John M. Rosen

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal appeal subject to a continuing publication ban, the appellant challenged convictions arising from historical sexual abuse allegations by multiple complainants.

The court held that the jury trial was rendered unfair by the admission of inadmissible hearsay, bad character, extrinsic misconduct, opinion, and some prior consistent statement evidence, together with inadequate limiting and curative instructions.

Although some relationship and narrative evidence was admissible for limited purposes, the charge failed to prohibit propensity reasoning and failed to properly confine the jury’s use of several categories of evidence.

Given that the case turned centrally on credibility and reliability, the errors were not harmless and could not be cured by the proviso.

The appeal from conviction was allowed, the verdicts were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.

The appellant appealed his sentence for participating in a savage beating motivated by an animus towards homeless people.

The trial judge considered the appellant's military status, noting his conduct brought dishonour on the Canadian military.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's consideration of these aggravating factors and held that the sentence was measured and reasonable, appropriately balancing the gravity of the crimes with the appellant's youth, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay serious charges against six police officers due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed the 56-month delay primarily to the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for five of the officers, finding the trial judge erred in attributing the delay to disclosure issues rather than the inherent time requirements of a highly complex case.

A new trial was ordered for those five officers.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the sixth officer, finding the delay in his much simpler case was unreasonable because the Crown unnecessarily insisted his trial follow the complex trial of his co-accused.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter as a secondary participant in a multiple shooting committed by a principal offender.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the elements of secondary participation, the use of after-the-fact conduct, and bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the jury instructions on secondary participation in first degree murder and attempted murder were seriously flawed and failed to articulate the essential elements the prosecution had to prove.

A new trial was ordered for the murder and attempted murder counts, and the sentence for the manslaughter conviction was reduced to 12 years.

The respondent was charged with second degree murder after strangling his wife.

At trial, he raised the defence of provocation, and the jury acquitted him of murder, convicting him of manslaughter.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the defence of provocation had an air of reality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding there was some evidence of wrongful acts and insults by the victim from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably find both the objective and subjective components of provocation were met.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, who were charged with first-degree murder in the death of their infant daughter.

The trial judge stayed the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, largely caused by the failings of the Crown's pathologist.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in including pre-charge delay in his calculation as a remedy for the cremation of the child's remains.

However, the Court upheld the stay, concluding that the post-charge delay of 55 months for one respondent and 42.5 months for the other was unreasonable and severely prejudiced their liberty and security interests.

The appellants were committed to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committals, arguing a denial of natural justice because they were not permitted to make submissions on post-offence conduct evidence.

The reviewing judge found a denial of natural justice but dismissed the application, concluding the appellants suffered no prejudice as committal was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that a reviewing judge has inherent jurisdiction to refuse certiorari where no prejudice occurs, and found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to support the committals.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial for first degree murder.

The preliminary hearing judge had committed the appellant based on the theory that the murder occurred during a sexual assault or unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal found there was no evidence of anal intercourse, as only a trace amount of the deceased's own sperm was found, and no evidence of unlawful confinement.

The appeal was allowed, the committal for first degree murder was quashed, and the appellant was ordered to stand trial for second degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after the elderly victims were stabbed in their sleep.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's motive, opportunity, blood on his track pants, and a confession to an undercover officer.

The trial judge admitted expert evidence from a police officer regarding crime scene reconstruction and criminal profiling.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of the expert evidence, demeanour evidence, and the conduct of Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that while the criminal profiling evidence was inadmissible, the crime scene reconstruction evidence was properly admitted.

The court applied the curative proviso to the profiling evidence, finding the case against the appellant overwhelming, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was justified in noting the difference between the two accused persons, specifically the use of a weapon while prohibited, and increasing the sentence on that account.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, parents of a three-month-old child who died from severe injuries, appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on charges of second degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence indicating which parent caused the fatal injuries or that they acted in concert, and thus they should be discharged or committed only for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inquiry judge correctly concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including exclusive opportunity, motive, and awareness of the child's deteriorating health—upon which a properly instructed jury could find either or both appellants guilty of second degree murder as principals or parties.

The accused was charged with murder.

A third party, the appellant, had allegedly confessed to the murder to his girlfriend and to his lawyers.

The accused brought a McClure application seeking production of the appellant's solicitor-client files to raise a reasonable doubt.

The motions judge granted the application.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal, finding the application was premature.

The accused had not established that the information was unavailable from any other source, as the girlfriend's testimony might be admissible.

Furthermore, it was not yet clear that the accused could not raise a reasonable doubt in any other way.

The appellant was charged with extortion, conspiracy to commit extortion, and threatening death.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the appellant by drawing an inference that he was an innocent dupe who merely facilitated a meeting without knowing its purpose.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the motions judge's decision, holding that the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, which is the province of the trier of fact at trial.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder after raising the defence of insanity at trial.

The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, holding that it could not substitute a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under s. 613(1)(d) of the Criminal Code because there was evidence to support the jury's rejection of the defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 613(1)(a) governs the determination of insanity issues on appeal and that an appellate court should not interfere with a jury's verdict unless it is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.