John I. Laskin

The plaintiff appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its fraudulent conveyance action against the debtor's wife on a non-suit motion.

The debtor cross-appealed the trial judge's decision granting judgment on his personal guarantee without allowing him to make closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

While the trial judge erred in denying the debtor the opportunity to make closing arguments, this did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

Furthermore, although the trial judge applied the wrong test on the non-suit motion by weighing competing inferences rather than assessing if a prima facie case was made, the trial judge correctly concluded on the merits that the plaintiff failed to establish fraudulent intent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the use of the complainant's videotaped statement and failed to review the evidence fairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not invite the jury to use the videotaped evidence impermissibly as a prior consistent statement, and the charge was balanced.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the recognized range and the trial judge properly treated the offences as akin to a breach of trust.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including sexually assaulting two 14-year-old boys, and was designated a dangerous offender by the trial judge.

On appeal, the appellant argued he should have been designated a long-term offender, asserting his risk could be managed in the community with chemical castration and strict supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The court noted the appellant's unwillingness to take sex-inhibiting drugs and the unavailability of the required level of community supervision.

The employer appealed a Divisional Court decision that overturned a Financial Services Tribunal ruling regarding the administration of a pension plan.

The Court of Appeal restored the Tribunal's decisions, holding that the employer was entitled to pay most plan expenses from the pension fund and to take contribution holidays using the actuarial surplus for both the defined benefit and defined contribution components of the plan.

The Court also found that while the notice of the conversion option was inadequate, the Superintendent was not required to refuse registration of the amended plan.

Finally, the Court held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to order costs payable from the pension fund.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting a mandatory injunction requiring them to remove a retaining wall that encroached on the respondent's adjacent commercial property.

The original encroachment was permitted under a 1973 settlement agreement, which stipulated that consent would be rescinded if further encroachment occurred.

The trial judge found that the wall had moved significantly, rescinding the consent and rendering the encroachment a trespass.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the encroachment constituted a trespass, that the appellants had not acquired title by adverse possession because their possession was consensual, and that a mandatory injunction was the appropriate remedy given the significant and ongoing interference with the respondent's property rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought release on bail pending trial for an offence involving a fatal stabbing.

Fresh evidence was introduced suggesting the deceased was the aggressor, providing context for the applicant's conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that, given the new information, detention was not justified on the tertiary ground, and the applicant met his onus on the secondary ground due to the availability of sureties to monitor his conduct.

The application for bail was granted.

The appellant appealed a finding of civil fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and not tainted by palpable and overriding error.

The court noted that although the respondent did not prove one particular of fraud (participation in a fraudulent discharge), the other proven particulars supported the judgment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for unpaid invoices, arguing that a different corporate entity was responsible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant had taken a different position at trial and that there was no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's finding of liability.

The appellant employer appealed a decision granting the respondent former employee the full benefit of share units under a Mid-Term Incentive Plan following a change of control.

The appellant argued the entitlement should be calculated pro rata to active employment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the change of control triggered actual and immediate vesting of the share units under the plan, rendering the pro-rata provision inapplicable.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his Hague Convention application for the return of his child to the United States.

The mother had moved with the child from Florida to Ontario when the child was two and a half months old.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the child was not habitually resident in Florida, that the father was not actually exercising custody rights at the time of the move, and that the father subsequently acquiesced to the child remaining in Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed paragraph one of the trial judge's order, arguing that there was no settlement because the wrongful dismissal claim component had not been resolved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties agreed the respondent would be paid 16% of the company's value, and the business valuators would account for the contingency of the wrongful dismissal claim.

The unresolved claim afforded no basis to set aside the agreement.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the challenge to the motion judge's jurisdiction had been abandoned for the purpose of the motion before her.

The Court also noted that the motion judge's order had no precedential value on the question of jurisdiction.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in denying the enhanced credit, noting the appellant served his pre-trial custody in segregation at his own request and had not engaged in rehabilitative programs.

The court upheld the sentence length given the offender's extensive record and high risk of re-offending.

However, based on a concession by the Crown, the court varied the parole eligibility period to half of the balance of the sentence imposed.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's excellent oral reasons.

The appellant appealed his one-year custodial sentence for assault, seeking to convert the remainder to a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge overstated the seriousness of one incident, the custodial sentence was justified given the appellant's previous record for assault, the seriousness of the current assault, and the serious injuries caused to the victim.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the refusal of a Superior Court judge to grant an order under section 37.1(1)(a) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The appellant sought disclosure of the existence or absence of a criminal record of a confidential informant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that such disclosure might enable the accused to determine the identity of the confidential informant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof, and upheld the SOIRA registration and the non-application of the Kienapple principle.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years due to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, and positive personal circumstances.

The moving party brought a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's judgment by striking out a reference to its withdrawal of a limitation defence argument and remitting the issue to the arbitrator.

The moving party argued that because the court had overturned previous case law and found the responding party to be an insurer, it should now be able to rely on the limitation defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party had expressly conceded the issue before the arbitrator and the lower court, and therefore could not revive the argument on appeal.

The appellant slipped and fell on a grape in the produce department of a grocery store owned by the respondent.

A jury found the respondent had taken reasonable care and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the standard of care and causation, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the standard of reasonableness under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and that there was sufficient evidence of the respondent's floor maintenance program to support the jury's verdict.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge granted a motion for a directed verdict.

The Court of Appeal held that the identity of names between the person the complainant identified as her assailant and the accused constituted some evidence on the issue of identity.

The appeal was allowed, the directed verdict set aside, and a new trial ordered.