Gladys I. Pardu

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision awarding sole custody of two children to their father.

The children had resided with the father since 2010 when the Children's Aid Society placed them with him, and the mother had previously agreed to this arrangement in 2012.

At trial, the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported continued residence with the father.

The mother sought to introduce hearsay evidence of statements made by the children and a surreptitious recording, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding this evidence and in awarding sole custody based on the father's alleged inattention to medical needs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the exclusion of the hearsay evidence or the recording, and finding the trial judge's custody determination was thorough, sensitive, and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal costs was refused.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision upholding an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing his motion to appoint private counsel for his two children.

The appellant sought to have private counsel appointed to conduct an investigation into the children's wishes regarding access arrangements, similar to what the Office of the Children's Lawyer would do.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the children had been consulted by OCL counsel two years prior and had indicated no desire for change, that they were well-functioning and not exhibiting behavioral or academic issues, and that appointing counsel would not be in their best interests.

The Superior Court upheld this decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appointment of counsel for children is discretionary under the Family Law Rules and must focus on the best interests of the children, to which deference is owed to the motion judge's assessment.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to defend the respondents in an action arising from an ATV accident.

The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the ATV was not required to be insured as it was being operated on private property and did not fall under the definition of "automobile" in the OAP 1.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the pleadings alleged facts permitting a finding that the respondents were not occupiers of the property at the time of the accident, which was sufficient to trigger the insurer's duty to defend under the policy.

The appellant sought to bring a class action against BP for secondary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act.

The motion judge found that eleven of fourteen alleged misrepresentations were statute-barred under the three-year limitation period in section 138.14 of the Act.

The appellant argued that section 138.3(6), which permits the court to treat multiple misrepresentations as a single misrepresentation, should extend the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 138.3(6) does not modify the event-triggered limitation period and was enacted to limit, not expand, liability.

An engineer employed by an engineering firm acquired shares in the company and sold them back for $891,820 to be paid in ten installments.

After the employee resigned and became CEO of a rival firm, the company refused to make further payments, alleging breach of fiduciary duty through solicitation of employees and use of confidential information.

The employee sued for breach of contract.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no breach of fiduciary duty caused any harm.

The company appealed, arguing that breach of fiduciary duty cases are unsuitable for summary judgment and require a full trial.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that breach of fiduciary duty is not a special category exempt from summary judgment and that no genuine issue for trial existed on the record.

The appellant appealed his eight-month sentence for uttering a death threat to a correctional officer.

The appeal raised the issue of collateral immigration consequences that were not considered at sentencing.

As a landed immigrant, a sentence of six months or more would trigger mandatory deportation without a right of appeal under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's immigration status and the danger opinion process initiated by the Canadian Border Services Agency.

The court reduced the sentence to six months less one day, finding that while collateral immigration consequences are relevant to sentencing, the sentence must remain proportionate to the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision in which the trial judge refused to impose a section 161 Criminal Code prohibition order against a respondent convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The respondent had been found guilty of more than twenty acts of sexual intercourse with his step-daughter over a 2.5-year period when she was between six and eight years old.

The trial judge imposed a 6.5-year sentence but declined the prohibition order, citing concerns about personal liberty.

The appellate court found that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the respondent's continued risk to children and imposed a tailored section 161 prohibition order for 15 years from release.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following an altercation in a correctional facility where he punched the complainant 25 to 30 times in the head.

The sole defence at trial was self-defence.

The trial judge found that the Crown had disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the appellant had launched a pre-emptive attack to maintain his status as the "heavy" rather than in genuine self-defence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the prison context and the "inmate's code." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the prison setting must be considered as a contextual factor, it does not override the Criminal Code's legal definition of self-defence.

Crown appeal of a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge for unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework.

The trial judge found net delay of approximately 32 months after accounting for 56 days of defence delay.

The Court of Appeal identified three fundamental errors in the trial judge's calculation of defence delay: failure to account for 87 days of defence delay in scheduling the preliminary inquiry, failure to account for 84 days of defence delay following a co-accused's adjournment request, and misapprehension of evidence regarding approximately 3.5 months of defence delay related to outstanding discovery.

The Court held that any one of these errors brought the delay under the Jordan ceiling, and cumulatively they brought it well below.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was lifted, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While responding to an emergency at high speed, he drove through a small town at 178 kmph in a 50 kmph zone, passed a construction zone and school, and collided with another vehicle.

Trial counsel conceded the actus reus and causation.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances.

The trial judge found it did, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence but was unsuccessful.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking heroin and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, based on surveillance evidence showing the appellant handing a coffee cup to another individual in a parking lot, which was subsequently found to contain approximately 100 grams of heroin.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider reasonable alternative inferences, including that the cup found in the vehicle might not have been the one exchanged and that the heroin could have been placed in the cup by the driver.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the only logical and reasonable inference was that the cup contained heroin when delivered.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the seven-year sentence, while at the high end, fell within the established range for trafficking such quantities of heroin and contained no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his sentence for flight from police and driving while disqualified.

The sentencing judge imposed a two-year sentence with credit for 283 days of presentence custody on a one-for-one basis, refusing enhanced credit at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating violations of federal statutory release with provincial institutional misconduct.

The court held that the loss of early release eligibility alone generally justifies enhanced credit at 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 142 days.

The respondent, an employee of the National Bank of Canada, developed severe allergic symptoms in April 2010 that she suspected were caused by mould exposure at her workplace.

She ceased working in August 2011 and was not diagnosed with a specific condition until February 2013, when Dr. Patel diagnosed her with a genetic deficiency affecting toxin detoxification and attributed her symptoms to mycotoxin exposure from toxic mould.

The respondent commenced an action in July 2013.

The Bank moved for summary judgment arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the limitation period commenced in February 2013 when the respondent received Dr. Patel's diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 years for attempted murder, along with 1.5 years consecutive on two counts of failure to comply with probation.

The appellant had repeatedly harassed a female acquaintance, was convicted of criminal harassment, and subsequently appeared at her home armed with weapons and homemade bombs.

During a confrontation, he stabbed a family member multiple times, inflicting serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the attempted murder sentence as appropriate and within the sentencing range for such offences, but allowed the appeal in part by making the failure to comply sentences concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the overall sentence from 16.5 years to 16 years before credit for pre-sentence custody.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a family law matter concerning spousal support.

The respondent wife sought full recovery costs of $38,642.47, while the appellant husband sought partial costs of $16,264.29.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent was largely successful on the contested issues on appeal, particularly in resisting the appellant's argument that the application judge erred in awarding spousal support.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated assault but contested the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including the absence of disclosed injuries to the back of her head despite claims of repeated head impacts, inconsistency regarding the number of times she was punched in the face, and her failure to identify the appellant in a photo lineup.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of sexual assault based on the complainant's testimony that the appellant tugged on her pants attempting to pull them down and made demands for money or for her to remove her clothing.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly addressed the weaknesses in the complainant's evidence and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence for criminal harassment, careless use of a firearm, threatening to cause bodily harm, and two breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years and six months, reduced by 18 months to reflect 12 months actual pre-sentence custody.

The appellant challenged the sentencing decision on multiple grounds, including the failure to give additional credit for interim release conditions, the characterization of the firearm use, and post-sentence rehabilitative efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting a landlord-tenant agreement as a complete release of the tenant from liability for fire damage.

The appellants argued the release applied only to the tenant personally but preserved a subrogated claim by the landlord's insurer against the tenant's insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that releasing the tenant precluded any subrogated claim against the tenant's insurer.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on July 6, 2016 by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant pleaded guilty following a ruling dismissing his Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's Charter ruling, which was based on findings of fact.

The appellant raised issues regarding his treatment during arrest and suggested ineffective assistance of counsel, but had not properly pursued such claims.

The court found no basis to conclude the guilty plea was not voluntary and informed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by wounding but acquitted of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where she struck her sister-in-law in the face with a glass during an escalated argument.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdicts were logically inconsistent as a matter of law, since both charges arose from the same conduct and the only contested issue was whether the blow was reflexive or intentional.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for aggravated assault, and entered an acquittal.