Christopher Hicks

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years.

He appealed, arguing that a stay of proceedings should have been granted due to serious police misconduct, including an assault during interrogation and subsequent attempts to conceal it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly remedied the Charter breaches by excluding the tainted evidence rather than granting a stay.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding constitutional exemptions for parole ineligibility, the admission of a jailhouse informant's testimony, and the jury instructions on first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence to establish he should be declared a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence.

The fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test, as it did not show a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences following a second trial for a home invasion.

He appealed his convictions and his eight-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate jury instructions regarding his alibi defence, failed to give a sufficient Vetrovec warning for an accomplice and a perjured witness, and erred in instructions on identification and prior bad acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, fair, and balanced, and that the sentence was fit given the circumstances of the offence and the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for unlawfully in a dwelling house, fraud, and attempted fraud.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions for unlawfully in a dwelling house and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to consider the counts separately, address legal issues regarding the appellant's status upon entry, and assess the reliability of the complainants' evidence.

The fraud convictions were upheld, but the sentences were varied because the original sentences exceeded the two-year maximum.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months for the fraud and attempted fraud counts, noting the appellant's terrible record of preying on elderly citizens.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter or provocation with the jury, that the Crown improperly elicited prior out-of-court statements to rebut recent fabrication, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding a forged arrest warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support provocation, that the prior statements were admissible, that any prejudice from cross-examination was cured by instructions, and that the fresh evidence was collateral.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident, arguing that as a self-represented accused requiring an interpreter he did not receive a fair trial.

The court held that the trial judge had a duty to provide meaningful procedural guidance and to inquire into an apparent Charter issue concerning hospital blood samples and medical records obtained without a Criminal Code demand or properly supported warrant.

Given the possible infringement of s. 8 and the need to consider exclusion under s. 24(2), together with broader failures to assist the accused and deficiencies in the treatment of the evidence, the fairness of the trial was compromised.

The convictions on the impaired driving charges were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and common assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors of law and was not required to provide detailed self-instruction in her reasons.

The court upheld the three-year sentence for sexual assault but allowed the sentence appeal in part to delete an illegal two-year probation order that followed the penitentiary sentence, substituting a concurrent six-month sentence for the common assault.

The appellant sought to challenge a single judge's denial of leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal.

The court held that no statutory right of appeal or review exists from a decision granting or denying leave under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

It further held that neither the Criminal Appeal Rules nor the Rules of Civil Procedure can create such a substantive right by incorporation, and that s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act does not apply because s. 7(3) expressly excludes motions for leave to appeal from the category of motions reviewable under that provision.

The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder.

He argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and the taking of bodily samples, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were inadequate, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant made an informed choice to cooperate with police, the jury instructions substantially complied with the required standards, and trial counsel's tactical decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal confrontation in his residence, where he asserted self-defence and the trial judge left provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the self-defence charge was adequate, but found reversible error in the response to the jury's question on provocation and in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct because the jury was not properly instructed on innocent explanations and conduct consistent with innocence.

The court further held that Crown counsel's cross-examination was repeatedly improper, including questioning on silence, disclosure, and criminal record details, and that the curative instructions did not adequately remove the prejudice.

Considering these errors cumulatively, the court concluded the appellant did not receive a fair trial and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed drug trafficking and proceeds convictions on the ground that he was wrongly denied a jury trial after failing to attend on the scheduled trial date.

The court held that under s.598(1) of the Criminal Code the onus rested on the accused to establish a legitimate excuse, and the pre-trial judge was entitled to reject the illness explanation as not credible.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to reconsider the pre-trial s.598(1) ruling on the basis that only the trial judge had jurisdiction.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the conditional sentence breach regime under s. 742.6 of the Criminal Code after a judge ordered that part of the unexpired conditional sentence be served in custody.

The Court of Appeal held that breach proceedings are part of the sentencing process, not a prosecution for a new offence, so the protections in s. 11 of the Charter do not apply.

The court further held that proof on a balance of probabilities and the statutory burden regarding reasonable excuse do not offend s. 7.

It rejected arguments concerning jurisdiction, the validity of the appellant's admission of breach, and the fitness of the resulting custodial variation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The police received a disconnected 911 call from the appellant's apartment.

Upon arrival, the appellant answered the door, stated there was no problem, and attempted to close the door.

The police forced entry to investigate the call and found the appellant's wife crying with a swollen eye, stating the appellant had hit her.

The appellant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to resist arrest after a struggle ensued.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a common law duty to protect life and safety, which justifies a forced entry into a dwelling to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller when the call is disconnected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was convicted of touching his six-year-old daughter for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge admitted the child's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code, despite inconsistencies with her viva voce testimony on cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the contradicted portions of the videotape were inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the strict adoption test for prior inconsistent statements does not apply to s. 715.1.

A videotaped statement is adopted if the child acknowledges making it and attempting to be truthful at the time.

Inconsistencies elicited during cross-examination go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The appellant and a co-accused were jointly tried and convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, each blamed the other.

The appellant testified, but had not given a pre-trial statement to the police.

The co-accused did not testify but had given a pre-trial statement.

Counsel for the co-accused cross-examined the appellant on his pre-trial silence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's silence in assessing his guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a co-accused may cross-examine an accused on pre-trial silence to make full answer and defence and attack credibility, the jury must be strictly instructed that such silence cannot be used as positive evidence of guilt.

The trial judge's instructions were fatally flawed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowing the Crown's appeal from their acquittal on charges of manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that under the established rules for directed verdicts, the Court of Appeal did not err in ordering a new trial.