David M. Paciocco

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of human trafficking, procuring a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, and advertising sexual services for consideration.

The trial judge misdirected the jury on the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing these offences.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by: (1) instructing the jury to read the disjunctive conduct elements conjunctively, requiring proof of near-total control over the complainant's movements; (2) failing to distinguish between "direction" and "influence" as different degrees of coercion; and (3) improperly extending the immunity provision for advertising one's own sexual services to those who assist in such advertising.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, TD Home and Auto Insurance Company, appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action against the vehicle owner and granting a rule 21 motion determining that a passenger was not entitled to indemnity under the owner's insurance policy.

The passenger had seized control of the vehicle's steering wheel during an argument, causing a collision that injured one of the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the rule 20 appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the vehicle owner was not negligent and was not vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act because the passenger took control of the vehicle without consent.

However, the Court allowed the rule 21 appeal, setting aside the determination regarding insurance coverage due to insufficient reasoning and procedural defects.

The Court reduced the costs award accordingly.

The respondents brought a motion to quash an appeal from orders dissolving an interlocutory injunction and dismissing a contempt motion.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the orders were interlocutory in nature and therefore the proper appeal route was by leave to the Divisional Court, not direct appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Costs were awarded to the moving party.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice denying leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that while there is limited authority to review a decision denying leave to appeal to the Divisional Court, that authority lies with the Divisional Court, not with the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court declined to award costs, noting that the respondent had supported hearing the appeal and the offer made was relevant to the merits of the underlying issues rather than to costs.

The appellant, a law professor with expertise in constitutional law and national security, appealed a decision denying him public interest standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 12 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act.

Section 12 prevents Parliamentary privilege from being invoked if a member of the Committee is prosecuted for disclosing protected information.

The application judge had denied standing without addressing the merits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in principle by requiring factual context and diversity of viewpoints for a pure question of constitutional law regarding Parliament's competence to abridge Parliamentary privilege without constitutional amendment.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion for a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend him against his daughter's negligent parenting claim.

The appellant was an occupant of a vehicle driven by an impaired driver at the time of the alleged injury.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not covered under the automobile insurance policy because his liability did not arise from the use or operation of the automobile, but rather from his parenting decisions.

The plain language of section 239(1)(a) of the Insurance Act requires that an occupant's liability must arise from the use or operation of the automobile to be covered.

The applicant sought to set aside a decision denying him an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision from 2010, which had substantially denied his appeal from support, equalization payments, and associated costs orders made after a Superior Court trial in 2008.

The applicant also sought additional relief including extensions to file leaves to appeal and notices of appeal relating to interim support orders, as well as orders for production and use of transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the lower court's decision and clarifying that the applicant's proper remedy for changed financial circumstances lies in an application for variation or termination of support obligations.

The appellant was convicted on 42 counts of possession of stolen property and fraud following a trial before a judge alone.

The trial judge used evidence from multiple counts as similar fact evidence to support findings of knowledge and intent, without any request from the Crown to do so.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying similar fact evidence without a Crown request and without conducting a proper admissibility inquiry.

The court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible and requires an onus on the Crown to satisfy the trial judge that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

This decision addresses the allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities following the Court of Appeal's allowance of an appeal in a family law matter.

The court was asked to determine the specific terms of a parallel parenting arrangement between separated parents regarding their six-year-old child.

The court rejected the mother's request for fresh evidence, finding sufficient information from the appeal record.

The court adopted a modified parenting schedule that balances the child's need for meaningful contact with both parents while minimizing school commuting time during the week.

The appellant developer appealed two summary judgments ordering the return of deposits paid for commercial and residential condominium units in a development.

The respondents had sought to rescind the purchase agreements based on material changes to the development disclosed in revised disclosure statements.

After the developer's financial difficulties led to receivership, the receiver conveyed the units to a third party, making performance impossible.

The motion judge found the agreements were terminated through no fault of the purchasers and ordered return of deposits with interest.

The appellate court upheld both judgments, finding the purchasers had not breached the agreements and were entitled to relief under the contractual termination provisions.

The appellant sought to set aside an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The appellant was a fully informed participant in the settlement, acting on legal advice, and knowingly entered into the settlement structured in the manner challenged on appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no illegality or impropriety in the enforcement of the settlement and upheld the motion judge's decision to enforce it.

The court also upheld the costs award made by the motion judge.

Two consolidated actions were brought by food industry companies and related parties against their commercial insurer following losses arising from an Indian meal moth infestation.

The first action sought indemnification for lost rental income and a bonus allegedly owed to the principal owner.

The second action sought indemnification for alleged theft of equipment and assets by a court-appointed receiver, resulting in business interruption losses.

The trial judge dismissed the first action entirely, finding the losses were indirect and not covered by the policy.

In the second action, the trial judge dismissed the property claim as time-barred but allowed the business interruption claim to proceed in part by applying a rolling limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the first action and reversed the trial judge's application of a rolling limitation period to the business interruption claim, finding that the insurer's obligation to indemnify was not a recurring contractual obligation.

Both actions were dismissed in their entirety.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for six offences committed during a shooting incident in Hamilton.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of five years imprisonment before pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed material legal errors: (1) improperly reducing the sentence based on time served for related but distinct Thunder Bay offences; (2) imposing a concurrent rather than consecutive sentence for possession of a firearm while prohibited; and (3) considering irrelevant mitigating factors.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of seven years for the discharging offence and one year consecutive for the firearm prohibition offence, resulting in a total sentence of eight years imprisonment.

This is an addendum to the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside a summary judgment granted to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought clarification regarding the treatment of costs awarded in the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the costs of the summary judgment motion be payable in the cause of the action, as the action between the plaintiff and respondents was ordered to proceed.

The Crown appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board regarding a respondent found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for violent offences committed at a Canadian Forces recruiting centre.

The respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

The Board ordered detention on a secure forensic unit but granted limited indirectly supervised privileges to attend a local college for educational purposes within a two-kilometre radius of the hospital.

The Crown challenged both the indirect supervision privilege and the Board's failure to prohibit all contact with uniformed military personnel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the Board did not err in law and its disposition was reasonable.

The respondent brought a claim for damages arising from the denial of payment under a life insurance policy.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion for summary dismissal based on lack of capacity and granted the respondent standing to bring the action notwithstanding his prior bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed, disputing whether the motion judge's order was made pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or inherent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the order was made pursuant to inherent jurisdiction as it was a civil action for damages brought years after discharge from bankruptcy, not a bankruptcy proceeding.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and possessing proceeds of crime for allegedly misappropriating $530,788 from her former employer between 2007 and 2012 through unauthorized cheques, fraudulent payroll entries, and unauthorized credit card charges.

She appealed on three grounds: (1) the application judge erred in denying her Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel; (2) the trial was rendered unfair by Crown misconduct; and (3) the trial judge erred in refusing to hear her Charter s. 11(b) application on procedural grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds but allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge's refusal to hear the s. 11(b) application was unreasonable.

Appeal from a motion judge's decision in a family law proceeding.

The appellant sought joint custody of one child, payment from trust funds for real estate commission and legal fees, and reimbursement for utility costs and repairs.

The respondent sought sole custody, child support, and reimbursement for university expenses.

The motion judge granted the respondent's custody claim on consent, awarded child support and section 7 expenses, limited the real estate commission, and found she lacked jurisdiction over repairs, utilities, and household contents as these pertained to a prior equalization order.

The motion judge awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed, challenging the motion judge's jurisdiction and factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly determined her jurisdiction and that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence.

The court declined to reconsider the motion judge's factual findings and costs award.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment order finding them liable for breach of contractual warranty and/or negligent representation arising from an inaccurate tree inventory attached to an Asset Purchase Agreement for the sale of tree farm assets.

The respondents claimed a shortfall of 83,106 saleable trees from the represented inventory of 236,341 trees.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the liability finding, holding that the tree inventory was not a contractual representation or warranty but rather a description of purchased assets.

The court found that the respondents had expressly agreed through due diligence inspection provisions that they had satisfied themselves as to the quantity and quality of plant material, precluding subsequent claims of misrepresentation.

The parties settled the appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed with costs payable by the appellants in the all-inclusive sum of $6,500.