John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility findings, noting they were well-supported by the evidence, including a corroborating statement made by the complainant's sister.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding a custodial term was not unreasonable and declining to give weight to fresh evidence, which included an unsworn letter from the complainant asking for leniency.

Following the dismissal of both the appeal and cross-appeal, the appellant sought $2,777.15 for the costs of transcripts.

The respondent opposed, arguing not all transcripts were necessary and that he had borne the cost of some.

The Court of Appeal ordered the parties to bear their own costs, citing divided success and the issues raised on the appeal and cross-appeal.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action claimed her injuries interfered with her ability to care for her child.

During the jury trial, defence counsel asked about pre-accident discussions regarding the Children's Aid Society (CAS).

The trial judge discharged the jury, expressing concern that a juror employed by the CAS might make independent inquiries.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by discharging the jury based on speculation rather than exploring less drastic remedies to cure any potential prejudice.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction.

The Crown conceded that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Securities Act.

The trial judge had held that the appellants had a continuing obligation to disclose poor intra-quarterly financial results before the closing of their initial public offering, and that their failure to do so rendered an implied representation of objective reasonableness in their financial forecast false.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act distinguishes between material facts and material changes, and imposes no continuing obligation to disclose material facts after a prospectus receipt is issued.

The Court further held that the trial judge erred in implying a representation of objective reasonableness and in failing to apply the business judgment rule to management's assessment of the forecast.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a trial judgment awarding spousal support to the respondent wife, the appellant husband sought trial costs of over $250,000 and appeal costs of nearly $50,000.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the husband despite his success and his offers to settle.

The court found that the costs sought were grossly excessive and that a costs award would have a devastating effect on the impecunious wife, destroying any chance she had to achieve financial self-sufficiency.

The court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that their former law firm did not breach its fiduciary duty.

The appellants argued the firm had conflicts of interest due to its retainer with Ernst & Young Inc. and its relationship with two National Trust directors, and that the firm failed to provide zealous representation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellants were aware of and agreed to the conditions of the retainer, and that the firm did not fail to act in the clients' best interests.

The court also upheld the judgment against the individual appellants, as the retainer extended to all defendants.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant invested in limited partnerships marketed as tax shelters and made monthly interest payments on loans used to purchase the units.

The partnerships were later revealed to be a sham, and Revenue Canada disallowed the appellant's tax deductions.

The appellant sued the respondent accounting firm for negligence, alleging they breached the standard of care for a review engagement by failing to include a 'going concern' note in the financial statements, which he claimed would have prompted him to stop making interest payments earlier.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the accountants met the standard of care for a review engagement and that, even if a going concern note had been included, the appellant would not have noticed it or acted upon it.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order under appeal was not a final order.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleading for unreasonable disclosure in a family law proceeding.

The Court of Appeal declined to interfere with the motion judge's finding and exercise of discretion.

However, the Court amended the order to clarify that the appellant has the right to move to set aside the default by demonstrating that his disclosure efforts justify reinstating his pleadings.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs.

The appellants, police officers and a police services board, were wholly successful on appeal in an action brought by the respondent regarding her treatment in police custody.

The appellants sought costs of $150,000 for all levels of court.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the successful appellants, finding that the case raised complex issues of general public importance regarding police duties to detainees.

Given the public interest nature of the litigation and the respondent's severe financial hardship, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after his estranged girlfriend disappeared and her dismembered remains were found two years later.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who helped dispose of the body, corroborated by circumstantial and forensic evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions, in admitting hearsay and after-the-fact demeanour evidence, and in allowing bad character evidence regarding a subsequent relationship.

The Court of Appeal found that while some bad character evidence was improperly admitted and misused by the Crown, the curative proviso applied because the remaining evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed a variation judgment concerning child and spousal support.

The trial judge had imputed an annual income of $175,000 to the husband, varied child support retroactively to the implementation of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, fixed arrears, and dismissed the wife's application to extend spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, including the imputed income and arrears calculations.

The Court also rejected the husband's claim of judicial bias, concluding the trial judge's interventions did not usurp the role of counsel or raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant lender appealed the dismissal of its claim against a law firm that acted for both sides in a loan transaction, alleging conflict of interest and failure to advise on risks.

The respondent mortgagors cross-appealed, arguing the mortgage was invalid because the law firm failed to insist the wife obtain independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that no disqualifying conflict existed, the lender would have proceeded regardless of further advice, and the wife would have signed the mortgage even with independent legal advice because the loan benefited her family.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was fit given the severe trauma caused by the assault.

The appellant, the directing mind of the plaintiff company, appealed two costs orders made against him personally.

The motion judge had awarded substantial indemnity costs against the appellant for both the dismissal of the company's claim and the failure of the appellant's summary judgment motion on the defendants' counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the costs order relating to the company's claim because the company was not a sham or 'man of straw' used to shield the appellant from liability.

However, the court upheld the costs order relating to the counterclaim, as the appellant was a party to that proceeding and the summary judgment motion was unreasonable.

The appellant, a law student, sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent made disparaging remarks about him into a microphone at an Italian social club meeting.

The motion judge dismissed the claims for libel and slander on a motion for summary judgment, finding that the use of a microphone was not a 'broadcast' under the Libel and Slander Act, that the appellant could not claim slander per se because he was not yet a lawyer, and that there was no evidence of special damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by deciding novel and significant questions of law on a summary judgment motion without a full factual record, and finding that there was some evidence of special damage.

The defendant insurer was successful on a motion and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded modest costs of $2,500 to the insurer, noting that the insurer had refused to pay the $97,500 it was obligated to pay until after the motion.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the stay was just over 14 months, with 12 months of institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not err in assessing actual prejudice, including psychological harm, strict bail conditions, and additional expenses.

The Court also agreed that the offer of 'Blitz Court' dates did not shorten the systemic period in this case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed and the respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's equal apportionment of liability in a slip and fall case.

The appellant tripped over a sand bucket upon exiting a building.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that both parties were contributorily negligent, as the appellant was moving too fast and failed to keep a proper lookout, while the respondent had placed the bucket on the landing.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.