Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The plaintiff sued the municipality for a slip and fall.

The municipality claimed contribution and indemnity from its winter maintenance contractor and the contractor's insurer.

The insurer appointed a single law firm to represent both the contractor and the municipality.

When the insurer later attempted to remove itself from representing the municipality, the municipality brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement for full defence and indemnity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appointment of joint counsel necessarily implied an agreement to both defend and indemnify the municipality, as any other interpretation would have placed counsel in an untenable conflict of interest.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The appellant appealed two orders concerning a default judgment for amounts owed on a professional student line of credit and a credit card.

The appellant had failed to file a defence, was noted in default, and default judgment was granted.

Her subsequent motions to set aside the default judgment were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judges that the motion to set aside was not brought in time, lacked a plausible excuse for the default, and presented no arguable defence on the merits.

The appellant's argument that repayment was only required upon her call to the bar was rejected as contrary to the written agreement.

In a court-appointed receivership, the spouse of the debtor's principal sought leave to appeal an order extending a Mareva injunction and repatriating a misappropriated HST refund.

A third party claiming an interest in the funds also appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the spouse's motion for leave to appeal, finding no arguable merit to her procedural complaints about the ex parte Mareva order.

The Court granted the Receiver and a secured creditor's motions for security for costs against the third party, finding his appeal appeared frivolous and he lacked assets in Ontario.

The appellant brought an oppression remedy claim against his siblings regarding the sale of shares in a family business and the failure to provide information.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while summary judgment is generally not available for applications under Rule 14, the procedural defect caused no prejudice.

However, the Court found that the respondents' subsequent application for a valuator constituted a new, discrete act of oppression.

Therefore, the oppression claim was not statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed and the matter directed to trial.

The appellant solicitors appealed an assessment ordering them to repay $73,000 and costs to their former client.

They argued the trial judge erred by relying on an inadmissible expert report, failing to dismiss for delay, and violating mediation confidentiality.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking further reduction of the accounts and a higher interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evaluation of the solicitors' competence, his procedural rulings, or his discretionary award of interest.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision on the main appeal.

In accordance with the parties' agreement, the court ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid out of the estate of the deceased.

The successful appellant was awarded $46,000, and the respondents were awarded $25,000.

The appellant, Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, appealed a decision regarding the calculation of amounts payable to the respondent non-utility generators under long-term power purchase agreements.

The dispute centered on whether a new government regulation reallocating the Global Adjustment Mechanism (GA) altered the calculation of Total Market Costs (TMC) under the agreements.

The application judge found that the new GA calculation was inconsistent with the definition of TMC, which required costs to be allocated pro rata to consumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not decide the case on an unargued issue, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and properly interpreted the agreements without improperly implying a term.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action against one driver.

He later amended his claim to add a second driver as a defendant, and the first driver crossclaimed against the second driver.

The second driver successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim as statute-barred, but the motion judge refused to dismiss the crossclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by conflating a lack of due diligence with the actual date of discoverability under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court dismissed the second driver's cross-appeal regarding the crossclaim, upholding the motion judge's finding on when the claim for contribution and indemnity was reasonably discoverable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter and assault with a weapon, as well as his sentence of five years' imprisonment and a ten-year long-term supervision order.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification and the Vetrovec warning for an accomplice's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the instructions.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued he should have received enhanced credit (1.5:1) for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in denying enhanced credit solely because the appellant did not apply for bail, enhanced credit was not warranted because the appellant's extensive criminal record and likelihood of reoffending meant he was unlikely to be granted early release.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision regarding a software licensing dispute.

The motion judge found that the respondent breached the licence agreement and infringed copyright by using the software on operating systems other than AIX, but did not breach the agreement by using it on multiple servers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contract, finding no server restriction but confirming the AIX operating system restriction.

However, the Court allowed the respondent's cross-appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the estoppel defence regarding the AIX restriction, and directed that the estoppel issue proceed to trial alongside the limitation defence and damages.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing he was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel failed to cross-examine the complainant on certain text messages and conducted a perfunctory examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that counsel's decision not to use the text messages was a deliberate tactical decision within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, as the text messages largely corroborated the complainant's account.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms offences, mischief, and intimidating a justice system participant.

The charges arose after the appellant fired a high-powered rifle into the home of a witness scheduled to testify against his friend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility findings or conclusion that the appellant had exclusive access to the firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the imposition of consecutive sentences for distinct wrongs was appropriate and the total sentence of eight years was not unreasonable given the gravity of the offences.

An administrative error imposing victim fine surcharges was quashed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for extradition.

The applicant argued the Minister erred in refusing disclosure of correspondence related to the termination of his Ontario prosecution and in assessing the Cotroni factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no air of reality to the disclosure claim and concluding the Minister's Cotroni assessment was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a 10-year sentence imposed for sexual interference, breach of probation, and breach of prohibition.

At trial, the Crown and defence had presented a joint submission for a 7-year sentence, which the trial judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not following the joint submission and by imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence that ignored the facts of the offence.

The sentence was reduced to the jointly submitted 7 years.

The deceased left a will that expressly disinherited his daughter, stating she had had no communication with him for several years.

The daughter challenged the will, adducing extrinsic evidence that her father's actual motive was racially discriminatory because she had a child with a white man.

The application judge admitted the evidence and set aside the will on public policy grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that third-party extrinsic evidence of a testator's motive is inadmissible when the will is clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, the court held that the public policy doctrine cannot be used to void an unconditional, private testamentary bequest based on a testator's alleged discriminatory motive, affirming the principle of testamentary freedom.

The appellant commenced an action in 2001 against the municipality.

After years of inactivity and failure to set the action down for trial, the motion judge dismissed the action for delay in 2015.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and failed to accommodate him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was indeed inordinate and inexcusable, raising a presumption of prejudice that the appellant failed to rebut.

The court noted that while self-represented litigants face challenges, they must still familiarize themselves with relevant procedures.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.

The appellant, author of a book, alleged that the respondents illegally reproduced and sold unauthorized copies of his work, claiming primary and secondary copyright infringement.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, with the motion judge finding no evidence that they had published, handled, distributed, or offered for sale any infringing copies.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge failed to apprehend key evidence and was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the hearing was fair and impartial.

The appellant commercial tenant suffered property damage from a flood and sued the respondent landlord for the uninsured balance of its loss.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the lease required the tenant to maintain all-risks insurance and barred claims against the landlord for property damage.

On appeal, the tenant argued summary judgment was inappropriate, the expired lease terms did not apply, and the landlord retained liability for failing to repair the premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that summary judgment is appropriate for waiver of subrogation cases, the overholding tenant remained bound by the lease terms, and the lease shifted the risk of damage from an insured peril to the tenant regardless of the landlord's conduct.