David E. Harris

The applicant brought a Charter application under sections 8 and 24(2) to exclude ammunition discovered during a police search of his residence.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant lacked reasonable grounds to believe ammunition would be found.

The court dismissed the application, finding the ITO met the low threshold for the 'will afford evidence' requirement and that it was a reasonable inference the applicant had additional ammunition stored at his nearby residence after accidentally shooting himself with a firearm during a robbery.

The respondent wife brought a motion under Rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules to set aside or stay a default divorce order.

She argued that granting the divorce would prejudice ongoing criminal proceedings in India against the applicant husband regarding dowry harassment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the wife had adequate notice of the divorce proceedings but failed to file an Answer.

Applying the test for setting aside default judgments, the court concluded there was no arguable defence on the merits and insufficient evidence that the divorce would prejudice the foreign criminal litigation.

The three offenders were convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for the stabbing death of a 22-year-old victim.

The sentencing judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenders were the aggressors who tracked down the victim for revenge after an earlier altercation where the victim had cut the principal offender with a knife.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for an 'aggravated manslaughter' sentence range, finding the earlier provocation mitigated the offenders' moral blameworthiness.

After applying significant credit for pre-trial custody, harsh jail conditions including triple bunking, and strict bail conditions, the principal offender was sentenced to a further 14 months, the second offender to 6.5 months, and the third offender to time served.

The applicant, charged with intimate partner violence, sought a bail variation under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code to permit contact with his wife.

The Crown opposed the variation, arguing there was no material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the applicant's new surety and voluntary counselling constituted a material change.

Balancing the need to protect the complainant with the secondary theme of family unity, the court allowed the variation, permitting contact with the complainant provided another adult is present, though cohabitation was not yet permitted.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a text message sent by the accused to a police officer inquiring about his mother's life insurance policy.

The Crown opposed, arguing it was self-serving hearsay.

The court found that while the text was presumptively inadmissible hearsay, it should be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement's substantive reliability was corroborated by other evidence and that fairness to the accused required its admission to provide a complete picture of his statements regarding the insurance policy.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied to re-open a pre-trial statement voir dire under section 551.3(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that fresh evidence showing he received pre-interview advice from a disbarred lawyer acting as a paralegal, rather than a licensed lawyer, undermined the original finding that his statement to police was voluntary and compliant with the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the fresh evidence could not have affected the original ruling, as the accused was not detained at the time and had explicitly declined to exercise his right to counsel even if he had been detained.

The accused was tried for possession and importation of child pornography after border security officers found numerous digital devices in his luggage at Pearson Airport.

The central issue was whether the accused had knowledge of the child pornography on the devices.

The court rejected demeanour evidence but found that the volume and dispersal of the illicit material across seven different devices constituted overwhelming circumstantial evidence of knowledge.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The offender was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after a trailer he negligently attached to a van detached, striking and killing a cyclist.

The offender saw the collision but drove away.

The court weighed the devastating impact on the victim's family, the offender's high moral blameworthiness, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a total sentence of 6 years in custody, reduced by Summers, Marshall, and Downes credits for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in 1 year and 1 month left to serve, plus a 10-year driving prohibition.

The appellant, a personal support worker, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident with Down Syndrome.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on hearsay statements made by the complainant to her sister and a police officer, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception and as res gestae spontaneous statements.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his hearsay analysis by failing to properly articulate reliability as a hearsay danger, misconstruing corroborative evidence, and failing to consider alternative explanations.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The trial was a credibility contest where both parties testified to diametrically opposed accounts of a domestic dispute.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying in part on the complainant's after-the-fact emotional state as corroborative evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the emotional state evidence was equally consistent with both accounts and therefore possessed no probative value.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, charged with possession and importation of child pornography, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence found on his digital devices during a border search.

The court previously found that s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the applicant was detained under s. 10 of the Charter when border officers requested his device passwords, resulting in a breach of his rights to counsel and to be informed of the reasons for detention.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded because the officers acted in good faith under the law as it existed at the time, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant, a Black man with a history of foster care abuse and a criminal record, applied for a bail review after being detained on firearms charges.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, placing significant weight on s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code regarding the overrepresentation of Black individuals in the justice system.

The court found that the proposed release plan, involving strict house arrest and two reliable sureties, adequately addressed the risks.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on bail.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had found that the police officer lacked an objectively reasonable suspicion that the respondent had operated his vehicle within the preceding three hours when she made an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach and exclusion of the breath evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the circumstantial evidence of the time of driving was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.

Although the trial judge erred in her analysis of the second Grant factor by not following binding precedent, a re-weighing of the factors still supported exclusion due to the seriousness of the officer's systemic misunderstanding of her legal obligations.

The defendant employer brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action, arguing the parties were bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in the plaintiff's employment contract.

The court first determined that the plaintiff, an insurance field agent, was an employee rather than an independent contractor.

The court then found that the second and third contracts, which introduced the arbitration clause, were invalid for lack of fresh consideration because they diminished the plaintiff's rights without providing any new benefit.

Consequently, the arbitration agreement was invalid under section 7(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and the motion to stay the action was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, an alternate juror reported that another juror had expressed a belief in the accused's guilt before any evidence was called.

The offending juror was discharged.

The accused moved for a mistrial, arguing the remaining jurors may have been tainted.

The court dismissed the application, finding that several other jurors had immediately criticized the offending remark and defended the presumption of innocence, demonstrating that the jury was not tainted.

During a trial for first degree murder where the accused raised self-defence, the accused applied to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence under the Scopelliti framework.

Specifically, the accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's habitual possession of a knife and prior use of a racial slur.

The court ruled that the evidence of habitual knife possession was admissible as it indicated a violent tendency.

The court also held that a prior ruling from a mistrial excluding the racial slur evidence was not binding under section 653.1 of the Criminal Code in the interests of justice, and admitted the evidence to demonstrate the deceased's anger and aggressive conduct.

Andre Martin was convicted of attempted murder with a firearm and unauthorized firearm possession.

The Crown sought an 18-year sentence, while the defence proposed 6-10 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the victim's permanent paralysis, and the offender's criminal record.

Mitigating factors included provocation, a dysfunctional upbringing, and systemic anti-Black racism.

The court emphasized general deterrence, denunciation, and the importance of rehabilitation, imposing a total sentence of 12 years, accounting for pre-trial custody and future COVID-related restrictions.

The applicants, who were charged with child pornography offences following searches of their digital devices at the border, brought a constitutional challenge against s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act.

They argued that the provision, which allows customs officers to search imported goods without any legal threshold, violates the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter when applied to personal digital devices.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the profound privacy interests in digital devices require a legal threshold for searches.

The court held that the provision violates s. 8 and is not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force or effect with respect to digital devices, but suspended the declaration of invalidity.

The applicant, Jeremy Pike, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his digital devices at the border.

The court found that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he was asked for his password, as he was detained at that point and should have been informed of his rights.

While the s. 8 breach (unreasonable search under a provision later found unconstitutional) was in good faith, the Border Services Officer's failure to take proper notes increased its seriousness.

Considering the seriousness and significant impact of both breaches, particularly the s. 10(b) violation, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from Mr. Pike's digital devices should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, O.Y., was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his former partner.

The Crown faced significant obstacles in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including evidence of the complainant's motivation to fabricate, unconfirmed testimony, and the accused's denial.

The court also addressed a Crown application for the complainant to testify behind a screen, which was denied.

Ultimately, the court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.