John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed a judgment enforcing a mortgage guarantee.

The appellant argued there was an implicit understanding that he would not be liable under the guarantee until the full mortgage amount was advanced, and that the respondent's failure to pursue $50,000 in a Crown forfeiture proceeding precluded the claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no support for the implicit understanding in the mortgage or commitment letter, and holding that the failure to pursue the funds in the forfeiture proceeding did not preclude the claim against the guarantor.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant voluntarily agreed to appear on the reality television show Dragons' Den and signed a consent agreement that precluded the two actions he subsequently commenced.

The appellant argued that it would be unconscionable to enforce the consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was given ample time to read the consent, did not ask for more time, and signed it without expressing any concern, making its enforcement not unconscionable.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his actions against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The motion judge had dismissed the actions under Rule 21.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the College's actions, including a referral to the Fitness to Practice Committee, were taken in accordance with its statutory mandate under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The Court also held that the appellant's Charter claims were properly dismissed as there was nothing to support them.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of careless storage of a firearm and ammunition after police, assisting sheriff's officers with an eviction, opened gun cases found in the apartment without a warrant.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the convictions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the appellant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and belongings despite the eviction order.

The court held that the police breached s. 8 of the Charter by opening the gun cases without a warrant or exigent circumstances.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay evidence, permitting improper cross-examination about whether he found the complainant attractive, and failing to properly apply the W.D. principles for assessing credibility.

Both parties also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearsay evidence was properly used to infer state of mind, the cross-examination was permissible to rebut the appellant's assertion of good character, and the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the respondents' civil action based on statutory immunity under s. 38.1 of the Independent Health Facilities Act and abuse of process.

The respondents cross-appealed the striking of allegations relating to investigations under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeals and the cross-appeal, holding that while s. 38.1 provides immunity for losses resulting from specific regulatory orders, factual findings at trial are required to determine if any claimed losses fall outside this protection.

The abuse of process arguments were also left open for trial.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge and finding the appeal had no merit.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of theft.

On the first count, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on recent possession was reasonable and supported by circumstantial evidence.

On the second count, the Court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that the appellant possessed the stolen items found in an apartment rented by someone else.

Consequently, the appellant's sentence was reduced from three years to two years, plus pre-trial custody credit.

The City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct standard of care and that her findings were supported by the evidence.

The Court also found that the trial judge correctly applied the 'but for' test for causation, noting that causation is a practical question of fact best answered by ordinary common sense.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act against a general contractor and a subcontractor following a workplace fatality.

The trial judge had dismissed the counts on the basis that they were duplicitous and failed to disclose an offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge confused overlapping counts with duplicitous ones, and erred in collapsing the information.

A new trial was ordered on the dismissed counts.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a marketing agreement by unilaterally reassigning four counties from the respondent's territory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the respondent had complied with its obligation to develop the market to the extent possible, that the entire agreement clause governed over prior understandings, and that extrinsic evidence properly identified the nine counties as the respondent's work zones.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to unreliable bookkeeping by a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bookkeeping irrelevant to the fraud finding.

The trial judge was entitled to rely on other witness evidence and the defence's admission that the appellant received the money from the joint venture.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm after police found drugs and a gun in his apartment while he was asleep on the balcony.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed two reversible errors.

First, the trial judge improperly reversed the burden of proof by holding that the appellant was legally deemed to be in possession of the contraband by virtue of his tenancy.

Second, the trial judge improperly devalued the appellant's credibility by misapprehending evidence to find a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and by incorrectly concluding he was fed answers during examination-in-chief.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that the respondent's submission to arbitration was not time-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of the commercial agreement, agreeing that the parties were obliged to attempt to resolve the dispute over information delivery and costs before proceeding to arbitration.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by not treating the admission of a BlackBerry text as late disclosure and by erroneously referring to a witness as an alibi witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the issue was admissibility, not late disclosure, and the trial judge's rejection of the witness's evidence was well-founded.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the risk of harm was not reasonably foreseeable, noting there was evidence to support this conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent municipality, though the court expressed hope that costs would not be requested.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

Multiple appellants challenged jury convictions for two first degree murders and attempted murder arising from a retaliatory gang-related shooting.

The court rejected allegations of unfair trial management, unfair jury instructions, improper admission of prior K.G.B. statements and preliminary inquiry evidence, erroneous refusal of severance, improper admission of intercepted artistic expression, and misdirection on cell phone location evidence.

Applying a threshold reliability analysis informed by Khelawon, the court upheld admission of a key unavailable witness's prior statements.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence application concerning synchronization of 911 and carrier clocks, holding the proposed evidence would not reasonably have affected the verdict given the broader evidentiary record.

The moving party sought leave to appeal his conviction for disobeying a traffic sign, arguing he should have been charged under a more specific provision and that the unilingual English sign was invalid under the French Language Services Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the prosecutor was entitled to proceed under the general provision and that the City of Toronto is not required to have bilingual traffic signs because it has not passed a by-law under section 14 of the French Language Services Act.

The appellant, a physician, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison for the death of his wife, which was caused by multi-drug toxicity from anaesthetics he injected.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay due to unreasonable delay, in her jury instructions on unlawful act manslaughter, motive, and causation, and in sentencing him based on unlawful act manslaughter rather than criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to make independent factual findings consistent with the jury's verdict for sentencing purposes.