Faye E. McWatt

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated February 10, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent law firm for unpaid legal fees.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred regarding service of the claim, full and frank disclosure, and the application of the test for setting aside default judgments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that service was properly effected under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the appellants failed to establish a plausible excuse for not defending the claim or an air of reality to any defence on the merits.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The defendants appealed the certification of a class action claiming intrusion upon seclusion following a massive data breach by third-party hackers.

The certification judge had allowed the claim to proceed, finding it was not plain and obvious that the novel claim would fail.

The Divisional Court majority allowed the appeal and set aside the certification of the intrusion upon seclusion claim, holding that the tort requires an actual intrusion by the defendant, not merely a failure to prevent an intrusion by others.

The plaintiffs' economic interests were adequately protected by the tort of negligence.

The applicant, a family health team, sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's decision to terminate its funding agreement without cause.

The applicant alleged the termination was made in bad faith to cover up fraud by the applicant's former board of directors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to terminate the funding agreement was a private law contractual matter not subject to judicial review.

The court applied the Air Canada factors and concluded the decision lacked a sufficient public character.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence to support the applicant's allegations of bad faith or improper purpose by the Minister.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision finding it breached the collective agreement by permitting a third-party hotel to use non-union workers for stage events.

The employer argued the arbitrator unreasonably extended the union's jurisdiction beyond theatrical events and misconstrued the prohibition on contracting out.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement, including the use of extrinsic evidence and the broad interpretation of the word 'permit', was internally coherent, logical, and reasonable.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs of $5,000 payable forthwith to the responding party.

The moving party, the defendant, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Koehnen J. dated March 1, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs fixed at $5,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Conlan J. dated November 27, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs fixed at $5,000.

The insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision regarding attendant care benefits for a catastrophically injured insured.

The issue was whether, for accidents occurring before June 3, 2019, the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) payable for attendant care services was included within the $6,000 monthly and $1,000,000 total maximum limits under section 19 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, or payable in addition.

The Divisional Court held that the language of section 19 is unambiguous and that HST must be paid as part of the attendant care benefit, subject to the maximum limits.

The appeal was allowed and the LAT decision was set aside.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated December 17, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The moving party, AXA Insurance Canada, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Roger J. dated January 20, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a costs award.

The motion was heard in writing and dismissed without costs.

The applicant brought an application which was heard on an expedited schedule.

The Divisional Court issued a brief endorsement dismissing the application with no order as to costs, noting that full reasons would follow in due course.

The applicant sought to quash a permit issued by the conservation authority to the respondent town for work on a beach, which was scheduled before the return of the Piping Plover.

The Divisional Court issued a bottom-line endorsement granting the application in part, quashing the permit, and remitting the matter back to the conservation authority.

The balance of the application was dismissed, with full reasons to follow.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal and a motion to stay the decision of Sweeny R.S.J. The Divisional Court directed the moving parties to file their materials electronically and advised that motions for leave to appeal are considered in writing under Rule 62.02.

After reviewing the moving parties' materials without requiring responding materials, the panel dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, rendering the motion for a stay moot.

No costs were ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents on charges of failing to provide necessaries of life and forcible confinement of their four-year-old child.

The trial judge erred by requiring proof of actual risk of harm for the necessaries charge under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, and by not considering the egregious conditions of confinement for the forcible confinement charge.

The appeal court found that a sanitary environment is a necessary of life and the child was in necessitous circumstances, overturning the acquittal on necessaries.

For forcible confinement, the court held that the parents' authority to confine ceases when conduct is abusive or harmful, remitting this charge for a new trial.

The applicant sought a bail review under section 520(1) of the Criminal Code, requesting vacation of a prior detention order.

The application was based on two alleged material changes in circumstances: a new release plan with different sureties (uncle and aunt) and the prevalence of COVID-19 in society and jails.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither the new release plan nor the COVID-19 pandemic, without specific medical evidence for the applicant, constituted a material change sufficient to warrant release on secondary or tertiary grounds.

The court emphasized the escalating gravity of the alleged firearm and drug offences and the applicant's history of breaching bail conditions.

The defendant, Philip Grandine, was sentenced for manslaughter after administering lorazepam to his pregnant wife, Karissa Grandine, who subsequently drowned in a bathtub.

The court found the defendant's actions were planned and premeditated, motivated by a desire for freedom from his marriage to pursue an affair and pornography, and constituted a deceptive and effective assault.

Despite the absence of extreme physical violence, the court emphasized the domestic violence, vulnerability of the victim (who was also pregnant), and breach of trust as aggravating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 years in penitentiary, less 37 months for pre-trial custody and house arrest, resulting in a further 11 years and 11 months to be served.