Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault, alleging that improper Crown submissions during closing argument and inadequate corrective instructions deprived him of a fair trial.

He also argued the trial judge improperly limited the jury’s ability to rely on the absence of evidence when responding to a deliberation question about blood‑alcohol testing.

The Court of Appeal held the Crown’s submissions did not misstate the law or invite an improper credibility contest and that the jury was properly instructed using the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge’s response to the jury correctly distinguished between drawing reasonable doubt from evidentiary gaps and speculating about uncalled evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for sexual offences involving a child, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition maintaining his detention with limited privileges.

He argued the Board misapprehended his request for indirectly supervised community access, provided inadequate reasons, and issued an unreasonable disposition.

The Court of Appeal held the Board understood the dual nature of his requests and sufficiently explained its reasoning.

The psychiatric evidence demonstrated that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety and required continuous supervision, particularly given the risk of reoffending against children.

The Board’s refusal to grant broader indirectly supervised community passes was therefore reasonable.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, appealed his ten-year global sentence for multiple violent in-custody assaults, including an aggravated assault that left a victim severely brain-damaged.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, including a post-sentencing diagnosis of schizophrenia and a Gladue report that was waived at the original sentencing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the ten-year global sentence remained fit given the extreme violence, the custodial setting, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed, save for minor corrections to pre-sentence custody credit and the setting aside of victim fine surcharges.

The applicant, charged with drug-impaired driving, sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued the appeal judge erred in calculating the delay by excluding the time taken by the Crown's certiorari application regarding the disclosure of drug recognition expert logs, and by selecting an incorrect end-date for the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no clear error of law or issue of significance beyond the case, as the appeal judge properly applied the Tsega framework to the certiorari delay and reasonably relied on the end-date accepted by the parties below.

The respondent insurer conducted an independent investigation into auto-collision industry fraud by intentionally damaging vehicles and submitting them to the appellants' body shops.

The respondent sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and other claims, alleging the appellants charged for unnecessary repairs and deliberately damaged vehicles further.

The appellants moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 21 based on the ex turpi causa doctrine and appealed the motion judge's refusal to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

However, the Court granted the appellants leave to amend their statement of defence to plead ex turpi causa rather than entrapment.

The appellant appealed an order settling amounts owing pursuant to a previous family law judgment, arguing errors in the calculation of post-judgment interest on an equalization payment and seeking credit for spousal support paid.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by including spousal support in her income when calculating her retroactive child support obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no error in the interest calculation.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that under the Child Support Guidelines, spousal support received must be deducted when calculating a payor's income for child support purposes.

The appellant's motion for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a 2015 settlement agreement to be a binding separation agreement.

The appellant argued for the first time on appeal that a provision requiring expert review of the agreement's impact on their disabled child's ODSP eligibility created an implied right to terminate the agreement, and that the court should have exercised its discretion not to enforce it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to entertain novel arguments not raised before the motion judge and finding no basis to interfere with the enforcement of the agreement.

The appellant developer contracted with an electrical contractor to construct two solar energy projects.

The contractor named the appellant as an additional insured under its commercial general liability policy for liability arising out of the contractor's operations.

After fires caused by transformers selected by the appellant, the appellant settled claims with the project purchaser and sought coverage from the insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's liability did not arise out of the contractor's operations, as the contractor merely installed the transformers chosen by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order adjudging him bankrupt.

The respondent law firm, to whom the appellant owed debts from matrimonial litigation, had issued an application for a bankruptcy order after the appellant's consumer proposal was rejected.

The bankruptcy judge found the appellant owed debts exceeding one thousand dollars and had committed an act of bankruptcy by failing to meet his liabilities as they became due.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the bankruptcy judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a final order in matrimonial proceedings, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, misapprehending evidence regarding support, and failing to impute income to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the appellant had ample notice of the trial date.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on spousal and child support, including the imputation of income to the appellant and the refusal to impute income to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that a first promissory note, which required repayment of a loan upon the deceased's death, was valid and enforceable, rather than a second note that forgave the loan.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting witness testimony and finding an email purportedly from the deceased was not sent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding that the proposed fresh evidence regarding the email did not meet the test for admission and would not have changed the outcome.

The respondent and the appellant were equal shareholders and directors of a corporation that operated a dairy farm.

The corporation sold its milk quota, and the appellant director used the net proceeds to purchase a property registered in the name of a company owned by his wife, characterizing the transaction as a loan.

The respondent sought an oppression remedy, and the trial judge declared the property was held in constructive trust for the corporation due to the appellant's breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the unauthorized transfer of corporate funds constituted oppressive conduct and that a constructive trust was the appropriate remedy.

The appellant, who had a lengthy history of violent offences against intimate partners, was convicted of attempted murder and choking.

The sentencing judge designated him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge improperly presumed an indeterminate sentence was required and failed to adequately consider treatment options.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge engaged in a rigorous, individualized assessment of the evidence and properly concluded that the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a trial judge's order that denied him access to a child placed in extended society care.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant had standing to appeal under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and concluded that determining the appeal on the merits was in the child's best interests.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's wishes to be adopted without ongoing access by the appellant.

Finding no error in the courts below and prioritizing the child's best interests, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, who own and manage the majority of units in a condominium operating as a retirement residence, appealed a summary judgment finding their conduct oppressive under s. 135 of the Condominium Act.

The motion judge found the appellants unfairly prejudiced the respondent minority unit owners by not requiring their own tenants to sign the standard services agreement, allowing the appellants to offer discounted services and gain an unfair marketing advantage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the oppression finding and the costs award, but varied the judgment to ensure it only applied prospectively so as not to affect the rights of current tenants who were not parties to the action.

Following an appeal, the parties agreed on the judgment amount but could not agree on costs.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs of $20,866.02 based on the standard charge terms of the subject mortgage.

The Court of Appeal awarded the requested amount, finding it fair, reasonable, and proportionate given the appellant's unfounded allegations of fraud and new issues raised on appeal.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the parties requested on consent to amend the partial indemnity costs of the applications below.

The Court of Appeal allowed the amendment, reducing the costs awarded to the appellants for the proceedings below from $93,000 to $55,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The respondent, having been entirely successful on the appeal of a family law matter, sought partial indemnity costs of $53,407.33.

The appellant argued the costs should not exceed $18,789.66.

The Court of Appeal applied the principle that costs must be fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

Acknowledging the voluminous record and the importance of the issues, including child custody, the court fixed the costs payable by the appellant to the respondent at $35,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs of the proceedings in the Superior Court on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents contested a disbursement for the appellants' expert witness on damages, arguing the expert's evidence was rejected by the application judge as a mere mathematical exercise.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondents, finding that disallowing the disbursement did not amount to an improper distributive costs order, and that the expert evidence provided no value as it consisted only of basic calculations using publicly available share prices.

Costs were awarded to the appellants excluding the expert disbursement.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing his tort claims against the police for false arrest, negligent investigation, and other causes of action arising from two separate interactions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the appellant's arrest in March 2016, dismissing the claims related to that incident.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in dismissing the tort claims related to the February 2015 incident, as those claims did not hinge on the reasonable and probable grounds for the later arrest.

The appeal was allowed in part to permit the February 2015 tort claims to proceed alongside the Charter claims.