Faye E. McWatt

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The applicant argued the changes violated sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter and relied on a recent coordinate court decision that found the repeal of peremptory challenges unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding the coordinate decision was plainly wrong and therefore not binding.

The court held that the amendments are constitutional and operate retrospectively.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after his pregnant wife drowned in a bathtub.

Because the jury's route to the verdict was ambiguous, the court was required to make findings of fact for sentencing.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused surreptitiously administered lorazepam to his wife to incapacitate her, allowing him to pursue an extramarital affair and access pornography.

The court rejected the defence theory that the victim knowingly took the drug, concluding the accused's actions directly contributed to her incapacitation and death.

The defendant, Dale Lapps, brought an application to resile from an admission made by his counsel regarding the admissibility of his trucking logs in his third trial for importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the admission was binding under section 655 of the Criminal Code and professional conduct rules.

The court found that an application was necessary to withdraw an admission and that such withdrawal is only permitted in narrow circumstances, such as mistake or misunderstanding, which were not demonstrated by the applicant.

The application was dismissed, and the admission stood.

Domenico Scopelliti was found guilty of manslaughter for shooting his father-in-law, Rocco Zito.

The jury found provocation, reducing the charge from first-degree murder.

The Crown sought an 11-year sentence, while the defence requested 7 years, with the accepted range being 8 to 12 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence due to the use of a firearm and the defendant's involvement in organized crime activities, despite mitigating factors like no prior criminal record and expressed remorse.

The court imposed a 10-year sentence, reduced by pre-trial custody.

At the close of the Crown's case in a first degree murder trial, the accused brought applications for a directed verdict.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone records, and motive, to establish that the accused planned and carried out the shooting.

Applying the test from Arcuri, the court found that the Crown's evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

The applications for a directed verdict were dismissed.

Sentencing for prolonged sexual abuse by a father against his daughter, including sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, incest, and a separate child pornography possession offence.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society were the primary sentencing objectives given the extreme breach of trust, prolonged grooming, repeated intercourse, and devastating harm to the child.

The offender's guilty plea and lack of prior record were mitigating, but did not outweigh the gravity of the conduct.

A total sentence of eight years' imprisonment was imposed, with 1.5-to-1 credit for pre-trial custody leaving four years to serve, together with extensive ancillary orders.

Following convictions for luring, making, possessing, and accessing child pornography, and for sexual exploitation arising from a basketball coach's grooming of teenage players, the offender brought a constitutional challenge to multiple mandatory minimum sentences.

Applying the s. 12 framework from Nur, the court held that the one-year mandatory minimum for luring had already been invalidated by appellate authority and that the one-year mandatory minimum for sexual exploitation was grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable cases.

The court rejected the challenge to the one-year minimum for making child pornography and the six-month minimums for possession and access, finding those punishments not grossly disproportionate either for the offender or the proposed hypotheticals.

The application was therefore allowed in part, with sentencing reasons to follow.

The applicant, O.M., sought to sever counts on a single indictment relating to two different complainants, Ms. D.K. and Ms. J.M., alleging various violent and sexual offences.

The court granted the severance motion, finding no factual or legal nexus between the sets of allegations, which were separated by five years.

The judge noted the risk of cross-pollination of credibility assessments and propensity reasoning if the charges were tried together, concluding that severance was required in the interests of justice despite limiting jury instructions.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

However, the accused had left Canada for over 10 months before being arrested.

The court held that the pre-arrest period did not engage s. 11(b) interests as the accused was unaware of the charges, or alternatively, it constituted a discrete event exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the accused failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness due to defence delay, including allowing his Legal Aid certificate to lapse.

The application was dismissed.

This is a costs ruling following motions where the respondent's motion to change an order was unsuccessful, and the applicant's motion to impute income and change child and spousal support was successful.

The City of Toronto also participated due to an assignment of arrears.

The court awarded the City of Toronto $5,000 in costs and the applicant $20,000 plus HST and disbursements for her solicitor's fees, and $2,000 plus HST and disbursements for her self-represented preparation time, finding the respondent's conduct unreasonable, particularly regarding financial disclosure and disregard for court orders.

The defendant, Justin Wallace, brought two motions during his criminal trial.

The first sought a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter due to lost preliminary inquiry evidence (cross-examination transcript of a complainant).

The second sought to exclude a BB gun under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and delayed right to counsel.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no actual prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence regarding the lost evidence, and no Charter breaches regarding the detention and search, accepting the officers' credibility over the defendant's.

This is a costs ruling following a trial where the respondent was entirely successful.

The applicant, who was self-represented, failed to provide costs submissions.

The court found the applicant's conduct throughout the proceedings to be unreasonable, including denying access to the parties' child without cause, making unreasonable demands in her draft order, and ignoring court orders.

The respondent, conversely, acted reasonably and made two offers to settle that were more favorable than the final trial order.

Despite the applicant's self-representation, her unreasonable behaviour necessitated the trial and warranted a costs award.

The respondent was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Sentencing following convictions for four counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference arising from incidents involving three male complainants over a nine-year period in the modelling industry.

The court held that, under the version of s. 742.1 then in force, conditional sentences were unavailable for the two sexual assault counts involving the adult complainant because sexual assault was a serious personal injury offence as defined in s. 752.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence against the offender's lack of record, community support, medical issues, publicity-related consequences, and the age of the offences, the court imposed a six-month conditional sentence on one count, concurrent 18-month conditional sentences on two further counts, and a concurrent 30-day intermittent custodial sentence with two days' credit on the remaining two counts.

DNA, firearms prohibition, and SOIRA orders were also made.

Criminal trial concerning a basketball coach charged with multiple child pornography and sexual exploitation offences arising from text-message communications with underage players.

The court held that explicit photos and videos of a complainant's penis and masturbation were child pornography under s. 163.1, applying the objective approach in Sharpe, and rejected the accused's position that the exchanges were merely jokes or locker-room talk.

The court further found that the accused occupied a position of trust or authority over one complainant and that the private use exception was unavailable because the sexual activity was unlawful notwithstanding apparent consent.

Acquittals were entered on counts where age or statutory elements were not proved, but convictions were entered on multiple communicating, making, possession, access, invitation to sexual touching, and attempt counts.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict trial over the custody of their three-year-old son.

The mother sought sole custody, while the father sought the same, alleging the mother was manipulative, alienated the children from their fathers, and fabricated criminal assault charges against him.

The court found the mother lacked credibility, repeatedly breached court orders, and acted contrary to the child's best interests.

Relying on evidence from the mother's own family members and the father of her older child, including surreptitiously recorded conversations, the court awarded sole custody to the father and granted the mother specified access.

The United States sought the extradition of Jianghong Wang for prosecution of sexual assault.

The respondent conceded identification and the sufficiency of evidence for the Canadian equivalent offence but argued the identification evidence was unreliable and insufficient for committal.

The court, applying the limited screening function of an extradition judge, found that the identification evidence, including multiple complainants identifying the respondent from news reports and consistent assault patterns, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for committal.

The application for extradition was granted.

The defendant, Michael Campbell, challenged the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the 'misconduct exception' which limits pre-sentence custody credit to a 1:1 ratio when an offender is denied bail under section 524(4) or (8).

The court found this provision to be overbroad and in violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, declaring it of no force and effect.

Consequently, the defendant was granted enhanced pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with additional credit for harsh institutional conditions and successful house arrest.

The court then proceeded to sentence the defendant for exercising control over a prostitute and possessing a prohibited firearm, imposing a total sentence of 45 months imprisonment, reduced by the enhanced pre-trial credit, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a Charter challenge against s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for serious personal injury offences.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 (overbreadth) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provision was rationally connected to its purpose of denunciation and deterrence, and did not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on the applicant or reasonably hypothetical offenders.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.