Charles William Hourigan

The appellant attended a Kiss concert at the Canadian Tire Centre in Ottawa and was removed by security staff.

He commenced an action claiming damages for discrimination, harassment, intentional infliction of nervous shock, mental distress, loss of income, loss of reputation and loss of business.

Claims against McGhee Entertainment and Kiss were dismissed for failing to disclose a cause of action.

A motion to dismiss against Gene Simmons was granted on the basis that the sole claim was for discrimination, which is prohibited from proceeding as a standalone action under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The appellant appealed the dismissal order against Simmons without asserting any alleged error of law.

Simmons brought a motion to quash the appeal as devoid of merit.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order striking his claims for wrongful dismissal and severance pay.

The respondents cross-appealed seeking to strike the appellant's remaining claims for emotional distress, breach of human rights, and occupational health and safety violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the wrongful dismissal claim but set aside the striking of the severance pay claim, finding that the limitation period for severance claims should run from the date of completion of employment rather than from the date of notice of termination.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision not to strike the remaining claims, finding them entangled with factual issues inappropriate for determination on a rule 21 motion.

The appellants, estate trustees of the testator's estate, appealed the trial judge's finding that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when executing two wills dated August 16, 2010 and September 8, 2010.

The trial judge found the testator was unaware of the nature and extent of his assets, did not remember persons he might be expected to benefit, and did not understand claims that could be made by excluded persons.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the costs award, which required the estate trustees personally to pay costs rather than having them borne by the estate.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable errors of fact and upheld the trial judge's findings on capacity and costs.

The appellants, towing companies owned by members of the Six Nations of Grand River Indian Reserve, sought to retain vehicles towed and stored at their facilities pending payment of towing and storage fees.

The respondent insurance company, which had acquired ownership of the vehicles following accidents or thefts, brought applications under the Repair and Storage Liens Act to retrieve the vehicles.

The appellants claimed exemption from the provincial lien regime under section 89(1) of the Indian Act, arguing that the vehicles constituted personal property of Indians located on a reserve and therefore could not be seized by non-Indian parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 89(1) of the Indian Act only protects against seizure by creditors or the Crown, not by debtors.

Since the respondent was a debtor rather than a creditor, the appellants could not claim the protection of section 89(1).

The appellant appealed a damages decision from the Superior Court of Justice.

The motion judge had declined to award damages due to the appellant's non-compliance with a pre-trial conference order regarding the filing of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that although the appellant did not comply with the order, she had filed an affidavit with supporting documentation and a factum detailing her damages claim.

The appellate court held that the motion judge should have afforded the appellant an opportunity to file compliant evidence to support her claim.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for breach of non-solicitation and non-interference covenants contained in an Asset Purchase Agreement and Non-Disclosure and Non-Solicitation Agreement.

The motion judge found the non-solicitation clauses unreasonable and unenforceable.

On appeal, the court determined that even if the motion judge erred in finding the covenants unenforceable, the action could not succeed because the motion judge made a factual finding that there was no evidence the respondent solicited clients of the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant sought to vary a trial judgment that had been set aside by the Court of Appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a judgment that had already been set aside by the appellate court.

The court also found no evidence of fraud or accidental slip that would justify relief under the applicable rules.

Appeal of a trial judgment in a property dispute between cottage owners.

The trial court found that the appellants had trespassed on the respondent's water lot and issued a permanent injunction restraining them from entering the dry land portion.

The appellants' counterclaim for an easement was dismissed.

On appeal, the appellants raised new arguments regarding riparian rights, accretion, and the high water mark, which had not been argued at trial.

The appellants also challenged the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons and sought to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the appellants were attempting to fundamentally alter their case post-trial and that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The appellant was convicted on an indictment containing ten counts of various offences against three persons, with allegations spanning periods of 8 to 10 years.

On appeal from conviction, the appellant advanced two grounds: first, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, subjecting Crown witnesses to a less rigorous standard than defence witnesses; and second, that the trial judge improperly imposed an evidentiary burden on the appellant to explain injuries sustained by one complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge's reasons reflected a cautious, even-handed approach to credibility assessment and that the trial judge's comments regarding the unexplained injuries were merely observations on the state of evidence rather than an improper shift in the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, using an imitation firearm in committing an offence, threatening to cause bodily harm, and carrying a concealed weapon arising from an altercation in a secondary school washroom.

The trial judge convicted based on the complainant's evidence, which was contradicted by the appellant and co-accused.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: uneven scrutiny in the trial judge's assessment of evidence and misapprehension of evidence based on impermissible speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge applied consistent standards and that the conclusions drawn were reasonable inferences from the evidence as a whole.

Appeal from a trial judgment setting aside a separation agreement due to material non-disclosure of a significant asset (a client book valued at $120,000).

The trial judge awarded equalization payments, increased child support, but denied spousal support.

The appellant challenged the valuation of the book, the quantification of the respondent's income for child support purposes, and the dismissal of her spousal support claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding errors in the trial judge's assessment of income (removal of 15% business expense deduction and three-year averaging methodology), awarding retroactive child support for 2010, remitting 2011 child support arrears for determination, and awarding non-compensatory spousal support for ten years based on the respondent's misrepresentations regarding income and assets.

The appellant moved for a stay of an order requiring the return of two children to England under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to dismiss the appeal.

The application judge had ordered the children returned to England, their habitual residence, after finding that the appellant had wrongfully retained them in Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-motion, finding the two sets of reasons constituted one final order appealable within the prescribed timeframe.

The court refused to stay the order for return of the children, finding no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured prompt return.

However, the court granted a partial stay with respect to portions of the order purporting to order the appellant's return to England and to award custody to the respondent if the children were not returned by the deadline.

The appellant sought an order releasing audio recordings of portions of his trial that were held in camera and subject to a sealing order, as well as any exhibits filed during the in camera proceedings.

The in camera proceedings related to a pre-trial application.

The appellant had appealed his conviction and sentence, and the correctness of the trial judge's decision on the pre-trial application was at issue on the appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found it was in the interests of justice to order production of the audio recordings and exhibits, as counsel required access to these materials to assess the viability of the ground of appeal and to pursue it if viable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault entered by a trial judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge found that the complainant, by virtue of her intoxication, lacked the capacity to consent to the sexual activity in issue.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable and based on misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the complainant's lack of capacity to consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

A non-party insurer sought directions from the Court of Appeal regarding the timing of payment for costs orders issued by the Court of Appeal and a lower court judge.

The insurer requested that the costs be payable within thirty days of the appeal hearing date.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the costs were payable forthwith as of the date the appeal was dismissed, with no contrary order having been made.

The Court also awarded costs of the motion itself to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment motion decision dismissing their defamation claim based on the description of the deceased as "divorced" on his death certificate.

The appellants argued that since the divorce was not final at the time of death, this description was defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the words were not capable of being defamatory.

The court also rejected the appellants' motion for fresh evidence and declined to address the issue of whether the matter should have been transferred from estates court to the civil list, finding such discretionary matters better left to the Superior Court.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judge's decision that the insured was "authorized by law" to operate a motor vehicle under statutory condition 4(1) of O. Reg. 777/93, despite being in breach of a probation order prohibiting him from driving at night and driving with alcohol in his system.

The insured had a valid driver's licence at the time of the accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, holding that "authorized by law" refers only to the provincial licensing scheme operated by the Ministry of Transportation and does not extend to breaches of court orders unrelated to driving licence conditions.

The court found that a broader interpretation would be inconsistent with s. 118 of the Insurance Act and would undermine the legislative intent to protect innocent tort victims.

The appellants appealed the Divisional Court's dismissal of their judicial review application challenging three decisions of the Ontario Racing Commission: a Suspension and Freezing Order against the owner, a procedural decision dismissing motions to quash or stay the orders, and a merits decision imposing licence suspensions, account forfeiture, and a fine.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate notice and particulars, loss of jurisdiction due to a panel member's expired term, and inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the notice was sufficient, the panel member could continue to sit under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, and the reasons were adequate to permit review of the reasonableness of the decision.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a failed residential subdivision development project in Fort Erie, Ontario.

The central issues were whether the parties had entered into an enforceable written agreement dated December 13, 2005, whether there was a breach or repudiation of that agreement, and the validity of a construction lien filed by Ravenda Homes.

The motion judge had dismissed Ravenda Homes's breach of contract action, vacated its certificate of pending litigation, allowed its lien action, and allowed the respondent's counterclaim in part.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most of the motion judge's findings but set aside the award of damages under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act, referring that issue to trial.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.