Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The respondent applied to the University of Waterloo as a transfer student but did not meet the academic standards due to prior grades affected by undiagnosed disabilities.

The University's Admissions Committee rejected his application based solely on those unaccommodated grades.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed his discrimination complaint, finding the University met its duty to accommodate.

The Divisional Court set aside the HRTO decision as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the HRTO decision was unreasonable, as the University could not rely solely on unaccommodated grades to demonstrate reasonable accommodation, but varied the remedy to remit the matter back to the HRTO rather than the Admissions Committee.

The appellant sued the directors and auditors of a credit union after losing his $5 million investment, alleging misrepresentations in an offering statement.

Midway through the trial, the appellant sought to amend his statement of claim to allege a new misrepresentation regarding the credit union's failure to obtain property appraisals.

The trial judge refused the amendment, finding it asserted a new cause of action that was discoverable years earlier and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that the proposed amendment relied on a different act and a separate failure to disclose, which was not encompassed by the original pleadings.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on wilful blindness when there was no air of reality to it on the record.

The Crown conceded there was no air of reality to wilful blindness but argued the trial judge found actual knowledge, or alternatively, that the curative proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repeated references to wilful blindness suggested he may have had a reasonable doubt about actual knowledge.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, as the error was not minor and the prosecution's case was not overwhelming, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of her former boyfriend.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined its own key witness on a prior inconsistent statement without bringing an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and subsequently used the inconsistency to impeach the witness's credibility during closing submissions.

The trial judge permitted this use and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held that this improper cross-examination and the subsequent use of the evidence prejudiced the appellant's defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding them only $5,000 in damages against their former real estate lawyer for a title defect error.

The trial judge found the lawyer breached his duty of care but concluded the appellants' significant claims for reduction in property value, carrying costs, and business losses were not caused by the title defect, but rather by the appellants overpricing the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation, damages, or the exclusion of expert evidence.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings in a family law application regarding child support for failing to comply with financial disclosure orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the remedy was not excessive given the appellant had breached six previous orders and received multiple warnings.

The court also upheld the motion judge's award of full recovery costs based on a finding of bad faith.

The appellants were convicted of drug trafficking offences following the execution of search warrants at two condominiums and a vehicle.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing that the searches violated their s. 8 Charter rights and that a delay in facilitating access to counsel violated s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal found that the searches were lawful, with the warrantless entry justified by exigent circumstances.

Although the court found a s. 10(b) breach due to a four-hour delay in providing access to counsel, it declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), noting the breach was an isolated incident rather than systemic.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant lawyer and his firm appealed an order directing the assessment of 14 accounts rendered to the respondent over an 11-year period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the application judge erred in finding 'special circumstances' under s. 4 of the Solicitors Act to justify assessing the older, previously paid accounts.

The assessment was limited to the final three accounts, which were in dispute regarding the allocation of settlement funds, and the respondent's corporation was added as a client on the assessment.

The appellant appealed an order requiring it to reimburse the respondents for legal fees incurred in collecting on promissory notes.

The appellant argued that the fees were related to a global settlement of disputes rather than collection, and that the application judge erred in awarding full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the enforcement efforts were inextricably linked to the settlement discussions, and that the application judge properly reduced the claimed fees by a third to arrive at a reasonable amount as required by the general security agreement.

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to serve and file a notice of cross-appeal.

The responding party opposed the motion, raising concerns about delay.

The court found that extending the time with appropriate directions would not delay the scheduling and hearing of the appeal.

The motion was granted, and the moving party was ordered to serve and file its notice of cross-appeal by a specified date.

The respondent was largely successful in defending her former husband's appeal and pursuing her cross-appeal.

She sought full recovery costs of $40,422.60.

The Court of Appeal awarded her costs of $38,000, ordering that 25% of the award be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office as it was proportionate to the support-related issues at stake.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

At trial, the Crown improperly cross-examined the appellant regarding his brother's immunity under s. 13 of the Charter.

The trial judge stopped the questioning, refused a stay of proceedings, and provided a strong limiting instruction to the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding the limiting instruction sufficient to cure any prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in rejecting hearsay evidence of historical sexual abuse as a mitigating factor.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board unreasonably found he posed a significant threat to public safety, applied the wrong legal test, and acted unfairly by copying portions of its reasons from a previous year's hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence of the appellant's treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight, and recent aggressive behaviour supported the significant threat finding.

While the Board's copying of previous reasons was ill-advised, the reasons as a whole demonstrated a firm grasp of the current evidence and did not warrant a new hearing.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for second-degree murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that renewed his conditional discharge.

He sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board's finding that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant posed a significant threat due to the risk of non-compliance with his medication if discharged absolutely without community monitoring.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault, alleging that improper Crown submissions during closing argument and inadequate corrective instructions deprived him of a fair trial.

He also argued the trial judge improperly limited the jury’s ability to rely on the absence of evidence when responding to a deliberation question about blood‑alcohol testing.

The Court of Appeal held the Crown’s submissions did not misstate the law or invite an improper credibility contest and that the jury was properly instructed using the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge’s response to the jury correctly distinguished between drawing reasonable doubt from evidentiary gaps and speculating about uncalled evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for sexual offences involving a child, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition maintaining his detention with limited privileges.

He argued the Board misapprehended his request for indirectly supervised community access, provided inadequate reasons, and issued an unreasonable disposition.

The Court of Appeal held the Board understood the dual nature of his requests and sufficiently explained its reasoning.

The psychiatric evidence demonstrated that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety and required continuous supervision, particularly given the risk of reoffending against children.

The Board’s refusal to grant broader indirectly supervised community passes was therefore reasonable.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, appealed his ten-year global sentence for multiple violent in-custody assaults, including an aggravated assault that left a victim severely brain-damaged.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, including a post-sentencing diagnosis of schizophrenia and a Gladue report that was waived at the original sentencing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the ten-year global sentence remained fit given the extreme violence, the custodial setting, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed, save for minor corrections to pre-sentence custody credit and the setting aside of victim fine surcharges.

The applicant, charged with drug-impaired driving, sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued the appeal judge erred in calculating the delay by excluding the time taken by the Crown's certiorari application regarding the disclosure of drug recognition expert logs, and by selecting an incorrect end-date for the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no clear error of law or issue of significance beyond the case, as the appeal judge properly applied the Tsega framework to the certiorari delay and reasonably relied on the end-date accepted by the parties below.

The respondent insurer conducted an independent investigation into auto-collision industry fraud by intentionally damaging vehicles and submitting them to the appellants' body shops.

The respondent sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and other claims, alleging the appellants charged for unnecessary repairs and deliberately damaged vehicles further.

The appellants moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 21 based on the ex turpi causa doctrine and appealed the motion judge's refusal to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

However, the Court granted the appellants leave to amend their statement of defence to plead ex turpi causa rather than entrapment.

The appellant appealed an order settling amounts owing pursuant to a previous family law judgment, arguing errors in the calculation of post-judgment interest on an equalization payment and seeking credit for spousal support paid.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by including spousal support in her income when calculating her retroactive child support obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no error in the interest calculation.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that under the Child Support Guidelines, spousal support received must be deducted when calculating a payor's income for child support purposes.

The appellant's motion for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.