Pellegrino Capone

The plaintiff, Arvan Rehab Group, sued Roderick Millea and his company, Millea Physiotherapy Professional Corporation (MPPC), for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy.

Arvan alleged that Millea, while still contracted with Arvan, secretly bid on and won a physiotherapy services contract with Norview Lodge, a client of Arvan, using confidential information and soliciting Arvan's employees.

The court found that the 2007 contract between Arvan and Millea was binding and enforceable, and that Millea breached its non-solicitation provisions.

The court also found that Millea, as a key employee/dependent contractor, owed and breached a fiduciary duty to Arvan.

Furthermore, MPPC was found jointly and severally liable for conspiracy and inducing breach of contract/fiduciary duty.

Arvan was awarded disgorgement damages based on MPPC's profits from the Norview contract.

This decision addresses costs and other amounts payable following a long-standing property dispute.

The plaintiff, Dino Lepre, sought costs for a dismissed contempt motion brought by the defendant, Laurie Ann Hynds, and for a partition application.

The court fixed Mr. Lepre's costs for the contempt motion and awarded him costs for the partition application, noting his success on key issues and reasonable settlement efforts.

The court also determined the amounts payable by Ms. Hynds to Mr. Lepre for property taxes and severance costs, with a credit for land transferred to Mr. Lepre.

The plaintiff challenged the 2016 will of his deceased sister, which left her entire estate to her stepson (the defendant) and transferred her home into joint tenancy with him.

The plaintiff argued the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to cognitive decline and delusions, and was unduly influenced by the defendant.

The defendant counterclaimed for the return of $247,322.95 that the deceased had transferred to the plaintiff and another sibling in 2014, alleging it was taken without her knowledge.

The court dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim.

The court found the deceased had the requisite capacity to execute the 2016 will and property transfer, relying on the assessments of her treating physician and a geriatric specialist.

The court also found no evidence of undue influence.

The counterclaim was dismissed as the court found it unnecessary to determine the exact reasons for the 2014 transfer, concluding it did not need to be undone.

The parties are joint owners of a property that was severed into two lots by a consent order.

The applicant, who had paid all property taxes and severance costs, sought reimbursement from the respondent.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse 50% of the property taxes paid prior to 2006, but reduced her obligation to 13.3% for subsequent years because the applicant had built a house and garage that increased the property's assessed value.

The court also ordered the respondent to pay 50% of the severance costs and ordered the applicant to pay $9,917 to compensate the respondent for receiving a smaller lot, calculated by splitting the difference between the parties' competing appraisals.

The defendant, Laurie Ann Hynds, brought a motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff, Dino Lepre, was in contempt of a 1999 court order (the "Lofchik Order") and an order allowing her to unilaterally sell jointly owned property (the "Powassan bush lot").

Lepre opposed this relief and brought a counter-motion for partition or sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The court dismissed Hynds' motion, finding the Lofchik Order unenforceable due to a 19-year delay and mutual non-compliance by all parties.

The court also found it would be unjust to grant Hynds sole control over the sale given Lepre's efforts in maintaining the property.

Lepre's counter-motion for partition or sale was allowed to proceed as an application.

The defendants moved to strike out several paragraphs of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b), 25.06, and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action involved an alleged breach of contract regarding the operation and sale of a pizza franchise.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the claim asserted a well-recognized cause of action for breach of contract and was not frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to compel documentary production was also dismissed as premature.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

Following an earlier decision dismissing the defendants’ motion to transfer the proceeding from Toronto to Simcoe, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff sought $13,054.92 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendants argued that $4,000 would be appropriate.

The court held that although the defendants’ motion had some merit and was a close call, the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable costs for successfully opposing the motion, including travel time required due to the defendants’ choice of venue for the motion.

The court reduced the claimed preparation and research hours as excessive and fixed a reasonable partial indemnity award.

The defendants moved to transfer a contract and fiduciary duty action from Toronto to Simcoe.

The court applied the venue transfer factors under Rules 13.1.01(2) and 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the plaintiff's presumptive entitlement to choose the venue and the moving party's burden to show on cogent and persuasive evidence that another county was more desirable in the interest of justice.

While some factors modestly favoured Simcoe and others modestly favoured Toronto, the balance did not displace the plaintiff's chosen venue.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant Bank appealed an order striking its amended third party claim without leave to amend for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the pleading failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 25.06(8) by not providing particulars of the alleged fraud or misrepresentation.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by making findings of fact and relying on inadmissible evidence on a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant the Bank leave to amend its third party claim.

The appellant was successful on appeal and was awarded costs for both the appeal and the original application.

The respondent sought leave to make further submissions regarding the quantum of the costs award for the application.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the appellant's bill of costs and determined that the original $18,000 award should be reduced by $2,015 to account for a refusals motion that the parties agreed would attract no costs and for the attendance of two counsel.

The costs for the application were fixed at $15,985 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The purchasers had invoked a provision of the agreement when the vendor was unwilling or unable to comply with outstanding work orders.

The Court of Appeal found that the purchasers did not act capriciously or arbitrarily, and upheld the trial judge's finding that the agreement was null and void, entitling the purchasers to the return of their $5,000 deposit.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a union official who became a member of the respondent charitable corporation, requested a copy of the corporation's membership list under s. 307(1) of the Corporations Act to communicate with other members about labour relations and management issues.

The corporation refused, and the application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding his purpose was to benefit the union rather than the corporation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge applied an overly restrictive test.

The Court found that the phrase 'purposes connected with the corporation' requires only a good faith reason related to or associated with the corporation, which includes advocating for changes to management and labour relations policies.

The appellants were employed by the Toronto Humane Society.

They repeatedly refused to implement the Society's new policies regarding the intake of stray animals, citing concerns about the legality of the policies.

After multiple meetings and legal opinions confirming the Society's authority, the appellants continued to refuse to perform their duties and were terminated.

The trial judge dismissed their wrongful dismissal actions, finding they were dismissed for cause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding that the appellants' unequivocal refusals to perform essential job duties amounted to a repudiation of their employment contracts, which the employer was entitled to accept.