John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued that a subsequent demand made by a breathalyzer technician without reasonable and probable grounds invalidated the initial valid roadside demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the initial demand was a continuing demand that remained in force until complied with, and the subsequent demand was merely a good faith attempt to give the appellant a further opportunity to comply.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the underlying contract, and therefore the arbitration clause, had terminated.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred, as the arbitration clause survived the termination of the contract and the question of termination was itself subject to arbitration.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the appellant, acting in his personal capacity, was not a party to the arbitration agreement between the respondent and the corporation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of administering a stupefying substance.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and the trial judge erred in relying on the complainants' conservative sexual nature to assess consent.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence, including expert toxicological testimony that the complainants' symptoms were not caused by alcohol alone.

The court concluded the complainants were drugged and rendered unconscious, making them incapable of consenting to sexual activity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Minister of Finance appealed a trial judge's decision allowing FCMI Financial Corporation's appeal of capital tax reassessments for the years 1984 to 1989.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that FCMI was entitled to use its own fiscal year end to calculate its share of a partnership's paid-up capital, could retroactively reduce its earned surplus based on unpaid income tax reassessments, and could rely on a revised financial statement to correct an error in its 1989 return.

The young person appealed a conviction under s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code involving a paint-gun.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the paint-gun was a 'firearm' under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge erred in law by applying a negligence standard instead of the correct standard of 'a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances' for s. 86(1).

The Court declined to apply the proviso, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in reviewing the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct test and reasonably concluded the authorizing justice could have issued the warrant.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking proper credit for pre-sentence custody.

With the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the trial judge's order, noting that with proper credit, the appellant's statutory release date would have been November 12, 2006.

The appellant sought to alter the costs award made by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the parties' submissions and found no basis to alter the trial judge's costs award.

Following an appeal in which the respondent was largely successful, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent.

The costs were fixed at $3,500, inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.

The applicant applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order her surrender to the United States under s. 57 of the Extradition Act.

She argued that the Minister failed to balance the effect of surrender against the regulatory nature of the offences, erred in treating the US prosecutor's position as irrelevant, misapplied the test for security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the offences serious, the Minister's treatment of the prosecutor's position proper, the s. 7 analysis reasonable, and the reasons adequate.

The appellant appealed from a committal order.

The appellant subsequently abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the motion judge's assessment that the appellant failed to offer a plausible explanation for her default, as she had advanced a patently false assertion that she was not the person named in the statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a consent order regarding the sale of a jointly owned property.

The motion judge interpreted the order as giving the respondent the election to either sell the property to a third party or acquire the appellant's interest directly, rather than requiring an open market sale where the respondent would have to bid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's interpretation of the consent order was reasonable, made sound commercial sense given the breakdown of the parties' relationship, and was entitled to deference.

The appellants appealed an order staying their entire proceeding pending the corporate revival of one of the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge had the discretion to stay the entire proceeding in the interests of efficiency, as it was preferable for both plaintiffs' actions to proceed together.

The appellant appealed a decision finding no de facto expropriation effected by an open space by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no de facto expropriation.

The Court declined to consider whether the respondent had the power to require dedication of the Woodlot as a condition to site plan approval, as the issue was not raised in the pleadings or below.

The Court also found no basis in the pleadings for an allegation of malfeasance of public office.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply binding precedent.

Because the approved screening device was located nearby and customs officials administered the test within nine minutes of the original demand, the conviction was restored.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment awarding sole custody of the parties' two children to the respondent mother and failing to determine access.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on the father's past deceitful conduct and insufficient emphasis on the children's best interests under the Divorce Act.

The trial judge failed to consider the children's needs, the maximum contact principle, and the merits of the existing shared parenting arrangement.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the issues of custody, access, and child support.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence explaining that intercepted communications relied upon by the Crown actually referred to a prior shooting, an explanation he deliberately withheld at trial for tactical reasons.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit the fresh evidence, finding it not sufficiently compelling to overcome the finality principle.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to excluded exculpatory statements and jury instructions on hearsay and party liability.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the issue of planning and deliberation.

The appeal was dismissed, but the first degree murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for second degree murder was substituted.

The appellant condominium corporation brought an application to remove the respondent's cats from her unit, after a previous identical application by the unit owner was dismissed and not appealed.

The application judge dismissed the second application as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant was an active participant in the first application and that permitting the second application would be manifestly unfair to the respondent by forcing her to relitigate the same issue.

The appellant appealed his convictions for obstructing a police officer and possession of a prohibited weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in the mens rea analysis for obstruction, misapprehended evidence regarding a suspected stolen vehicle, and erred in finding a buck knife opened by centrifugal force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the proper mens rea analysis, correctly understood the evidence, and was entitled to rely on the police officer's demonstration of the knife.