John I. Laskin

The self-represented appellant appealed the final judgment of the Superior Court of Justice striking her statements of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the comprehensive reasons of the judge at first instance and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $1,000 to the respondents.

Following a successful appeal, the court addressed the disposition of the $15,000 costs awarded by the Divisional Court to the respondent.

The court applied the general rule that when an appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set aside and costs below are awarded to the successful appellant.

The appellants were awarded $15,000 in costs for the Divisional Court proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historic sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the limited use of evidence that the complainant's mother kicked him out of the apartment, and regarding potential collusion between the complainant and her brother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's limiting instructions were adequate and a special instruction on collusion was not mandatory.

The appellant appealed her sentence for two bank robberies, seeking to convert the custodial portion into a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably balanced the appellant's personal circumstances with the seriousness of the offences, which involved planning and threats of violence.

The sentence imposed was deemed fit.

The father appealed a trial judgment that transferred custody of his 16-year-old son to the mother due to severe parental alienation and authorized the mother to take the son to a specialized reunification workshop.

A stay of the trial judgment was previously granted.

The mother brought a motion to set aside the stay, and the son brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's motion, finding the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the stay until the imminent appeal hearing.

The Court granted the son's motion to intervene, noting his age, the profound impact the order would have on his life, and the benefit of hearing his perspective, subject to terms preventing delay or the introduction of fresh evidence.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident after losing control of her car on an icy patch of a municipal road.

She sued the municipality for negligence, alleging a failure to adequately salt the road.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality had met the standard of care by promptly salting the road, though light blowing snow delayed the salt's effectiveness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were well-supported by the evidence and that the municipality had taken reasonable steps to address the winter road conditions.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he adduced fresh evidence that he was subject to a deportation order and had lost his right to appeal it because his sentence was two years or more.

The Court of Appeal found that while the original sentence was not unfit, the certainty of deportation to a country where he had no ties, combined with his rehabilitation and the fact he had nearly completed his sentence, justified reducing the sentence to two years less a day to preserve his right to appeal the deportation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving while disqualified under s. 259(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The information alleged he was disqualified by an order under s. 259(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding that the s. 259(1) order had expired at the time of the offences.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the appellant's provincial licence suspension was in respect of his prior dangerous driving conviction, which was required to rely on the definition of disqualification under s. 259(5).

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement involving a 13-year-old neighbour.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the accused by assuming guilt to establish the complainant's credibility, and failed to adequately consider whether the evidence left a reasonable doubt even if the accused's testimony was rejected.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant suffered a serious head injury when she walked into a nearly invisible steel pole protruding from a parked, unidentified truck.

She sued her insurer for damages under the unidentified motorist coverage of her policy.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that the appellant was not 'struck by' or 'hit by' the truck because it was stationary.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the words 'struck by' and 'hit by' should be interpreted broadly in light of the remedial purpose of the coverage, and that contact with a stationary vehicle satisfies the requirement.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal on liability and partial success on the costs appeal, the respondents sought costs of the appeal totaling $675,880.87.

The appellant argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to divided success and duplication of counsel by the amalgamated municipal respondents.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents one set of costs, fixed at $125,000, reflecting the straightforward nature of the legal issues, the duplication of argument, and the appellant's partial success on the costs appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for possession of a controlled substance and breaches of a long term supervision order.

Based on fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal set aside two convictions and entered acquittals.

The sentence for the remaining breach of a long term supervision order was reduced to 12 months, less 3 months of pre-trial custody, for a net sentence of 9 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to address peripheral evidence and erred in finding he was in a position of trust.

He also sought an intermittent sentence for his 45-day term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence peripheral and the position of trust supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants leased land from the respondent's predecessor and built cottages used as year-round secondary homes.

The respondent sought to significantly increase rent and replace the leases with licences.

The Landlord and Tenant Board and the Divisional Court held that the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 did not apply because the premises were used for recreational purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the cottages were 'living accommodation' used as 'rented residential premises' and that the Act applies regardless of whether the premises are used for recreational purposes or as a secondary residence.

The appellant, an independent power producer, appealed a trial judgment that found the respondent breached a power purchase agreement but awarded no damages due to unreliable evidence.

The trial judge had concluded that the respondent failed to include an inter-area transmission credit in its avoided costs calculations, but dismissed the damages claim because the appellant's expert evidence was deemed unreliable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of breach but held that the trial judge erred in dismissing the damages claim entirely.

Relying on Martin v. Goldfarb, the Court found that where a significant loss is proven but the quantum is difficult to assess, the plaintiff should not be denied compensation.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on damages was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80' and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by using his breathalyzer readings to assess the credibility of his 'evidence to the contrary' (the Carter defence).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Boucher against using breathalyzer results to assess credibility applies only when the Crown relies on the presumption of accuracy.

Because the Crown called the breath technician and relied only on the presumption of identity, the trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer readings in assessing the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant had engaged in sexual activity with the appellant, mistakenly believing him to be his identical twin brother, with whom she had an ongoing consensual sexual relationship.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the complainant's mistake as to identity meant she did not subjectively consent to the sexual activity.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant could not rely on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, as he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless or wilfully blind.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of production of marijuana and bribery.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) due to the respondent's language difficulties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence for the marijuana charge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bribery charge, holding that the statements offering money to police constituted the actus reus of a new offence and did not flow causally from the Charter breaches.

A new trial was ordered for the bribery charge.