John I. Laskin

The appellant, a bartender on the respondent's boat, appealed the dismissal of her action for damages after she fell while descending a ladder and broke her leg.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was the author of her own misfortune and preferring the respondent's evidence regarding the appellant's footwear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings or his conclusion that the respondent was not negligent under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The appellant, an informal committee of senior debenture holders, sought leave to appeal orders made by the supervising judge in a CCAA restructuring.

The orders authorized the debtor company to enter into agreements with stakeholders and a finance provider to facilitate a proposed plan of arrangement.

The appellant argued the judge lacked jurisdiction to make orders that entrenched elements of a plan before creditor approval and that the plan was doomed to fail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the supervising judge had broad jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to move the restructuring process forward, provided the creditors retained their final right to vote on the plan under s. 6.

The appellant appealed a decision confirming an order of the Chief Building Inspector under s. 17(1) of the Building Code Act, arguing that the order must be in writing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the current statutory provision does not require the order to be in writing and contemplates that it can be given orally and subsequently reduced to writing.

The protection for the owner is found in s. 17(7), which requires the chief building official to apply to a judge for confirmation of the order.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding a shareholder's agreement, oppression, and ordering an advance payment of $75,000 along with substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions.

The refusal to acknowledge the respondent as a shareholder constituted oppression under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld as a proper exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of two witnesses used to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding the fresh evidence would not have affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appellant, a licensed insurance broker, pleaded guilty to fraud after misappropriating approximately $227,000 from clients' accounts.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors, including his gambling addiction and health challenges.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the original sentence but admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's severe cardiac condition, which developed shortly after his incarceration.

Given the risk that he could not receive adequate medical treatment in prison, the court allowed the appeal and substituted a 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and five-month custodial sentence, arguing that he was denied a fair trial because he was unrepresented by counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had given the appellant an opportunity to retain counsel and, when refused, properly assisted him with his defence in accordance with the duty outlined in McGibbon.

The court concluded the appellant conducted his defence intelligently and reasonably effectively, and found no error in principle with the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the surviving victim, who had a significant criminal record, gave inconsistent statements, and had a motive to lie.

The trial judge refused to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the victim's evidence, reasoning that such warnings do not apply to victims.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as a Vetrovec warning was mandatory given the witness's unsavoury character and the importance of his testimony.

The error could not be saved by the curative proviso, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $29,856.97 payable by the Attorney General of Canada, and costs of the motion fixed at $5,991.03 payable by the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario, following an appeal regarding a sealing order and access to search warrant information.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, seeking to have charges quashed or a new preliminary inquiry ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the provincial court judge had already decided to convert the proceedings into a preliminary inquiry, a decision not subject to the current appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's findings of credibility regarding himself, his wife, and the grandmother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed her youth court sentence.

The Crown acknowledged that, regardless of whether the original disposition was fit, the appellant had made remarkable progress in turning her life around, as evidenced by a post-sentence report.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varying the custodial portion of the sentence to time served and setting aside the probation order.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding joint decision-making for the medical treatment of the child of the marriage and the costs award in favour of the respondent.

The trial judge had ordered joint responsibility for medical decisions, requiring the parties to follow the primary care doctor's advice while permitting naturopathic remedies in conjunction with medical services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the medical decision-making orders and no error in principle in the discretionary costs award.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence, treating the aunt's evidence improperly, and providing inadequate reasons under Sheppard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, which properly considered demeanour and common sense without engaging in propensity reasoning.

The court also held that any discrepancies in the evidence did not affect the core issue of consent, and the reasons for judgment were sufficient.

The appellant appealed an order made in divorce proceedings.

She argued she did not receive the notice of motion, but the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that she was properly served at her address for service.

However, the Court found that the motion judge erred in granting corollary relief relating to the sale of the matrimonial home before the respondent's petition had been amended and served on the appellant.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the paragraphs of the order relating to the sale of the house, while upholding the severance of the divorce and the granting of the divorce.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed a judgment regarding a commercial lease dispute.

He argued the trial judge failed to give him a fair opportunity to present his defence by not allowing him to call a specific witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding the trial judge afforded a reasonable opportunity and properly exercised discretion, as the appellant provided no summary of the proposed relevant evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages awarded for the appellant's failure to abide by the lease's closing hours.

The Court found the fine provision oppressive and not a genuine pre-estimate of damages, reducing the judgment by $4,040.50.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision dismissing its trust claim under the Construction Lien Act.

The trial judge had inquired into the bona fides of the appellant's invoice during the trial of an issue in family law and trust claim litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to examine the invoice and that expert evidence demonstrated the invoice was unsupportable, meaning no trust claim could arise for work not performed.

The appellant appealed a decision reducing her spousal support from $1,200 to $400 per month.

The respondent had applied to terminate support after discovering the appellant was in a new common-law relationship and receiving financial support from her new partner.

The application judge found a material change in circumstances and reduced support due to the appellant's lack of effort to become self-sufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's assessment of the appellant's efforts or the quantum of support, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in family law matters.

The appellants were employed by the Toronto Humane Society.

They repeatedly refused to implement the Society's new policies regarding the intake of stray animals, citing concerns about the legality of the policies.

After multiple meetings and legal opinions confirming the Society's authority, the appellants continued to refuse to perform their duties and were terminated.

The trial judge dismissed their wrongful dismissal actions, finding they were dismissed for cause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding that the appellants' unequivocal refusals to perform essential job duties amounted to a repudiation of their employment contracts, which the employer was entitled to accept.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard to circumstantial evidence.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's competing inference on the basis that it was not 'equally plausible'.

The Court of Appeal held this was a clear legal error, as reasonable possibilities in favour of an accused may give rise to a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.