Shane Rayman

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

Metrolinx applied for a warrant to take possession of expropriated lands, while the respondent landlords and tenants applied to postpone possession, arguing Metrolinx failed to make a valid, good-faith offer of compensation under s. 25 of the Expropriations Act.

Metrolinx had offered $1.00 due to alleged environmental contamination but refused to answer questions or provide environmental reports during examinations.

The respondents sought an adjournment to bring a refusals motion before a Master.

The court granted the adjournment, finding the respondents had a reasonable basis to test whether Metrolinx's offer was made in good faith.

The applicant, a commercial tenant, sought judicial review of the respondent City's actions during the expropriation of restrictive covenants in its lease.

The applicant alleged a denial of procedural fairness regarding the timing of disclosure and the City's refusal to consent to an adjournment of the Hearing of Necessity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the City met its statutory obligations and owed no broader common law duty of procedural fairness at that stage.

The Court also declined to rule on the validity of the expropriation, finding the application premature as the applicant had withdrawn from the statutory hearing process and no final expropriation decision had been made.

The parties reached an agreement regarding the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs to the respondent in the agreed amount of $20,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant property owner appealed a decision granting the respondent municipality a prescriptive easement for a watermain installed on the property in 1979-1980.

The appellant argued the municipality's use was not open, that the burden of proof regarding permission was reversed, and that public authorities with expropriation powers cannot acquire prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge reasonably inferred the owners had actual or imputed knowledge of the watermain, the lack of evidence of permission rendered any burden of proof issue moot, and there is no legal bar preventing municipalities from acquiring prescriptive easements.

The applicant property owner sought a mandatory injunction requiring the respondent municipality to remove a watermain that had been installed on its property in 1979 or 1980.

The municipality brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that it had acquired a prescriptive easement over the land.

The court found that the municipality had established continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use of the land for the watermain for over 20 years prior to the property's conversion to the Land Titles system, without permission from or objection by the property owners.

The court granted the municipality a prescriptive easement and dismissed the property owner's application for removal.

The appellant's property was damaged by flooding following significant rainfalls in May 2013.

The floodwaters originated from adjacent land expropriated by the respondent municipality in 2009 for a construction project.

The appellant had commenced an injurious affection claim before the Ontario Municipal Board in 2011.

Following the flooding, the appellant commenced an action in Superior Court in June 2015.

The respondent moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the claim was discoverable when the flooding occurred in May 2013.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether an action in Superior Court would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy, and by misapprehending the evidence regarding the appellant's belief that the OMB had exclusive jurisdiction over injurious affection claims.

The appellants, owners of waterfront properties on Nottawasaga Bay, appealed a decision of the Coordinator in the Office of the Surveyor General confirming a municipal resurvey under the Surveys Act.

The resurvey extended two road allowances straight across accreted lands to the water's edge, effectively cutting off the appellants' water access.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding that the Coordinator's decision was unreasonable.

The Court held that the Surveys Act does not displace the common law principles of accretion, which dictate that accreted lands attach to riparian properties and should be equitably allocated.

The matter was remitted for a trial of an issue regarding whether the survey should be confirmed with or without amendments.

The appellant car wash business appealed an Ontario Municipal Board order requiring it to pay $86,943.20 in costs to the respondent municipality after its claim for injurious affection was dismissed.

The appellant argued the costs were excessive and the Board placed undue reliance on the respondent's $15,000 settlement offer.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly exercised its discretion under the Expropriations Act to award costs based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct in refusing the offer and proceeding with a meritless claim.

The plaintiff, a long‑term managerial employee terminated without cause, moved for summary judgment seeking damages for wrongful dismissal beyond the statutory minimums paid under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The employer argued that contractual terms limited notice to statutory minimums, that bonus payments should not form part of damages, and that mitigation issues required a trial.

The court found the contractual termination clause void for violating statutory minimum standards and rejected the employer’s claim that it had been validly amended.

Applying Bardal factors, the court held that the employee was entitled to 18 months’ reasonable notice and that bonus payments formed an integral component of compensation during part of the notice period.

Summary judgment was granted with damages reflecting compensation and benefits during the notice period, subject to a trust for mitigation income.

The appellant operated a truck stop on Highway 17 that was effectively put out of business when the province constructed a new section of Highway 417, severely restricting access to the property.

The Ontario Municipal Board awarded compensation for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act.

The Court of Appeal set aside the award, finding the Board failed to adequately balance competing rights and to recognize the elevated importance of public utility.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that reasonableness of interference must focus on whether the individual claimant has shouldered a disproportionate share of the burden of construction, not on whether the public benefit outweighs private harm.

The Board's decision was restored.