Faye E. McWatt

The accused brought a motion under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for alleged breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from charge to the anticipated trial was approximately 31 months, with about 19 months attributed to institutional or mixed institutional delay.

Applying the Morin framework, the court considered the reasons for delay and whether actual or inferred prejudice had been established.

The accused alleged stress, bail restrictions, housing issues, and inability to travel, but the court found these harms were not caused by the delay or were self-inflicted due to failure to seek bail variations.

Given the seriousness of the charges and absence of demonstrated prejudice, the court concluded the delay did not justify a stay.

The offender pleaded guilty to recklessly discharging a firearm, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, and possessing an over-capacity magazine after firing shots in a residential complex.

He brought a Charter challenge arguing the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 244.2(3)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the sentence was not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the offence and the risk to the public.

The offender was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of five years, reduced to two years net after credit for pre-trial custody.

Following convictions for criminal harassment and breaches of probation, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed the offender’s extensive criminal history including numerous sexual offences, violent offences, and repeated breaches of court orders, as well as psychiatric assessments diagnosing schizophrenia, traumatic brain injury, paraphilias, and substance abuse disorders.

Expert evidence established a high risk of future sexual violence and persistent failure to restrain behaviour.

The court concluded the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met under both s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii).

The offender failed to establish that community management would adequately protect the public, and the court imposed a penitentiary sentence followed by long‑term supervision.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender for a psychiatric assessment to determine whether a dangerous offender or long‑term offender application should proceed.

The offender had been convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and two counts of discharging a firearm with intent.

The court reviewed the offender’s extensive criminal record, including numerous firearm, drug trafficking, and breach offences, and considered the low threshold for ordering an assessment.

Finding reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be designated a dangerous offender due to a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour involving firearms and drug trafficking, the court ordered the assessment.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding his alcohol consumption and in finding that the roadside screening demand was made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also held that the 13-minute delay for the arrival of the screening device was reasonable, and even if a section 10(b) Charter breach occurred, the breath sample evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2).

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed under the Securities Act for unregistered trading, trading without a prospectus, and breaching prohibition orders.

The sentencing judge had imposed an 18‑month sentence to run concurrently with a 27‑month sentence the respondent was already serving for separate securities offences involving a different company.

The Crown argued that the concurrent sentence undermined deterrence and failed to reflect that the offences arose from separate schemes occurring at different times with different victims.

The Superior Court held that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately consider the distinct nature of the schemes and the respondent’s repeated breaches of prohibition orders.

The court concluded that the totality principle did not render a 45‑month total sentence disproportionate and ordered the 18‑month term to be served consecutively.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after a trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter and excluded breathalyzer evidence obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) fail.

The trial judge concluded the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because he was unfamiliar with certain ASD error codes.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test by failing to properly assess the objective component of reasonable and probable grounds and by speculating about the reliability of the device without supporting evidence.

The court held that an officer may reasonably rely on an ASD fail where the officer reasonably believes the device is functioning properly and there is no evidence of unreliability.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample under the Criminal Code.

He argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding impairment, failed to explain the mens rea for the refusal offence, and failed to apply the “last chance” doctrine.

The Superior Court held that although the trial judge’s reasons were brief, they were sufficient when read in light of the record and allowed for meaningful appellate review.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded that the trial judge properly found that the appellant deliberately obstructed the breath testing process.

The “last chance” doctrine did not apply because the appellant never attempted to comply with the breath demand.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions and 30-day sentence for assault and sexual assault committed during a roadside stop.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, misapprehended evidence, and provided after-the-fact justification for the convictions by releasing reasons five months later.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable error in the delay calculation or credibility findings, and no evidence rebutting the presumption that the reasons reflected the trial judge's actual reasoning.

The sentence appeal was granted in part, upholding the 30-day jail term but varying it to be served intermittently on weekends.

Following conviction for criminal harassment and multiple breaches of probation, the Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for an assessment to determine whether the offender should be designated a dangerous offender or long‑term offender.

The respondent argued that the predicate offence was not a serious personal injury offence because no physical violence occurred.

The court held that the circumstances of the harassment — including threatening sexual conduct and pursuit of the complainant — constituted conduct likely to inflict severe psychological damage under s. 752(a)(ii).

Given the offender’s extensive criminal record, including numerous violent, sexual, and breach-related convictions, the court found reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found to be a dangerous or long‑term offender.

The application for a 60‑day assessment was granted.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge failed to properly consider the objective component of the reasonable suspicion standard required for an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court held that it was not necessary for the trial judge to explicitly articulate the legal test so long as the reasons demonstrated that the relevant factors were objectively weighed.

The evidence, including the odour of alcohol from the driver’s breath, the accused being the sole occupant of the vehicle, unusual behaviour during the stop, and the officer’s experience, provided sufficient grounds to support the demand.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt on two counts of indecent act.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly reversed the burden of proof by failing to require the Crown to disprove the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, and improperly drew an adverse inference from the rejected alibi.

The appeal judge found no error regarding the burden of proof, but held that the trial judge erred by treating disbelief of the alibi as evidence of guilt without proof of deliberate fabrication.

Because the counts were factually intertwined and the adverse inference undermined the assessment of credibility, the error tainted both verdicts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and improperly applied the credibility framework from R. v. W.D. The appeal court reviewed the record and found the trial was straightforward, with credibility as the central issue.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s theory that the complainants fabricated allegations to interfere with a firearms licence appeal and found the appellant’s testimony not credible.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the W.D. framework and provided reasons grounded in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a criminal sentencing decision following trial convictions under ss. 5(2) and 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court addressed large-scale production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA, methamphetamine, and ketamine from a clandestine laboratory.

The evidence established a high-capacity operation with significant public-safety and health risks, including deceptive marketing of tablets containing highly addictive methamphetamine.

The court treated denunciation and general deterrence as paramount, relying on comparator jurisprudence and the seriousness of domestic synthetic-drug production.

Applying aggravating and mitigating factors individually, the court imposed lengthy penitentiary terms on all three offenders, with concurrent sentences on each count and ancillary DNA and firearms-prohibition orders.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry ruling that discharged the accused on a charge of first degree murder while committing one accused on second degree murder and the other on accessory after the fact.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by weighing evidence, preferring defence-favourable inferences, and failing to consider the evidence as a whole under s. 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court found the preliminary inquiry judge improperly assessed competing inferences and failed to recognize that the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting planning and deliberation.

Evidence including the shooter’s approach, the execution-style killing, the presence of a getaway driver, and post-offence conduct could reasonably support committal for first degree murder.

The discharge order was quashed and the matter remitted with directions to commit both accused for trial on first degree murder.

A self-represented applicant sought costs against a provincial court judge personally after successfully obtaining relief relating to the judge’s refusal to remove him as counsel during a criminal trial.

The Superior Court considered whether costs could be awarded against the judge and whether the Crown should receive costs against the applicant.

The court held that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity under s. 82 of the Courts of Justice Act, barring any costs award against the judge.

The court also declined to award costs to the Crown against the applicant despite concerns about the merit of the motion.

Both costs requests were dismissed.