Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant was charged with breaches of the Building Code Act for failing to comply with Property Standards Orders.

She applied to the Superior Court for an order in lieu of prohibition to stop the proceedings, arguing the summonses were flawed and service was defective.

The motion judge dismissed the application.

The appellant was subsequently convicted ex parte in Provincial Offences Court.

She appealed the motion judge's dismissal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the presumption of regularity applied to the summonses and service was an issue for the trial court.

The Court also noted the appeal was moot because the appellant had already been tried and convicted.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee without cause and awarding 15 months' reasonable notice plus damages for lost bonus payments.

The employer argued the employee breached its Code of Business Conduct by sharing a private placement memorandum with a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the document was not confidential and its disclosure did not violate the Code.

The Court also upheld the 15-month notice period and the award of damages for lost bonuses, finding that unilateral changes to the bonus plan introducing forfeiture provisions had not taken effect.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed after 14 years of employment.

The motion judge awarded a 17-month reasonable notice period but denied damages for lost bonuses, finding the bonus plan required 'active employment'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on whether the 'active employment' term was ambiguous rather than whether it unambiguously limited the appellant's common law right to damages.

The Court found the term did not oust the common law entitlement and awarded the appellant damages for the bonuses he would have earned during the notice period.

This appeal concerned a priority dispute between insurers over statutory accident benefits payable after a motor vehicle accident, turning on whether the injured claimants were principally dependent for financial support on the named insured at the time of the accident.

The court held that appeals from insurance arbitrations are governed by the administrative law framework, and that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness rather than correctness.

Applying that standard, the court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because it imposed an impermissible permanence requirement on a recent relationship, adopted a categorical approach inconsistent with the dependency jurisprudence, and relied on speculation rather than the evidentiary record.

The appeal was dismissed and the respondent insurer remained entitled to have the arbitrator's award set aside.

On a civil appeal arising from historic sexual and physical abuse allegations based largely on recovered memories, the court held that the trial judge erred by using expert psychological evidence to corroborate the truth of the respondent's allegations and resolve a credibility contest.

Expert evidence could explain memory processes and damages, but could not be used to decide the ultimate issues of credibility, reliability, and liability.

The court therefore set aside the judgment, dismissed the assault claim, and held that a new trial was unnecessary because the admissible evidence was evenly balanced.

The court also allowed the appellant's defamation counterclaim in part, finding that qualified privilege did not protect defamatory communications sent to a former friend who had no reciprocal interest or duty to receive them.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial.

After convicting the appellant but before sentencing, the trial judge realized he had concurrently presided over a preliminary inquiry in an unrelated attempted murder case where the appellant testified as an alleged victim.

The trial judge granted a mistrial in the preliminary inquiry but refused one in the appellant's trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that a reasonable person would apprehend that the trial judge may have been unconsciously influenced by the evidence from the preliminary inquiry, particularly regarding voice identification and wiretap evidence.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and other offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board maintaining her detention order at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

She argued the Board erred in its application of the Winko test by considering the risk of psychological harm sufficient to meet the threshold and in finding a detention order was the least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded the appellant remained a significant threat to the public and that a conditional discharge would be insufficient to manage her risk.

The appellant sued his former lawyer for solicitors' negligence and breach of service agreements.

The respondents successfully moved to strike portions of the statement of claim under Rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11 as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by treating the pleadings motion as a summary judgment motion under Rule 20, improperly conducting a merits-based analysis of the conflicting affidavit evidence rather than assessing whether it was plain and obvious the claims could not succeed.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the Court of Appeal previously quashed one of his two convictions for attempted possession of a firearm.

The appellant sought a reduction of his sentence to time served and a reduction of the victim fine surcharge.

The Crown agreed to the surcharge reduction but opposed reducing the three-year probation term.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge treated the attempt to possess two guns as an aggravating feature for the entire sentence, not just the custodial portion.

Consequently, the court varied the sentence for the remaining conviction by reducing the probation period from three years to two years and the victim fine surcharge from $400 to $200.

The appellants, judgment creditors of a bankrupt investment dealer, appealed the dismissal of their claim that funds held in an 'Accumulating Account' were held in trust for them.

The account was established pursuant to terms and conditions imposed by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that while there was certainty of subject matter and object, the appellants failed to prove certainty of intention to create a trust.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, estate trustees, appealed a motion judge's order that they bear their own costs of an estate litigation settlement.

The appellants argued they were entitled to indemnification from the estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while estate trustees are generally entitled to indemnification for reasonably incurred legal costs, the appellants' dilatory and self-interested conduct in failing to make timely disclosure disentitled them to recovery from the estate.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an underinsured taxi.

The plaintiffs and their insurer, the appellant, sued the respondent municipality, alleging it negligently failed to enforce its taxi licensing by-law which required $1,000,000 in liability coverage.

The trial judge found the municipality owed a duty of care but did not breach the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the municipality did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs, as the claim was for pure economic loss and lacked sufficient proximity.

Furthermore, the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the municipality met the standard of care.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder following a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on text messages, circumstantial evidence, a jailhouse informant, and an in-court identification by the victim's mother made for the first time during cross-examination.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the eyewitness identification and the jailhouse informant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instruction on the eyewitness identification evidence constituted a fatal misdirection by failing to highlight the specific dangers of the delayed, in-court identification.

A new trial was ordered.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge dismissing their motion to expedite the hearing of two leave to appeal motions.

The underlying matters related to a Crown wardship order and a Habeas Corpus application.

The moving parties argued that as Aboriginal people, they had a right to have matters heard in a court of equity applying Aboriginal law, and that the children's aid society had no authority to apprehend their children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's procedural ruling that the matters were not properly before the court.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

He argued the motion judge mistranslated a French termination clause in his employment contract and erred in finding it did not contract out of the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the translation error but found it immaterial, as the motion judge correctly understood the clause referred to minimum notice and intended to respect the Act.

Applying deference to the motion judge's contractual interpretation, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $184,211.58 and declaring an equitable mortgage on their properties for unpaid corporate advances.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from missing documentation, rejecting a non est factum defence, and finding joint and several liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, or refusal to draw an adverse inference.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant Estate successfully defended the respondent's claim for a one-half interest in a property, the court determined the costs for the proceedings in the court below.

The Estate sought partial indemnity costs of $169,508.

The court reduced this amount by $30,000 to account for two unsuccessful motions brought by the Estate during the litigation.

Costs were fixed at $134,478.68 payable by the respondent to the Estate.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash an appeal.

The responding party argued the appeal should proceed, asserting the order below was not made on consent and the court lacked jurisdiction, while also appealing the costs component.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, finding that the communication contemplated by the order below had already been sent, rendering the order spent and the appeal moot.

The court also noted that no leave to appeal costs had been sought.

The appellant applied for an order requiring consumer reporting agencies to remove debts over two years old from his credit report, arguing that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 should apply.

The application judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Limitations Act does not apply to the Consumer Reporting Act.

The passing of a limitation period precludes court enforcement but does not extinguish a debt, and the reporting of such debts is expressly contemplated by the Consumer Reporting Act.

The respondent, a convenience store clerk, sold cigarettes to a 17-year-old test shopper after misreading the birth year on the shopper's identification due to 'human error'.

She was convicted of selling tobacco to a minor under the Smoke-Free Ontario Act, but the summary conviction appeal court overturned the conviction, finding her honest mistake satisfied the statutory defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the statutory due diligence defence requires a reasonable belief formed after exercising reasonable care in reviewing the identification, which a mere unexplained human error does not satisfy.