David E. Harris

The defendants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision sets their parole ineligibility periods.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a semi-automatic assault rifle, the public nature of the killing, elements of planning, and the criminal record of one offender, as well as prior criminal conduct involving the same firearm.

Mitigating factors included youth and difficult upbringing for one offender, and being a first offender for the other.

The court also addressed the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct under Section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the weight to be given to jury recommendations.

Parole ineligibility was set at 16 years for Shamar Meredith and 12 years for Thulani Chizanga.

The defendants brought a motion under Ontario's Anti-SLAPP legislation to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiffs.

The action stemmed from "vicious" online reviews posted by the defendants about the plaintiffs' plumbing business and its principal.

The court determined that the online reviews constituted "expression" on a "matter of public interest." While the plaintiffs' defamation claim was found to have substantial merit and no valid defence, the court ultimately dismissed the action.

It concluded that the minimal harm suffered by the plaintiffs did not outweigh the significant public interest in protecting freedom of expression, even when the expression was offensive and vitriolic.

The court also clarified that the plaintiffs had not properly pleaded the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff obtained default judgment against the corporate defendant and two officers.

One officer, Daniel Brewer, moved to set aside the default judgment against him, arguing he had no actual notice of the proceedings after selling his shares and his counsel's subsequent withdrawal.

The court found that Brewer did not receive notice of crucial steps in the litigation due to an incorrect address used by his former counsel, and that his reliance on counsel and a co-defendant's assurance was reasonable.

The absence of actual notice, not due to Brewer's fault, was deemed a fundamental procedural flaw.

The motion to set aside the default judgment and related orders against Brewer was allowed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to compel the Crown to disclose details regarding police "pointer car" designations, arguing its relevance to a Charter Section 9 arbitrary detention issue.

The applicant was detained solely because he was driving a vehicle designated as a "pointer car," which may have been an outdated and incorrect designation.

The court found the evidence concerning the purpose, implementation, and removal procedures of the pointer car designation system to be "obviously relevant" to assessing the constitutional validity of the detention.

The motion was allowed, and the Crown was ordered to disclose all requested information.

This is a defence bail review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code, appealing a decision to detain the applicant on secondary and tertiary bail grounds.

The applicant proposed a new surety (grandmother), increased surety amount, more stringent house arrest, and GPS electronic monitoring as material changes in circumstances.

The court found a material change based on the new surety, applying a flexible approach to due diligence in bail reviews as per R. v. St. Cloud.

However, the court ultimately found the proposed plan and sureties insufficient to mitigate the significant public safety risk posed by the serious firearms and dangerous driving charges, dismissing the bail review application on secondary grounds.

This decision addresses a request by counsel for two individuals convicted of second-degree murder, and agreed to by the Crown, to conduct sentencing remotely via video, audio, or written decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the constitutional imperative of the accused's presence for sentencing under Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the requirement for a valid waiver of physical presence, and the public interest, including victims' rights.

The court found that sentencing is part of the trial and that physical presence serves both individual and broader public interests, especially for serious offences.

The court determined the matter was not urgent for appeal purposes and preferred to defer sentencing to early July, hoping for an in-person proceeding if courts reopen, otherwise revisiting the remote sentencing issue.

The individual and corporate accused appealed their sentences for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, involving the failure to safely dispose of PCBs and comply with an environmental protection compliance order.

The sentencing judge had imposed significant fines and an intermittent jail term on the individual.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by relying on a precedent involving a much higher degree of moral culpability and actual harm, whereas the present case involved passive negligence and potential harm.

The appeal court vacated the jail sentence for the individual and reduced the fines for both accused, emphasizing the principle of restraint in regulatory sentencing and the distinction between actual and potential harm.

The applicants, convicted of second-degree murder, sought a mistrial based on the Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Chouhan*, which clarified that former provisions regarding peremptory challenges remained operative during their jury selection.

The trial judge acknowledged the probable reversible error but denied the mistrial application, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict for an error of law, as such remedies are the purview of the Court of Appeal.

The court emphasized that a jury verdict is "sacrosanct" and a trial judge's post-verdict jurisdiction is "extremely limited," applying only to issues concerning the integrity of the deliberative process or the rendering of the verdict itself, not errors of law committed during trial.

The applicant, Aiko Hamasaki, brought a motion to exclude a statement she gave to police, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided upon arrest.

However, the court found a breach of section 10(b) when a police officer suggested Ms. Hamasaki consult a lawyer "more versed in criminal law" than her immigration lawyer, Matthew Wong, after she had expressed a desire to contact Mr. Wong.

This unsolicited advice was deemed an impermissible interference with her right to counsel of choice, especially given her vulnerable state and the power imbalance.

Consequently, the statement was excluded from evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, Shayan Syed, sought bail release under s. 522(1) of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder.

The court considered the secondary ground for detention, focusing on the protection and safety of the public.

Despite a proposed house arrest plan with his mother as surety and electronic monitoring, the court found the applicant presented a high risk due to violent tendencies, unpredictability, a history of violence (assault, uttering threats, breaches of court orders), and unmanaged schizophrenia and psychosis exacerbated by drug use.

The proposed surety's credibility was severely damaged by her denial of a prior threat incident involving the applicant, to which he had pled guilty.

The court dismissed the bail application, concluding the applicant failed to satisfy the secondary ground.

Sohail Rajan's fourth bail application, heard via audioconference due to COVID-19.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the exclusion of a firearm from evidence and the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on correctional institutions.

The secondary ground (risk to public safety) was satisfied due to the weakened Crown case, accumulated pre-trial custody, and a robust bail plan including sureties and GPS monitoring.

The tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence) was fundamentally altered by the pandemic, as a reasonable and informed public would be concerned about the health risks in jails.

The applicant, suffering from psoriasis, was deemed more vulnerable.

The court granted bail with strict conditions, including house arrest, three sureties, and GPS monitoring with direct police notification for alerts.

Jeremy Kandhai pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited firearm with accessible ammunition and breach of a firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing was expedited due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the 30 months (45 months with 1.5x credit) pre-trial custody, enhanced credit for lockdowns, an early guilty plea, and an assault suffered by the accused in custody.

The judge determined that the appropriate overall disposition was time served, emphasizing the increased hardship of incarceration during the pandemic as a significant factor.

The accused brought several pre-trial motions in a sexual assault and sexual interference case.

The motions challenged the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under Section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter and on voluntariness grounds, sought directions regarding a Section 278.93 application concerning a video, and requested editing of the complainant's Section 715.1 statement.

The court dismissed the Charter and voluntariness applications, finding the accused was sufficiently informed of the charges and jeopardy.

For the video, the court declined a definitive pre-trial ruling on admissibility, deeming it contingent on the complainant's testimony, but clarified that the video was part of the subject matter of the charge and thus not subject to Section 276.

Regarding the Section 715.1 statement, the court ordered two passages containing leading and rhetorical questions from the interviewer to be edited out, while allowing another.

The Crown applied under Section 521 of the Criminal Code to review the respondent's bail release, seeking detention or surety supervision.

The application for detention or surety was denied, but the court found significant procedural errors in the original bail hearing where the Justice of the Peace unduly restricted the Crown's presentation of evidence.

The court emphasized the balance between efficiency and procedural fairness in bail hearings, noting that expedition should not compromise the Crown's right to be heard, especially regarding evidence pertinent to public safety.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the defendant, a passenger, was questioned and his personal information was subsequently run through a police database.

The court found that the police officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the passenger was psychologically detained without reasonable suspicion and compelled to provide identification.

The officer's testimony regarding the voluntariness of the information and the purpose of the questioning was deemed incredible.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court concluded that the Charter breach was serious, the evidence was conscriptive and created by the breach, and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded from the trial.

The plaintiff sought to amend a prior judgment, alleging an obvious error regarding an agreement on an incentive package.

The defendant disputed the agreement and raised its own complaint about the judgment's finding on mitigation.

The court treated the letters from counsel as motions and dismissed both, finding that the alleged errors were not clerical slips or omissions under Rule 59.06(1) but rather challenges to judicial reasoning.

The court also found no agreement between counsel regarding the incentive package and that the defendant's mitigation complaint faced the same jurisdictional impediment.

This decision provides reasons for an inquiry into an incident where the accused, David Baichoo, appeared in a security gown, naked underneath, on the first day of his first-degree murder trial.

The incident, which led to the loss of a trial day and compromised the dignity of the proceedings, was attributed to the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC).

The court found that the TSDC's reliance on unreliable body scans for contraband and the indifference of staff, particularly Sgt. Polanski, led to the deplorable situation.

Despite the subsequent abandonment of the defence's application for costs, the court issued these reasons to highlight systemic failures in the treatment of accused persons and to ensure accountability.

The appellant, Fiago Heron Sr., appealed convictions for two counts of weapons dangerous to the public peace and one count of assault with a weapon.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to critically assess the credibility of a key Crown witness, Paula Heron (the appellant's wife), despite significant inconsistencies in her testimony and a potential motive to fabricate.

The trial judge's reliance on the consistency of Crown witnesses without proper credibility analysis of Paula Heron was deemed an insufficient ground for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, convictions vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, M.K., was charged with sexual assault, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, death threats, and simple assault against his wife, A.H., following their arranged marriage and her arrival in Canada.

The case was a pure credibility contest with no significant corroboration.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding forcible confinement to be substantially exaggerated and unreliable, particularly as the accused was absent for most of the alleged confinement period.

The Crown's cross-examination of the accused and defence witnesses was criticized for its demeaning tone, incivility, and unfairness, including misrepresenting a police statement.

Ultimately, the court found the complainant's allegations of criminal conduct unreliable and unsafe for a finding of guilt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The accused, Richard Pereira, charged with first-degree murder, brought a directed verdict application to reduce the charge to second-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence for first-degree murder based on forcible confinement under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, but insufficient evidence for planned and deliberate murder under s. 231(2).

The application was dismissed, and the charge of first-degree murder based on forcible confinement proceeded.