David H. Doherty

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third component of the reasonable doubt analysis outlined in R. v. W.D. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly articulated the burden of proof, reviewed the evidence, and made findings of fact that were open to him, rendering the verdicts reasonable.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order that varied his access to his children.

Following the initial trial judgment, the respondent sought a further hearing due to the appellant's inappropriate conduct during his first visit.

The appellant requested an adjournment but left the courthouse, and the trial judge proceeded in his absence, ordering no access except by further court order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to proceed or to vary the order, noting the appellant could have applied to the trial court to regain access but failed to do so.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to nine counts of theft related to his role as the mastermind of a scheme where younger individuals stole motor boats and construction equipment valued at approximately $65,000.

He appealed his sentence of imprisonment, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately explain why a conditional sentence was not warranted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range and the sentencing judge gave cogent reasons emphasizing denunciation for the planned and well-developed scheme.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application to direct the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry to state a case regarding his jurisdiction to hear certain evidence.

The Commissioner had ruled he had jurisdiction to hear evidence from a complainant regarding a recent sexual assault by teenagers and the subsequent police investigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Commissioner committed a jurisdictional error by misconstruing the Order in Council that established his mandate.

The Court held that the inquiry's subject matter was limited to historical sexual abuse of young people by persons in authority or positions of trust, and the proposed evidence fell outside this scope and was not reasonably relevant.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred in its treatment of an impugned letter contained in his hospital records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly admitted the letter as part of the hospital records without using it for the truth of its contents, and that the Board's decision was reasonable on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant, a long-term offender, was convicted of breaching a condition of his long-term supervision order that required him to report any relationships entered into with females.

He had engaged in a 90-minute conversation with a woman at a laundromat and gave her his phone number, which he did not report to his supervisor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was meant to capture relationships with some mutual level of involvement, not casual encounters or unsuccessful attempts to initiate a relationship.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal.

His counsel had been removed from the record, he had left the country, and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $20,335.62.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, agreed with the motion judge's reasons, and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judge's spousal support order following a 19-year marriage.

The trial judge had ordered time-limited support with a review order and refused to make support retroactive.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in imposing a review order, refusing retroactive support, and in determining the quantum and duration of support.

The Court increased the support amount and duration, applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines as a cross-check, and set aside the review order.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board refusing his request to be transferred to medium security and ordering an independent assessment prior to the next annual review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that remaining at Oak Ridge was the least restrictive means of controlling the significant risk posed by the appellant.

The Court also found that ordering an independent assessment was a prudent precautionary step, not an indication of uncertainty.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reasons of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge, noting that he considered the same issues raised on appeal and committed no error in law.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that 15 years was outside the appropriate range given the appellant's young age, lack of prior criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

However, noting the brutal and senseless nature of the group murder, the Court concluded that an increase from the minimum period was warranted.

The appeal was allowed and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding the Consent and Capacity Board's findings that she was incapable of consenting to treatment and managing her property.

The Board found that while the appellant could understand relevant information, her delusional disorder prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board applied the correct legal tests from Starson v. Swaze and that its conclusions were reasonable and supported by the medical evidence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere, holding that the sentence was well within the appropriate range given the circumstances.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his 18-month sentence for retrieving, loading, and firing a rifle in close proximity to his wife during a domestic dispute.

He sought a reduction to time served (four months) followed by probation, noting he had been released on the Temporary Absence Program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the offence very serious and holding that the trial judge did not err in concluding that denunciation required incarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment arising from three threatening documents sent to his former spouse's lawyer during family proceedings.

He argued the letters were not 'directed' at the complainants and that there was insufficient evidence the former spouse feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant intended the documents to reach the complainants, satisfying the requirement under s. 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, and that there was a basis for the trial judge's findings regarding the former spouse's fear.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with a 14-year parole ineligibility period.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication, capacity to form intent, after-the-fact conduct, and provocation.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions were adequate and that the trial judge properly related the evidence to the issues of intent and foreseeability.

The court also upheld the 14-year parole ineligibility period as not clearly unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varied the sentence to time served, and vacated the restitution order.

The probation order was extended to two years with an added condition prohibiting the appellant from attending specific locations.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to stay Ontario proceedings against them based on an exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring British Columbia.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the respondents had shown a 'strong case' not to enforce the clause.

The court deferred to the motion judge's weighing of factors, including that the claims were part of a larger multi-party action in Ontario, the respondents were unsophisticated, the clause was in a pre-printed contract, and the appellants showed no juridical advantage to a trial in British Columbia.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claim in the underlying collection action was not a liquidated claim.

Consequently, the appellant was not a creditor within the meaning of the Bulk Sales Act.