David H. Doherty

The appellant mother sought an order in Ontario to supersede an Arizona custody order.

The motion judge declined to exercise discretion under s. 42 of the Children's Law Reform Act, focusing exclusively on the parties' prior agreement to return to the Arizona court for variations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider other material factors, including the children's interests and the factors in s. 42(1)(b).

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination on a full record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. framework by asking if his evidence 'might reasonably be true' rather than if it raised a reasonable doubt.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the inapt phrase, the trial judge clearly understood the Crown bore the burden of proof throughout.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the error could have affected the verdict given the credibility issues.

The applicant sought bail pending his application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to order his surrender for extradition to Germany.

The court found that the judicial review application was not so devoid of merit as to be frivolous, as it raised a novel issue regarding the Minister's power under s. 43(2) of the Extradition Act.

Given that the applicant met the other statutory criteria and had been on bail without incident for eight and a half years, the application for bail was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of child pornography.

He argued that evidence of two pairs of underwear found in his possession upon arrest should have been excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and that the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence was relevant, no objection was made at trial, and a limiting instruction was unnecessary given the defense's position.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting at an individual who had forcibly entered his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding self-defence on the attempted murder charge were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the instructions conflated the distinct issues of intent to kill and self-defence, leaving the jury with the incorrect impression that self-defence was irrelevant if intent to kill was proven.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant brought an action for constructive dismissal, alleging the employer unilaterally changed his working conditions and reduced his wages.

These events occurred after a union was certified but before a collective agreement was reached, triggering the statutory freeze period under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The employer successfully moved to strike the action on the basis that the Ontario Labour Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Weber analysis to find that the essential character of the dispute was a breach of the statutory freeze, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board.

The union appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board certification order and remitted the matter for reconsideration.

The Divisional Court had found the Board erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the employer's late-filed response.

Before the appeal was heard, the Board reconsidered the matter, accepted the late response, and revoked the certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the union's appeal as moot, finding no live controversy remained and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case on the merits.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter issues raised were bound by previous decisions and that the Board's decision was reasonable on the record.

The Court also held that the Board did not err by failing to initiate its own inquiries beyond the material placed before it.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a police officer's entry into his home violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the officer approached the home lawfully to investigate an accident and stepped into the foyer on the implied invitation of the appellant's wife.

The implied invitation doctrine applied, distinguishing the case from R. v. Evans.

The appellant appealed his conviction for selling crack cocaine to an undercover police officer, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on identification evidence and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him regarding his alibi and prior criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on identification, when read as a whole, properly distinguished between certainty and reliability.

The court also held that the Crown's cross-examination on the appellant's alibi and prior record was proper and cured by appropriate limiting instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict arising from a motor vehicle accident, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the respondent's counsel made a prejudicial jury address.

The Court of Appeal held that it was open to the jury to conclude the respondent steered into the oncoming lane to avoid an unidentified vehicle.

The court also found that a factual error in the respondent's jury address did not prejudice the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondents, who were previously declared vexatious litigants, leave to proceed with an action under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by misapprehending evidence regarding the appellants' knowledge of the respondents' claims prior to a settlement, and by treating the issue primarily as one of issue estoppel rather than examining the totality of the respondents' conduct.

The Court concluded the respondents' devious conduct to circumvent the vexatious litigant order constituted an abuse of process, allowed the appeal, and refused leave to proceed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium security setting at the hospital, despite submissions from the hospital and the Attorney General that his detention in a minimum security setting should be continued.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error and held that the disposition was reasonable given the appellant's worsened mental condition, recent elopement, violent ideation, and high risk for future elopements and violent recidivism.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent conceded that the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the trial judge rejected a joint submission of two years plus three years' probation, instead imposing a sentence of four and a half years.

The trial judge found the joint submission fell well below the minimum appropriate sentence, noting aggravating factors including domestic assault with a knife, forced entry, being on probation for offences against the same victim, and a record of over fifty convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed the joint submission was too low but held the trial judge should have imposed a sentence at the bottom of the appropriate range.

The Court varied the sentence on the break and enter count to two and a half years, resulting in a total effective global sentence of four years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to take judicial notice of physical signs of sexual intercourse in a child and by treating his failure to contact his family as after-the-fact conduct indicative of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to take judicial notice or in his treatment of the after-the-fact conduct.

The Ministry of Labour appealed a decision staying or dismissing charges against the respondent employer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence of actual, irremediable prejudice to the respondent's ability to make full answer and defence simply because the employees no longer worked for the employer.

The matter was remitted to the trial court for trial.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision granting certiorari to quash a decision made at the conclusion of a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Superior Court judge that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by considering the evidence in isolated segments rather than as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 11(b) Charter analysis by not giving adequate weight to the harm to his health caused by the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to diminish the force of the prejudice claim because the appellant failed to raise health concerns before the motion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in rejecting a conditional sentence after considering the appellant's health problems.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant failed to appear at the hearing despite being advised by amicus curiae that the appeal could be dismissed if he did not appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.