Bryan Badali

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his discreditable conduct (public nudity) that occurred several years after the charged offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge incorrectly admitted this evidence, as its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court emphasized that the similarities between the discreditable conduct and the charged offences were generic and lacked a sufficient nexus, and that the trial judge did not adequately assess the moral and reasoning prejudice, even in a judge-alone trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and aggravated assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly inferred guilt from disbelief of his testimony and that the robbery conviction was unreasonable, contending the theft was complete before the violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the rejection of testimony or the continuous transaction for robbery.

The court also found the custodial sentence imposed was fit.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision to continue his detention on a charge of second-degree murder, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to a trial judge's ruling granting leave to raise a third-party suspect defence.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing the decision de novo, assumed a material change but ultimately found that the apparent strength of the prosecution's case remained very strong despite the third-party suspect evidence.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that detention was still necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the horrific nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the overwhelming forensic evidence against the applicant.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a review under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code of the dismissal of his third bail application.

The application argued that a pre-trial ruling allowing a third-party suspect defence constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo bail hearing.

The motion judge found it arguable that the most recent bail judge erred by applying too high a threshold for "material change" and by not fully balancing factors in his alternative reasons for denying bail.

The application for a direction to review by a panel of the court was allowed.

A Toronto Police officer, Christopher Hutchings, was charged with assault following an incident on a TTC bus involving a "disorderly male" Chase Richards.

The court assessed whether Officer Hutchings had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and if his use of force was reasonable, proportionate, and necessary.

The judgment relied on video evidence, expert testimony on police use of force, and witness credibility.

The court found that Officer Hutchings had objectively and subjectively reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Richards for mischief due to his non-compliance and aggressive behaviour, which caused the bus to go out of service.

The court rejected Mr. Richards' claim of being choked, finding his actions on video inconsistent with such an event.

While acknowledging the social context of racial profiling, the court found no evidence that race influenced the officer's actions.

Officer Hutchings was found not guilty.

The applicant, Shaun Rootenberg, sought an order for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for his appeal, having exhausted legal aid options.

The Crown opposed, arguing the appeal lacked arguable merit and counsel was not necessary.

The court found that while the proposed grounds of appeal were weak, they were arguable for the purpose of the application.

Specifically, the second and third grounds, concerning the legal implications of strip searches during pre-trial custody and sentencing credits, involved significant and novel legal components, making the appointment of counsel necessary for a fair and effective appellate review.

The application for the appointment of counsel to advance all three grounds of appeal was granted.

The appellant, an overnight attendant at a group home, was convicted of criminal negligence causing the death of a resident with developmental disabilities who drowned in a bathtub.

The appellant had left the resident unsupervised, contrary to an "eyes-on" protocol.

On appeal, the court found the verdict unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of causation.

The forensic pathologist's opinion on drowning was based on information not fully supported by the record, and he could not eliminate other potential causes like a sudden cardiac event.

The court noted a risk of the jury reasoning backward from the death to infer causation without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal was the extraordinary delay (over four years) by the trial judge in delivering written reasons for judgment after announcing the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal found that this prolonged delay, coupled with the complexity of the case, rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality, rendering the reasons an "after-the-fact justification." Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Nicholas Berto, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failure to remain at the scene of an accident, and sought leave to appeal his 18-month and 6-month consecutive sentences.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by not leaving the lesser included offence of dangerous driving to the jury, claiming his driving constituted two separate incidents with an intervening act.

He also sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his intellectual disability and mental health for sentencing purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the intervening act argument as the dangerous driving was one continuous transaction.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it was not materially different from evidence already considered.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered all factors and the sentence was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside in light of R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant, J.J., appealed convictions for sexual assault and break and enter.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of DNA evidence, the imposition of an onus on the appellant to provide a benign explanation for DNA presence, and trial counsel's conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the DNA evidence in his reasons, did not reverse the burden of proof regarding innocent DNA transfer, and that trial counsel's prior representation of an investigating officer did not result in an actual conflict of interest impairing trial fairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder and robbery, appealed on the sole ground that his trial counsel breached the duty of loyalty, effectively depriving him of counsel.

The appellant argued that counsel acted as amicus curiae rather than defence counsel, undermining his defence through misguided actions and communications with the Crown, including lying to gain trust and sharing defence strategy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while counsel's actions were at times misguided and unethical (e.g., lying about his background), they did not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.

The court applied the two-part test for breach of loyalty, requiring an actual conflict of interest and impairment of representation, concluding that counsel's actions, though inadvisable, were not motivated by conflicting loyalties but rather by an attempt to manage a difficult client in a challenging case with strong Crown evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder following a second trial.

He raised six grounds of appeal, challenging the jury instructions on post-offence conduct and constructive first degree murder, the admission of his statements to police, the admission of a recanting witness's prior statement, the admission of intercepted communications with his former spouse, and the lawfulness of the wiretap authorizations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds.

The court found that while the trial judge erred in finding no independent evidence of fabrication regarding the appellant's alibi, the failure to give an O'Connor instruction did not prejudice him.

The court also held that spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act does not survive divorce.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Pierre Labelle, appealed his convictions for indecent acts, criminal harassment, and communicating for sexual services with a minor.

The primary issues on appeal were the trial judge's treatment of non-identification evidence, the reasonableness of the criminal harassment conviction against one complainant (J.V.), and the alleged improper use of the appellant's willingness to fabricate evidence as positive evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the non-identification evidence lacked probative value, the criminal harassment conviction was reasonable based on the evidence, and the trial judge correctly used the appellant's fabrication as a basis for rejecting his evidence, not as positive evidence of guilt.

Three appellants were convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, with two also convicted of unlawful confinement.

Following the trial judge's reasons, the appellants moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, but the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal in the result and leaving several s. 11(b) legal issues — including treatment of multiple accused and post-conviction applications — to be resolved in a future case.

The offender, Andrew Gabourie, pleaded guilty to multiple Criminal Code charges, including arson endangering life, possession of an explosive substance, and uttering threats.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his lengthy criminal record, the planned nature of the arson, and the presence of many people near the fire.

Mitigating factors included his guilty pleas and significant mental health issues (PTSD, ADHD, severe anxiety, bipolar disorder).

The court also considered the harsh conditions of his presentence custody, which was spent in segregation (Behavioural Stabilization Unit), exacerbated by his mental health.

Applying Summers, Duncan, and Hearns credits for presentence custody, including enhanced credit for segregation and COVID-19 conditions, the court imposed a total sentence of 1200 days, which was reduced to time served.

The offender was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after defrauding a woman he met on a dating website of $595,000.

He used a false surname and convinced her to invest in a fictitious internet app and second mortgages, but instead used the funds for personal expenses, gambling debts, and restitution for a prior fraud conviction.

The court found the offender's actions highly exploitative and noted his extensive related criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to 6 years' imprisonment, less 462 days of pre-trial custody credit, and ordered restitution and a fine in lieu of forfeiture, each in the amount of $558,456.

In a professional discipline hearing, the member admitted misconduct arising from counselling a client with an acquired brain injury while lacking relevant competence, using abusive and demeaning communications, breaching confidentiality, and engaging in boundary violations and conflicts of interest through overlapping family representation and personal self-disclosure.

The Panel found the admitted facts established multiple breaches of the governing regulation, the Code of Ethics, and the Standards of Practice Handbook, and further found the conduct disgraceful, dishonourable, and unprofessional.

Applying the public-interest approach to joint submissions, the Panel accepted the jointly proposed order.

The member was reprimanded, suspended for four months with one month remittable on compliance, made subject to remedial terms and education requirements, and ordered to pay $5,000 in costs.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.

Two consolidated appeals arising from dial-a-dope drug investigations in which undercover officers, acting on unsubstantiated tips, telephoned phone numbers alleged to be associated with drug trafficking and arranged purchases of cocaine.

The majority affirmed the entrapment framework established in R. v. Mack and R. v. Barnes, holding that police must form reasonable suspicion — whether individualized to a person or tethered to a sufficiently particularized virtual location such as a phone number — before offering an accused the opportunity to commit a criminal offence.

In the first appellant's case, the majority upheld his convictions, finding that reasonable suspicion had crystallized during the call before the opportunity to traffic was extended, as the accused's use of drug-subculture slang corroborated the tip.

In the second appellant's case, the majority found entrapment had occurred because the opportunity to traffic was provided before reasonable suspicion was established, and accordingly reinstated the stay of proceedings.

The minority would have revised the bona fide inquiry prong to require only a factually-grounded investigation into a tightly circumscribed location motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes, under which both appeals would have been dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.