Bryan Badali

The appellants, Torcaso and Maione, appealed their convictions for break and enter, with Torcaso also appealing an assault conviction.

They argued that a letter sent to the trial judge by a juror created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias argument, finding the juror denied authorship and the letter's content did not suggest bias.

The court also found no error in the jury instructions on identity, noting the trial was a "one issue trial" and the jury was adequately cautioned.

Torcaso's sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of striking the victim's surcharge; all other appeals were dismissed.

The applicant, who had been convicted of fraud, applied to reopen a stay of proceedings application based on alleged Charter violations.

He argued that his s. 8 rights were violated by the frequent and allegedly public manner of strip searches while in pre-trial custody, and that his s. 7 rights were violated by the previous Crown counsel's refusal to consent to an adjournment amidst late disclosure.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the strip searches were conducted in accordance with policy and justified by institutional security concerns, and that the Crown's conduct did not amount to bad faith or shock the conscience of the community.

The court concluded that this was not one of the clearest of cases warranting the extraordinary remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was found guilty of fraud over $5,000.

In the same reasons for judgment, the trial judge dismissed the applicant's pre-trial application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged abuse of process by correctional officers, without allowing a full evidentiary record.

The applicant brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the denial of procedural fairness gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias tainting the entire proceeding.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and concluding that re-opening the stay application to allow a full evidentiary record was the appropriate and proportionate remedy.

The accused, Shaun Rootenberg, was charged with fraud over $5,000.00.

The defence brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on late disclosure and alleged abuse during pre-trial custody (strip searches).

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no prejudice from late disclosure and that the strip search complaints were not properly brought in the criminal forum.

On the fraud charge, the court found no deceit or falsehood in the initial investments by the complainant, Victoria Smith, but found the actus reus and mens rea of fraud established through "other fraudulent means" due to the unauthorized diversion of Ms. Smith's investment funds for personal use and to third parties.

Rootenberg was found guilty.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on incapacity and consent, and the trial judge's response to jury questions regarding bodily harm and consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding admissibility of prior sexual assault evidence and counselling records, the exclusion of a prior consistent statement, the instruction on incapacity as part of the Crown's case, and the response to jury questions regarding the relationship between bodily harm and consent.

On appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, the appellant sought a variation of the sentence.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to 133 days.

The appeal was heard on the same date as the decision was rendered.

Two separate appeals concerning the entrapment defence in dial-a-dope drug trafficking investigations.

In Williams' case, the trial judge found entrapment and stayed drug trafficking charges, but the Crown appealed.

In Ahmad's case, the trial judge rejected an entrapment application and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that police may provide opportunities to sell drugs to persons associated with phone lines reasonably suspected of being used in dial-a-dope operations, even without reasonable suspicion that those individuals are engaged in criminal activity, provided the police are conducting a bona fide inquiry.

The majority found no entrapment in either case.

The concurrence reached the same result but on the basis that police had reasonable suspicion that both accused were engaged in criminal activity.

A Toronto police officer was convicted of attempted murder for firing a second volley of six shots at a knife-wielding man lying on a streetcar floor, 5.5 seconds after an initial volley that had fatally wounded the victim.

The officer was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the six-year sentence, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the mandatory minimum sentences for attempted murder with a firearm do not violate the Charter.

The court rejected the officer's constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and dismissed his application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The appellant, a police superintendent acting as Incident Commander during the 2010 G20 Summit, appealed convictions for professional misconduct relating to the mass arrests of protestors at the Novotel Hotel and the intersection of Queen and Spadina.

The Hearing Officer found the arrests were unlawful and constituted an unnecessary exercise of authority, and that the appellant committed discreditable conduct by leaving detainees in inclement weather.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the Hearing Officer correctly applied the law regarding reasonable and probable grounds and the ancillary powers doctrine.

On the cross-appeals regarding penalty, the Commission found the original penalties (a reprimand and forfeiture of 10 days off) were unreasonable given the severity of the Charter breaches.

The Commission varied the penalties to the forfeiture of 20 days off for each of the two unlawful arrest convictions, to be served consecutively with the 20 days off forfeited for discreditable conduct.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences against his cousin committed when she was a young girl.

He was sentenced to two years less a day in jail and three years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction arguing the trial judge engaged in an unbalanced approach to evidence resulting in a reversal of the burden of proof and failure to give effect to the presumption of innocence.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly applied Gladue principles and underemphasized deterrence and denunciation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant while she was asleep at his residence on November 18, 2015.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual contact while the accused claimed the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and rejected the accused's evidence, determining that the accused placed his fingers in the complainant's vagina while she was asleep and knew she was asleep when he did so.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused sought leave under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant and adduce evidence regarding prior sexual activity between them.

The Crown charged the accused with sexually assaulting the complainant while she was asleep.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of: (1) a single prior act of sexual intercourse; (2) multiple acts of massaging over clothing; and (3) the complainant permitting the accused to photograph and video her while naked.

The court applied the three-part test under section 276, examining relevance, probative value, and prejudicial effect.

The court permitted cross-examination and evidence regarding the prior sexual intercourse and massaging incidents, finding them relevant to rebut the Crown's theory of motive and to establish the nature of the relationship.

The court prohibited admission of the actual photographs and videos but permitted cross-examination regarding the circumstances of their creation.

Jordan McPhee pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and robbery.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation.

The court, considering McPhee's criminal record, a subsequent aggravated assault conviction, and a psychiatric risk assessment, found him to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of six years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody) followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order, with specific recommendations for conditions to the parole board.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and his sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying uneven scrutiny, failing to apply the W.D. framework correctly, and providing insufficient reasons.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the unprovoked nature of the attack and the appellant's prior record, though the sentence was varied to credit 74 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of attempted murder, applied for release from custody pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant would surrender into custody, but argued his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the merits of the appeal regarding inconsistent verdicts shifted the balance in favour of reviewability, and that a fully informed public would not find his release contrary to the public interest.

The applicant, a police officer, was convicted of attempted murder after shooting a person on a streetcar.

He brought a constitutional challenge against the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder with a restricted firearm under s. 239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the high moral blameworthiness of the applicant's conduct, nor was it overbroad in its application to police officers.

This case concerns the sentencing of Police Constable James Forcillo for attempted murder.

The court first addressed a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum punishment of five years for attempted murder under s.239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, finding it did not infringe ss.12 or 7 of the Charter.

The sentencing judge then determined the appropriate sentence, rejecting the defence's submission that Forcillo's moral blameworthiness was low due to a misperception.

The court found that Forcillo acted contrary to his training by shooting a potential threat and failing to use de-escalation, constituting a high level of moral blameworthiness and an egregious breach of trust.

Despite mitigating factors such as positive personal characteristics and the impact of protective custody, the aggravating factors, including the abuse of authority and the serious actual harm caused, substantially outweighed them.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence.

A sentence of six years in the penitentiary was imposed.

The moving party sought to set aside prior Mareva injunction orders under Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the orders were obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations.

The alleged fraud concerned a business partner’s denial of authorship of an email offering the moving party a profit-sharing interest, which later emerged during related criminal proceedings as authentic.

The court found that the denial of the email constituted fraudulent testimony.

However, the court held that the email was not material to the motions judge’s earlier decision granting and maintaining the Mareva injunctions, which rested on separate findings regarding unauthorized diversion of company assets.

As the alleged fraud did not form part of the foundation of the earlier orders, the motion to set them aside was dismissed.