Karen M. Weiler

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 for his role in a massive investment scheme.

At sentencing, while unrepresented, he disputed many facts but the trial judge refused to strike the plea and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and ordered $35.6 million in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the undisputed facts satisfied the elements of fraud.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the restitution order to $20 million to better reflect the appellant's degree of criminal responsibility and the funds he retained control over.

The appellant underwent breast augmentation surgery and subsequently experienced complications.

She consulted another plastic surgeon who advised her that the initial surgery was performed below the standard of care and that she should contact a lawyer.

The appellant delayed commencing her action until she received a formal written expert report, by which time the one-year limitation period under the Health Professions Procedural Code had expired.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding that the appellant had discovered the material facts necessary to base an allegation of negligence during her initial consultation with the second surgeon, and did not need to wait for a formal written opinion or her medical charts to discover her claim.

The appellant father sought an extension of time to perfect his appeal of an order under the Hague Convention returning his child to Mexico.

The appellant's counsel missed the deadline by one day due to a misunderstanding of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding whether a transcript of the motion hearing constituted 'evidence'.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing the appeal was an abuse of process driven by the child's aunt rather than the father.

The court granted the brief extension, finding the intention to appeal was maintained, the delay was explained, and issues of standing and abuse of process were best left for the panel hearing the appeal.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement to address the costs of an appeal that was previously allowed.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal and the application below at $10,500, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the respondents to the appellant.

The appellant, Robert Hryniak, brought a motion to extend the time to perfect his appeal from a summary judgment finding he defrauded the respondents.

The respondents opposed and brought cross-motions to lift the stay pending appeal and for security, citing concerns that the appellant was dissipating assets, specifically his matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal analyzed the test for extending time, including a detailed review of the merits of the appeal concerning the newly amended Rule 20 summary judgment powers.

The Court granted the extension of time but, to prevent prejudice and asset dissipation, imposed strict terms requiring the appellant to post a $950,000 letter of credit and provide an undertaking not to encumber assets.

The respondents' cross-motions were dismissed.

The tenants appealed a Divisional Court decision that reversed a Landlord and Tenant Board order granting a 2.5% rent reduction.

The Board had found that the landlord's removal of fenced-in gardens to build townhouses constituted a reduction in 'common recreational facilities'.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in applying a correctness standard of review, finding that reasonableness was the appropriate standard.

While the Board's finding that the landscaped areas were 'common recreational facilities' was reasonable, its conclusions that there was a 'reduction' in facilities and its calculation of the rent reduction were unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order declaring that the respondent had no legal obligation to terminate her second-trimester pregnancy to mitigate damages in a wrongful birth action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration, finding that the issue was not a pure question of law suitable for determination on the pleadings under Rule 20.01(1)(a).

Instead, it was a question of mixed fact and law that required a full factual record at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and obstruction of justice.

At trial, the complainant was a hostile witness who claimed she could not remember making prior statements.

The trial judge admitted the complainant's out-of-court statements to a nurse and the police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of threshold reliability and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order that struck their claim against a corporate representative personally and imposed conditions on an injunction restraining mortgage enforcement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed no personal cause of action against the representative and that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in requiring the appellants to pay renewal fees and monthly mortgage payments as a condition of equitable relief.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement regarding property and support claims arising from divorce proceedings.

She argued that the respondent's acceptance constituted a counter-offer because it included minor modifications regarding tools and spousal support arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the modifications did not alter the main substance of the agreement and that the offer was accepted in time.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed a decision of the motion judge granting summary judgment in favour of the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the motion judge, finding no error in the granting of summary judgment.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the deceased's surviving husband was the beneficial owner of certain corporate shares, despite the deceased's estate being the legal owner.

The appellants argued this required a finding of fraud or an express trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Business Corporations Act, beneficial ownership is not limited to ownership through a formal trustee and can exist without fraud.

The court found the deceased was implicitly a bare trustee for her husband, who had absolute control of the shares.

The court also rejected arguments that the action was barred by the Trustee Act limitation period, as no personal wrong was alleged against the deceased.

The self-represented appellant chose not to appear for his peremptory appeal, advising the court through amicus curiae that his decision was a principled one based on a prior Supreme Court of Canada ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to his failure to appear.

The appellant franchisee appealed an order appointing a receiver over its business.

The franchisee argued that the franchisor had forgiven its debt for unpaid royalties and advertising contributions through two letters, and that the application judge erred in considering PST arrears not pleaded in the notice of application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the letters were merely proposals requiring acceptance, which never occurred.

The court also held that the PST default was properly considered as it was raised in supporting affidavits without causing prejudice, and rejected new arguments regarding jurisdiction, waiver, and estoppel.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order sanctioning the monitor's methodology for distributing funds in Nortel's Health and Welfare Trust under the CCAA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the interpretation of the specific termination clause was not of significance to the practice, the appeal was not prima facie meritorious, and granting leave would unduly hinder the progress of the restructuring.

Costs were awarded to the Monitor.

The appellant commenced an application for oppression relief under the Canada Business Corporations Act, supported by an affidavit from an individual who lacked direct knowledge and was unavailable for cross-examination.

When the appellant attempted to substitute the affidavit after the respondents had filed their responding materials, the motions judge struck the application as an abuse of process, with leave to re-introduce it upon payment of costs thrown away.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge was entitled to infer prejudice and properly exercised his discretion.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's interpretation of section 22(i) read in conjunction with section 23.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 on consent.

The appellant, a paralegal, was convicted of theft, forgery, and fraud after stealing personal injury settlement funds from vulnerable clients.

He was sentenced to 23 months' incarceration and ordered to pay $141,752 in restitution.

He appealed the restitution order, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his inability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in cases of breach of trust, the claims of the victims are paramount.

The court found the trial judge properly considered the appellant's future employment prospects and the lack of evidence regarding the whereabouts of the stolen funds.

In six family law cases, a Superior Court judge exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to order the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to represent children or conduct investigations, bypassing the statutory request process.

The OCL appealed these mandatory orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the judge erred by circumventing the existing statutory structure under the Courts of Justice Act, which grants the OCL discretion to accept or decline requests for involvement based on its resources and intake criteria.

The appellant hospital appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an individual found not criminally responsible for first degree murder.

The Board had previously adjourned the hearing to obtain an independent psychiatric assessment regarding the individual's past criminal involvement.

Despite the assessment failing to resolve these concerns, the Board's majority granted the absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to an unexplained gap in its reasoning regarding the relevance of the past criminal conduct and its failure to address inadequacies in the proposed treatment plan for monitoring medication compliance.