arguing his income had materially decreased.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the third-party respondents' motion, dismissing the conspiracy claims, finding that the corporate transactions were undertaken for legitimate tax and estate planning purposes, not to harm the applicant.

The court also granted the husband's motion to vary support, significantly reducing his child and spousal support obligations retroactively to January 1, 2017, based on a material change in his income.

The defendants in a solicitor negligence action brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel of record, arguing that counsel would inevitably be required to testify as a witness regarding advice he gave the plaintiff in the underlying real estate litigation.

The court applied the factors from Essa (Township) v. Guergis and concluded that counsel's evidence regarding the plaintiff's decision to proceed with the underlying action was highly relevant to the defendants' defence that the plaintiff's losses were caused by his current counsel's advice.

The court ordered the removal of the plaintiff's counsel and directed the production of counsel's file and accounts from the underlying action based on a deemed waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The plaintiff condominium corporation brought an action for $75 million in damages for construction deficiencies against 53 defendants.

One defendant, Liberty Development Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it had no contractual or operational connection to the project.

The plaintiff brought a preliminary motion to admit an expert report, which was dismissed for failing to meet the Mohan criteria.

The court dismissed Liberty's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring trial regarding Liberty's operational involvement, representations of its involvement, and its relationship with the construction manager.

The court also held that partial summary judgment was not advisable in the context of the litigation as a whole due to the risk of duplicative and inconsistent findings.

The plaintiff condominium corporation sued 53 defendants for construction deficiencies.

One defendant, Liberty, brought a motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to stay or quash the summary judgment motion, arguing Liberty failed to make proper documentary production and improperly refused questions on cross-examination.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding no grounds to restrict Liberty's right to advance its summary judgment motion, but established a procedure for the plaintiff to bring a specific motion regarding the refused questions and documentary production prior to the hearing of the summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order that stayed his action pending the payment of several outstanding costs orders.

The plaintiff argued the Master lacked jurisdiction to vary a previous order to include additional costs awards reinstated by the Divisional Court.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master had jurisdiction under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 59.06(1) to vary the order based on the changed factual landscape.

The court also reprimanded the self-represented plaintiff for making unauthorized audio recordings of the proceedings in violation of section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

In an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act alleging multiple contraventions, the respondents brought a preliminary motion arguing that several alleged breaches were statute‑barred because the applicant knew or ought to have known the relevant facts more than six weeks before commencing the application.

The motion was dismissed in earlier reasons.

The court then addressed costs and held that the applicant, as the successful party on the motion, was entitled to costs.

However, because the motion raised legitimate legal uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the Act’s timing provision, the court ordered partial indemnity costs payable in any event of the cause rather than forthwith.

Motions were brought to quash summonses issued by a litigant seeking to compel opposing counsel and a proposed estate trustee during litigation to testify in support of a motion alleging judicial duress in prior settlement proceedings.

The court considered the stringent requirements for summoning opposing counsel as witnesses, emphasizing that such a step requires a high degree of materiality and necessity and should be avoided unless demanded by the administration of justice.

The court found the evidence sought was neither material nor necessary, noting that the moving party had already filed affidavits, transcripts, and audio recordings addressing the relevant events.

The proposed examinations were characterized as a fishing expedition and potentially tactical, as they would force opposing counsel to withdraw and cause delay and expense.

The summonses were quashed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

Following an unsuccessful motion by certain defendants seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel from the record, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff requested substantial indemnity costs alleging the motion contained meritless allegations and misstatements of fact amounting to reprehensible conduct.

The court found the motion lacked merit and was ill‑conceived but declined to characterize the conduct as reprehensible.

The court held that reasonably generous partial indemnity costs were appropriate in the circumstances and fixed costs accordingly.

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly exercised a shotgun buy/sell provision in a shareholders agreement, requiring the respondents to transfer their shares in the corporation.

The respondents argued the shotgun notice was invalid because it was issued jointly by two shareholders, and alternatively, that the applicants repudiated the agreement by demanding a release not required by the contract.

The court held that the shotgun provision, interpreted in its factual matrix, allowed for joint exercise by the applicants as a single shareholder group.

The court further found that the applicants did not repudiate the agreement, as they were ready and willing to close without the disputed release, whereas the respondents refused to close.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to transfer their shares.

Following a successful application contesting a federal election in which the court declared the election null and void due to voting irregularities, the applicant sought $90,000 in costs.

The court considered whether any respondent could properly be characterized as an unsuccessful party responsible for paying those costs.

The successful candidate was found to have done nothing wrong and stood in a similar position to the applicant, while the Chief Electoral Officer maintained neutrality and could not legally take positions favouring any candidate.

Given the public interest nature of the proceeding and the absence of a party properly liable for costs, the court declined to award costs.

Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and the applicant’s security for costs deposit was ordered returned.

The applicant, an unsuccessful candidate in a federal election decided by a plurality of 26 votes, brought an application to contest the election under s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act.

The applicant argued that irregularities in voter registration and vouching affected the result.

The court found that the onus was on the applicant to prove on a balance of probabilities that irregularities occurred and affected the result.

The court identified 79 votes that were cast irregularly due to failures in registration and vouching procedures.

Because the number of irregular votes exceeded the plurality, the court declared the election null and void.