Alexandra Hoy

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly analyze circumstantial evidence and contradictions in the victim's testimony, and erred in principle during sentencing by confusing the roles of the assailants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 6.5-year sentence was fit given the appellant's prior record and the aggravating nature of home invasions, though the assault conviction was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant was convicted of multiple weapons offences based entirely on circumstantial evidence after a police officer witnessed a single gunshot and briefly chased the fleeing suspect.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant's DNA found on the recovered handgun, a fleeting description by the officer, and grainy surveillance videos showing the appellant in the vicinity over an hour prior.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's verdict unreasonable, concluding that the totality of the evidence was too generic to establish the appellant's identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The parties made written submissions regarding the costs of the appeal and a related motion for leave to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs as between the respondent and the Nealon appellants.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, against the Garber appellants.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen property, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

He argued that the trial judge erred in relying on flawed eyewitness identification evidence and in finding that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly cautioned herself on the frailties of eyewitness identification and reasonably relied on overwhelming confirmatory evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the dangerous driving and the stolen licence plate.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following his guilty pleas to several offences, including driving while disqualified.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum available under the Criminal Code at the time was five years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lifetime prohibition, and substituted a five-year driving prohibition, noting the appellant's criminal record and the nature of the offences.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing her appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to raise a question of law alone as required by section 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, with the consent of the Crown, the court vacated the $300 victim fine surcharge.

Ten days after the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment authorizing the responding party to enforce its mortgage, the moving parties brought a motion seeking to declare the enforcement proceedings null and void.

The moving parties argued they were commercial farmers and had not received the required notice under s. 21 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the moving parties were barred from raising the issue at this late stage since mortgage enforceability was squarely at issue on the appeal.

The court found no credible evidence that the moving party was a commercial farmer and deemed the motion an abuse of process intended to delay creditors.

The appellant pled guilty to robbery and using an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles, failed to consider rehabilitation, and that the sentence should be reconsidered due to the Sharma decision and COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge appropriately applied Gladue principles, considered rehabilitation, and already accounted for COVID-19 hardships.

A conditional sentence was unavailable as the sentence was not less than two years.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 6-year sentence for internet luring, sexual interference, and sexual assault of a developmentally delayed child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which relied on corroborating electronic messages showing grooming behaviour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the exploitation of a highly vulnerable child.

However, the court stayed the sexual assault charge to avoid double jeopardy.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the timeline of events and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the timeline discrepancy went only to the reliability of time estimates rather than core credibility, and that the trial judge had ample corroborating evidence to support his findings.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing an error in the calculation of his pre-trial custody credit.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that the parties made a mathematical error at trial.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, allowed the appeal, and reduced the appellant's sentence by 257 days.

The appellant, a unionized employee of the Ontario Public Service, commenced a civil action against her employer and union alleging workplace discrimination and harassment.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement and was therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator or the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 46.1 of the Human Rights Code granted the court concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 46.1 does not override the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators where the dispute arises from a collective agreement and no independent civil wrong is pleaded.

The respondent was the successful party on the appeal and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent costs of the appeal and the costs appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,342.33 all inclusive.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a dock they constructed on Lake Simcoe constituted a private nuisance to the neighbouring respondent.

The trial judge had ordered a mandatory injunction for the dock's removal, punitive damages of $100,000, and substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of nuisance and the mandatory injunction, noting the dock substantially and unreasonably interfered with the respondent's ability to use their boat.

The Court also upheld the punitive damages against the property owners (Garber) due to their refusal to remedy the nuisance.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the punitive damages against the contractor (Nealon) and reducing the costs awarded against him to a partial indemnity scale, finding his conduct did not warrant such exceptional penalties.

The appellant mother appealed an order placing her two children in extended society care with no access.

The children, who are Métis, were apprehended due to exposure to domestic violence and adult sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extended society care order, finding no error in the lower courts' assessment of the children's need for protection or the statutory time limits.

However, applying the Kawartha framework, the Court found the trial judge erred by placing the burden on the mother to prove access was beneficial.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the mother monthly photograph access as it was in the children's best interests and would not impair adoption prospects.

The parties reached an agreement regarding the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs to the respondent in the agreed amount of $20,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The respondents moved to quash an appeal from an order that appointed an investigative monitor, released interim funds, granted an interim injunction, converted an application to an action, added parties, and refused to seal the court file.

The Court of Appeal held that all aspects of the order were interlocutory in nature, as they did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties or the real matters in dispute.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, as appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation and inducing breach of contract arising from a residential property refinancing.

The trial judge found no evidence that the respondent made false representations or intended to procure a breach of the settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no error of law, no differential standard of scrutiny applied, and no reasonable apprehension of bias from the trial judge's questioning.

The appeal and the appeal as to costs were dismissed.

The appellant property owner appealed a decision granting the respondent municipality a prescriptive easement for a watermain installed on the property in 1979-1980.

The appellant argued the municipality's use was not open, that the burden of proof regarding permission was reversed, and that public authorities with expropriation powers cannot acquire prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge reasonably inferred the owners had actual or imputed knowledge of the watermain, the lack of evidence of permission rendered any burden of proof issue moot, and there is no legal bar preventing municipalities from acquiring prescriptive easements.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring a non-seasonally limited easement over their property in favour of the respondents' landlocked cottages and enjoining them from interfering with access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the deeds unambiguously granted unrestricted rights of way.

The court also rejected arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a civil context, the relocation of the easement, the test for a permanent injunction, the restriction to a single gate, and the absence of a respondent's factum at the application stage.

The judgment was varied on consent to remove the word 'prescriptive' as the easement was deeded.