John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of 15 years and 3 months' imprisonment followed by a 10-year supervision order for severe, long-term domestic abuse.

The amicus curiae conceded there were no arguable grounds for the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the amicus argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's age and progressive dementia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting expert evidence that the appellant posed a moderate to high risk to re-offend and that his dementia might stabilize with treatment.

The court agreed with the trial judge's characterization of the offences as the worst case of domestic abuse short of murder, concluding the sentence was fit.

The respondent was sued after his son was injured while driving a go-kart on a private track.

The respondent sought coverage and a defence from his automobile insurer.

The insurer brought a motion to determine whether a go-kart is an 'automobile' under the standard Ontario automobile insurance contract.

The motion judge found that a go-kart is an automobile because it is capable of being driven on a highway.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the proper question is whether the vehicle required motor vehicle insurance at the time and in the circumstances of the accident.

Because the go-kart was operated on a private track, it did not require insurance and was not an 'automobile' under the policy.

The appellant appealed her sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily injury and failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's six-year sentence for dangerous driving exceeded the Crown's requested maximum of five years and fell outside the acceptable range.

The appeal was allowed, reducing the dangerous driving sentence to four years (for a global sentence of five years) and the driving prohibition from sixteen years to eleven years.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, which included a consecutive sentence for a conviction under s. 345 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave thorough and balanced reasons, the global sentence of eighteen months plus five months pre-trial custody credit was fit, and the consecutive structure caused no prejudice.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision declaring that the respondent is exempt from paying retail sales tax on wooden pallets it rents to ship consumer goods.

The application judge found the pallets were exempt under s. 7(1)41 of the Retail Sales Tax Act because they were attached to or incorporated into tangible personal property for the purpose of sale, and were not returnable containers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the transfer of pallets to customers constituted a sale for consideration, as the rental costs were built into the product price, and the final product sold was a palletized package.

The appellant owned a cottage in a provincial park and historically accessed it by driving over beach property.

The Ministry terminated vehicular access, offering alternative parking.

The appellant sought a declaration of a legally enforceable right to drive over the beach, claiming it was a highway or she had an easement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the Crown owned the beach, it was not a highway, and her prior use was by permission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on ownership, the application of the Public Lands Act, and the lack of an easement, as well as the trial costs award of $133,800.

The appellant municipalities appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for a pedestrian's injuries caused by a depression exceeding two inches on a commercial street corner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the state of repair and inspection system were inadequate.

The court also found the trial judge's reasons were adequate for appellate review and refused the respondents' cross-appeal on costs.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the underlying order was interlocutory because it did not dispose of any substantive defence.

Accordingly, the motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and costs were awarded to the moving party.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge dismissing his action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The Crown breached its fiduciary duty in 1886 by making an improvident sale of the appellant's timber rights.

The trial judge valued the timber rights at $31,600 and awarded simple interest adjusted for inflation, denying the appellant's claim for equitable compensation including compound interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the valuation but allowed the appeal on compensation, finding that the trial judge erred in failing to compensate the appellant in equity for its lost opportunity to have the funds invested.

The Court held that an award of equitable compensation including compound interest is not barred by the Crown's historic immunity from paying interest, and ordered a new hearing to determine the appropriate compensation.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was convicted in absentia in France for serious drug offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

He was subsequently convicted of unrelated drug offences in Canada.

France requested his extradition to serve his sentence.

The appellant appealed his committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the delay in extradition proceedings constituted an abuse of process and that his surrender would violate his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding no evidence of state misconduct or manipulation to support an abuse of process claim.

The Court also held that the Minister reasonably applied the Cotroni factors in determining that extradition was appropriate despite the possibility of domestic prosecution.

The appellant lawyer sought compensation for fees and disbursements incurred while representing a former client on solicitor-client privilege issues after the appellant's law office was searched.

The application judge ordered the Crown to pay the appellant at the prevailing Legal Aid rate and referred disputes over hours to the Legal Aid Plan.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by fettering his discretion and treating the matter as a criminal legal aid case.

The Court allowed the appeal and fixed the appellant's compensation at $200 per hour for 140 hours, plus disbursements.

The respondent sued the Ministers of National Revenue and Indian Affairs and CRA officials, alleging they targeted him and his business regarding the tax exemption in s. 87 of the Indian Act.

The appellants moved to strike the Amended Statement of Claim.

The motion judge dismissed the motion in part.

The appellants appealed, focusing on the Superior Court's jurisdiction to declare a GST assessment null and void.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim for declaratory relief, finding the pleadings did not provide a basis in fact or law for such a declaration, without deciding the broader jurisdictional issue.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the City of Windsor for the cost of restoring municipal roads to grade after Canadian Pacific Railway abandoned a railway line.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the railway's obligation to maintain the bridges continued after abandonment, and that the damages awarded represented the least cost to restore the roads to grade.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the ownership of lands under the Riverside Drive bridge and allegations of bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the road was a busy public road in the 1880s, the railway never intended to acquire the land under the bridge, and the road was a municipal street owned by the City.

The appellant's argument that the federal Crown owned the land was rejected, as the road was not an unopened road allowance laid out by a Crown surveyor.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for administering a stupefying substance and sexual assault, as well as his 22-month sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, misapprehending expert toxicological evidence regarding the effects of GHB and alcohol, and finding that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and that the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication were supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity after police executed a search warrant at her residence.

The police breached the front door without knocking and announcing their presence, which the trial judge found violated s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis.

The 15-month sentence was also upheld as fit for a large-scale grow operation.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding the respondents not liable.

The appellants acknowledged the trial judge's charge to the jury was excellent but argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was amply supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the relevant statute and regulation do not create a private law duty of care.

The court also declined to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary costs award.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $5,733.32.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the merits of the claims asserted had been finally adjudicated in previous proceedings.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $5,000.