David H. Doherty

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's interjection during argument resulted in unfairness and challenged the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the unfairness argument and held that the factual challenges revealed no error in law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the sentence fell within the parameters of the joint submission put forward by counsel.

The court found the joint submission to be a fair reflection of the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's serious, related, and lengthy criminal record.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's inferences regarding the speed and location of the appellant's vehicle were amply justified by the evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's decision to reject a conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's disposition.

The Court held that the trial judge's inferences from a conversation with the victim's mother were reasonably open and that the proposed fresh evidence regarding a Human Rights Commission claim was properly rejected.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed for lack of merit.

The appellant, an in-house corporate counsel, appealed a trial judge's order making him jointly and severally liable for $140,000 in costs awarded against his employer and related companies.

The trial judge had found that the appellant shared a common financial interest with his clients through an employment agreement, placing him in a conflict of interest with his duty to the court and his clients.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the employment agreement did not actually give the appellant a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if such a financial interest existed, it would align with the clients' interests rather than conflict with them, and would not breach the lawyer's duty to the court absent unprofessional conduct in the litigation.

The costs order against the appellant was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after Customs officials found 849 grams of cocaine hidden in his luggage.

At trial, the Crown relied on false statements the appellant made to Customs officials during routine questioning to prove he knew the drugs were in his luggage.

The appellant argued that admitting these statutorily compelled statements violated his s. 7 Charter right against self-incrimination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that routine questioning at the border does not engage the principle against self-incrimination, as travellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy or right to remain silent in that context.

The 40-month sentence was also upheld.

The appellant municipality entered into an agreement to sell surplus land to the respondent developer but failed to give public notice of the proposed sale as required by s. 268(3)(c) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

When the municipality refused to close the transaction due to a zoning dispute, the developer sued for breach of contract.

The municipality argued the agreement was void because of its own failure to provide the statutory notice.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statute requires notice to be given before a binding agreement is signed, the failure to do so did not render the contract void or unenforceable, as the statute does not expressly invalidate such contracts and public policy does not favour voiding contracts for technical deficiencies.

The appellants were convicted of various weapons offences and crimes of violence related to the collection of drug debts.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the segregation of evidence, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

However, the sentence appeals for three of the appellants were allowed, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider the principle of rehabilitation and mitigating factors, resulting in reduced sentences.

The appellant, an 18-year-old driver, was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle suddenly swerved across a median into oncoming traffic, killing one passenger and injuring others.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of a surviving passenger who described the vehicle jerking but could not say if the appellant deliberately caused it or was trying to regain control.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, holding that the evidence of a two-to-three-second loss of control, without proof of deliberate swerving or prior bad driving, could not support a finding of a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The successful appellant insurer sought partial indemnity costs of $171,943.31 for an appeal.

The Court of Appeal reduced the fees claimed by two-thirds, noting that the preparation time spent by junior lawyers and law clerks was excessive given the lack of complexity of the issues.

The court also reduced the costs because the insurer's trial counsel had failed to raise the issues on which the insurer ultimately succeeded on the liability appeal.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 for fees and $10,000 for disbursements, plus GST.

In the context of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice regarding a 1959 murder conviction, the Crown applied for a production order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code against third-party journalists.

The journalists had produced a documentary about the case and interviewed several witnesses who were now providing fresh evidence.

The journalists resisted, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a production order against a third party for investigative purposes.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to order production where it is in the interests of justice to assist in determining the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The court ordered the production of two of the three retained video recordings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim on a personal guarantee.

The respondent, a bookkeeper, signed a document described to her as being for 'standard credit information' without reading the small print containing the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Tilden v. Clendenning principle, finding that the appellant knew or ought to have known the respondent would not read the form and did nothing to bring the guarantee to her attention.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision, arguing that the binding precedent of Karakas was at odds with the Supreme Court's decision in Heredi v. Fensom and attempting to distinguish their case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the case could not be distinguished from Karakas and that the automobile was not merely ancillary to the damage caused.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the viva voce evidence of their medical expert because no report was filed.

The Court of Appeal held that even if this was an error, it would not have affected the trial judge's decision on the threshold question, as she had the expert's detailed notes and found the appellant lacked credibility.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding pre-offer costs.

The trial judge had awarded no costs for proceedings prior to the defendants' settlement offer without providing reasons.

Applying Rule 76.13, the Court found it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to commence the action under the ordinary procedure and awarded them partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer.

The appellants' parked motor vehicle was destroyed by a fire allegedly caused by a transmission fluid leak.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred by the two-year limitation period in s. 206(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, relying on the binding precedent of Karakas v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while there was arguable merit to the appellants' claim that Karakas was at odds with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court was not asked to overrule Karakas and the present case could not be distinguished from it.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its oppression claim regarding the sale of a debtor's assets and the refusal to permit redemption of shares.

The Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction without deciding the issue.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was a participant in the prior receivership proceedings where the sale was approved and chose to take no position.

The proper time and place to protest the unfairness of the sale was during the motion to approve the sale in the receivership proceedings.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action and allowing the respondent's counterclaim on a promissory note arising from a share purchase agreement.

The appellants had alleged unconscionability, economic duress, and oppression.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by deciding which competing inferences should be preferred from primary facts in evidence on a motion for summary judgment.

The court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict awarding the elderly respondents damages, including $250,000 each in general non-pecuniary damages, after an oil spill destroyed their home.

The appellant argued that a mistrial should have been declared due to prejudicial evidence regarding insurance and settlement negotiations, and that the damages were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfair prejudice to warrant a mistrial and concluding that while the general damages award was high, it was reasonably open to the jury given the devastating impact of the loss of the respondents' home.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appeal.

On consent, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal.

The moving party was awarded $5,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and GST, payable solely by the appellant Berg Mesrop.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank for defaulted loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the loan defaults despite some inaccuracies in the bank's documents.

The court also rejected the appellant wife's claims of undue influence and non est factum regarding a personal line of credit, noting she signed the documents at her husband's request without reading them and there was no freestanding obligation for the bank to provide independent legal advice.