David E. Harris

The defendant, P.N., was accused of seven counts including assault, mischief, threatening death, and sexual assault by his ex-girlfriend.

The court found significant issues with the complainant's credibility and reliability, including shifting testimony, a strong motive to fabricate allegations due to the defendant's deception about his marriage, and the perjury of a key Crown witness (the complainant's roommate).

The complainant's account of the sexual assault was deemed unlikely and lacking detail.

The defendant was found not guilty on all counts due to the Crown's failure to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, Bardott Walters, was charged with three counts of assault against her two daughters and husband.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainants' testimony, noting a strong motive to fabricate due to ongoing acrimonious family law proceedings and evidence of collusion among the complainants.

The Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal on all counts.

This ruling addresses the voluntariness of statements made by Malik Essue, who is charged with first-degree murder, to police.

The central issue was the police's failure to provide a proper primary caution and their use of trickery during the interview.

The court found that Essue was a suspect in law, despite police assertions to the contrary, and that the partial caution given was inadequate.

The police also failed to inform Essue that the interview was being recorded and falsely told him he was not a suspect.

The court concluded that the police's deliberate omissions and deception undermined the fairness of the statement-taking process and Essue's ability to make a meaningful choice.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and Essue's statement was ruled inadmissible at trial.

The accused, Nathaniel Dillon, was charged with assault, forcible confinement, threatening bodily harm, and sexual assault against his then-girlfriend, ZK.

This judgment specifically addresses the assault and sexual assault counts.

The court admitted prior discreditable conduct evidence to demonstrate the accused's control and coercion over the complainant.

The complainant's testimony, supported by photographic evidence of bruising, was found credible despite inconsistencies regarding her movements during the incident and delayed reporting, as these were understood within the context of an intimate partner relationship and the psychological realities of abuse.

The court found that the complainant did not consent to the sexual acts, which were performed out of fear of further harm, and rejected arguments of implied consent or honest belief in consent.

During the execution of a search warrant at a residence, the applicant, a Black man who was not the target of the warrant, was ordered to the ground and handcuffed by tactical officers pursuant to a general police policy.

He was subsequently arrested for drug possession by another officer who mistakenly believed he was already under arrest and who lacked objective reasonable grounds.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude the seized fentanyl under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found flagrant violations of the applicant's s. 9 and s. 10(b) rights, noting the systemic issues and the heightened impact of the breaches on a racialized individual in his own home.

The evidence was excluded.

The Crown applied to admit non-expert recognition evidence from a high school principal identifying the respondent in a surveillance video recorded days before a first-degree murder.

The respondent objected, arguing the video quality was poor and the police identification procedure was suggestive.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence admissible, finding that the principal's extensive prior familiarity with the respondent provided a strong foundation for the identification, which outweighed the procedural flaws and put the jury in a better position to assess the evidence.

During a jury trial for importing cocaine, the accused raised the defence of duress, testifying she and her son were forced at gunpoint to carry the drugs.

In cross-examination, the Crown suggested an alternate theory that the accused initially agreed to carry the drugs voluntarily but was only coerced when the perpetrators forced her son to participate.

The accused denied this.

The court ruled that the Crown could not advance this alternate theory to the jury, finding it lacked an air of reality and was purely speculative, as there was no direct or circumstantial evidence to support it.

The applicant, Mathew Cohen, sought a stay of proceedings under Section 24(1) of the Charter as a remedy for unreasonable delay under Section 11(b).

The total delay was 63 months.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, subtracting defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the defence's prolonged pursuit of disclosure regarding a police officer's notes was futile and attributed some delay to the defence.

The court also determined that the pandemic's impact on court operations constituted a significant and long-lasting discrete exceptional circumstance, extending beyond the defence's concession.

Ultimately, the net delay was calculated at just over 25 months, which is below the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, having been convicted of importing cocaine and awaiting sentencing, brought an application to vary his bail conditions to permit him to travel to Spain with his son.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant posed a flight risk given the likelihood of a lengthy penitentiary sentence, and that permitting international travel for a convicted drug importer would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant challenged the police stop and subsequent search of his SUV on Charter grounds (sections 8 and 9), arguing arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A loaded handgun and fentanyl were found.

The applicant alleged police officers falsified notes and testimony regarding the reason for the stop (burnt-out headlight vs. prior BOLO) and the observation of cannabis in plain view.

The court found the police evidence untrustworthy, concluding the stop was based on stale BOLO information, not a burnt-out headlight, and the cannabis observations were inconsistent and unreliable.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), emphasizing the seriousness of wilful Charter violations and testimonial dishonesty.

The court also commented on the police's failure to record interactions when attempting to enlist the applicant as a confidential informant, recommending a procedure for such records.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and the accused, who presented starkly different accounts of the sexual encounter.

The complainant testified to non-consensual acts, while the accused maintained all activity was consensual.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness on the central issue of non-consent, despite some memory issues.

However, the court determined that the accused's evidence, while not positively believed, could not be safely rejected and raised a reasonable doubt regarding the essential element of lack of consent.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Brandon Drakes-Simon and Jason Williams for attempt murder, following their conviction for first-degree murder of the same victim.

The attempt murder involved a planned shooting on a highway.

The court identified several aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, possession of multiple illegal guns, Drakes-Simon's prior gun convictions, extreme recklessness endangering others, and a judicial finding that the crime was a contract killing.

Mitigating factors for Williams included his lack of a prior criminal record and strong family support.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 16 years for Drakes-Simon and 11 years for Williams, both running concurrently with their life sentences for first-degree murder.

This was an uncontested family law trial addressing parenting, child support, and equalization.

The applicant father sought sole decision-making authority and primary custody, citing concerns about the respondent mother's strict adherence to the Brahma Kumaris organization and its perceived negative impact on their son's development, as well as her stated intention to leave the country for an extended period.

The court granted the father final decision-making authority and primary custody, finding the mother's beliefs concerning and her planned absence fortifying this decision.

The court declined to impute income to the mother for child support, concluding she was genuinely unable to work due to mental health reasons.

An equalization payment was ordered in favour of the father, to be paid from the mother's share of the matrimonial home proceeds upon sale, despite her non-disclosure.

The court ruled on the voluntariness of a statement made by the accused, David Scott, to police after his arrest for importing child pornography.

The statement was found inadmissible because the interviewing officer improperly induced the accused by insinuating that cooperation would positively impact his bail release, creating a false dichotomy between confessing and securing liberty.

The court emphasized that such a threat, especially when false, compromises the detainee's free choice to remain silent.

The accused, Jude Egwu, was arrested for sexual assault and gave a statement to police after invoking his right to counsel.

His lawyer, a casual friend practicing family and immigration law, provided no legal advice regarding his right to silence or self-incrimination.

A blended voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of the statement.

The court found that while the police complied with s. 10(b) Charter, the lawyer's complete failure to provide advice, coupled with the accused's lack of comprehension of the primary police caution, created a fundamental unfairness in the interrogation process.

Although not a Charter violation attributable to the state, the court exercised its common law power under s. 24(1) of the Charter to exclude the portion of the accused's statement where he became evasive and conspicuously dodged questions about having sex with the complainant, as its admission would infect the appearance of a fair trial.

Ashir Mahmood was found guilty by a jury of sexually assaulting C.A. The court, in its sentencing reasons, made a finding of penetration for sentencing purposes under section 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

Aggravating factors included the brazen nature of the assault on a sleeping victim, the lack of condom use causing additional trauma, and a breach of trust.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, the offender's relative youth at the time of the offence, family support, and a significant pre-sentence delay of almost five years.

The court noted the offender's substance abuse and mental health issues but found they did not diminish responsibility for the offence.

The judge imposed a sentence of three years incarceration, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, and made strong recommendations for mental health and addiction treatment during custody.

David Scott was found guilty of possession and importation of child pornography.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court addressed the Kienapple principle, finding that the possession count should be conditionally stayed as it arose from the same delict as importation.

The court then determined that a sentence of two years less a day was within the appropriate range.

Crucially, the court held that the one-year mandatory minimum sentence for importing child pornography under section 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code violated Section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was of no force or effect, thereby allowing for a conditional sentence.

Considering mitigating factors such as the offender's age, first-offender status, remorse, family support, and the impact of Charter breaches by law enforcement, the court imposed a 23-month conditional sentence with strict conditions, along with ancillary orders including DNA analysis, SOIRA registration, forfeiture of devices, and a 20-year Section 161 order.

A.G. was found guilty of five criminal charges, including assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement against D.H. The court considered aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence, breach of trust, and the severe impact on the victim, balanced against mitigating factors including the offender's youth, first-offender status, and significant delay in sentencing.

The Crown sought 7 years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years for the September 2017 offences and two months consecutive for an August 2017 assault, totaling five years and two months, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence due to the seriousness of the crimes.

The appellant landlord appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for property damage against former tenants for lack of jurisdiction.

The tenants had vacated the property on July 31, 2021.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that under the amended Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, the Landlord and Tenant Board does not have jurisdiction over claims where the tenant vacated before September 21, 2021.

Therefore, the Small Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

The matter was remanded to the Small Claims Court.

The Crown applied to admit three categories of discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Brandon Drakes-Simon and Justin Malcolm, in a first-degree murder trial: Drakes-Simon's acquisition of a firearm, his expressed intention to deal with legal bills, and evidence that he was seeking additional "contract killing" work.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling all three categories of evidence inadmissible.

The judge found the evidence to have negligible probative value due to its general nature and to be overwhelmingly prejudicial, particularly as it amounted to forbidden bad character reasoning.