Civil Litigation - Plaintiff

A case management conference was held to set the timetable for two grouped appeals arising from a decision certifying a class action against the Province of Ontario but declining to certify it against 49 Children's Aid Societies regarding the use of 'Birth Alerts'.

The appeals will be heard by a five-judge panel to consider whether the court should depart from the Ragoonanan principle.

The case management judge set the schedule for responding materials, intervention motions, and factums.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The moving parties (Vendors) sought to lift an automatic stay of an order requiring the responding party (Purchaser) to pay €855,155 pending the hearing of an application regarding an earn-out payment dispute.

The Purchaser had appealed the order, triggering an automatic stay under Rule 63.01(1).

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to lift the stay under Rule 63.01(5), finding that the Purchaser's financial instability created a material risk of non-payment, which constituted financial hardship for the Vendors.

To balance the risk to the Purchaser, the stay was lifted on the condition that the Vendors pay an equivalent amount into court as security pending the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The respondents and third parties brought a motion for security for costs against the appellants pending an appeal of a summary judgment order in a mortgage enforcement action.

The motion judge found that the appeal had a low prospect of success and that the appellants were unlikely to pay a costs award, satisfying the 'other good reason' requirement under Rule 61.06(1)(c).

The court ordered the appellants to post security for costs, though the amount for the plaintiff was reduced as a party should not have to give security simply to defend an order obtained below.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from a social media post by the respondent about Halal mortgages, which the appellant claimed referred to him and his former company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the post related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant failed to show the defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned words did not identify him.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants, FedEx, appealed an order certifying a class proceeding brought by the respondent, who alleged FedEx charged undisclosed and unsolicited customs brokerage fees in breach of the Consumer Protection Act.

FedEx argued the claim disclosed no cause of action, lacked common issues, and had an overly broad class definition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the systemic nature of the billing practices raised common issues, and the class definition appropriately included claims that might face limitation or jurisdictional defences, which are better addressed at trial.

The moving party, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant and prohibited from filing further materials without leave, sought leave to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The underlying action involved allegations of improper disclosure of confidential youth records by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed notice of appeal contained the same fatal flaws as her previous pleadings and failed to raise tenable grounds.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal, finding that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the respondent would suffer prejudice.

The motion for leave to file a notice of appeal was dismissed.

The moving party insurer sought an extension of time to file materials for leave to appeal and a stay of a Divisional Court order requiring it to pay $365,257 for home modifications under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The responding party, a 92-year-old woman with catastrophic injuries, required the funds to modify her daughter's home for her care.

The Court of Appeal granted the unopposed extension of time but dismissed the stay motion.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the insurer failed to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the responding party given her advanced age, poor health, and immediate need for the benefits.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

The moving parties brought a motion to transfer part of an appeal to the Divisional Court, extend the time to perfect the appeal, and stay the trial judgment pending appeal.

The underlying dispute involved three brothers and a jointly owned residential investment property, resulting in a trial judgment that dismissed a breach of contract claim and ordered partition and sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to transfer, opting to combine the appeals under section 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to avoid inconsistent results.

The court granted the extension of time to perfect the appeal and granted a stay of the partition and sale order pending appeal, finding serious issues to be tried and a risk of irreparable harm.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay damages for sexually assaulting the respondent after administering the drug temazepam without her knowledge.

The appellant argued the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, provided insufficient reasons, and erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted a thorough credibility assessment, provided extensive reasons capable of appellate review, and properly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunne because the appellant failed to put his version of events to the respondent during cross-examination.

The moving party sought a stay pending appeal of orders striking her trespass action as an abuse of process and granting the responding party vacant possession of a mortgaged property.

The moving party had previously been evicted following a default judgment but illegally re-entered the property.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found no serious issue to be tried, as the moving party's action was a clear collateral attack on the default judgment.

The balance of convenience favoured the responding party due to mounting arrears and the moving party's illegal occupation.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank's claim for amounts due on a credit card and two lines of credit.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the bank discovered the claim when she first missed minimum monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the credit agreements created demand obligations, meaning the limitation period only began to run when the bank cancelled the accounts and demanded full repayment.

As the action was commenced within two years of the earliest cancellation date, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against Mexico, which was dismissed by a three-member arbitration tribunal.

The appellant later discovered that the Mexican-appointed arbitrator had communicated with Mexican officials during the arbitration regarding potential future appointments.

The application judge found a reasonable apprehension of bias but declined to set aside the award, reasoning that the other two arbitrators were impartial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the award, holding that a reasonable apprehension of bias concerning one member of a tribunal taints the entire panel and cannot be balanced away as a minor procedural error.

The appellant insurer appealed a partial summary judgment declaring it responsible for covering water damage to the respondent's property.

The insurer had denied coverage based on an exclusionary clause for water entering through basement walls, arguing it applied because water from a burst watermain entered via a pipe transecting the basement wall.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plain meaning of 'wall' does not include a pipe, as they serve conflicting functions.

The court held that any ambiguity in the exclusionary clause must be resolved against the insurer who drafted the policy.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced an action against his former landlord for the disposal of business assets and related mental distress.

The motion judge dismissed the action as a nullity, finding that only the trustee in bankruptcy had the capacity to sue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the assets were exempt 'tools of the trade' under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the exemption limit was only $11,300, the claim sought damages rather than the return of property, and the mental distress claim was inextricably linked to the property claim belonging to the bankrupt estate.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant, the parties were unable to agree on the costs of the underlying summary judgment motion.

The respondent argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge and that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Court of Appeal followed its general practice of deciding costs immediately and awarded the appellant its requested partial indemnity costs of $47,660, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion.

The court declined to interfere with a separate costs order regarding a co-defendant, as it had not been raised on appeal.

The appellant, a defendant in an ongoing Superior Court action, commenced a separate action against the opposing counsel and their law firm, alleging negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, and conspiracy.

The motion judge dismissed the action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision, as opposing counsel owed no duty of care to the appellant and the statement of claim failed to particularize any valid causes of action.