Alan D. Gold

The appellant, Nicholas Doering, brought a second appeal against his conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life, after the Court of Appeal had previously affirmed his guilt on that charge and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in not re-opening the case to allow new legal arguments on his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to re-open the case as the matter was remitted for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the issue of guilt was res judicata and the current appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on its previous order, emphasizing the principle of finality in the appellate process.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the application judge's ruling on pole camera surveillance or the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the total incarceration period from 18 to 15 years and quashing the delayed parole order.

The court found the trial judge erred by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a first-time offender.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred by not cautioning the jury about relying solely on uncorroborated police evidence of an accused's utterance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police witnesses are assessed for credibility and reliability in the same manner as any other witness.

A specific cautionary instruction is only appropriate if an evidentiary foundation is laid, and a categorical approach is unwarranted.

The court also found that the prosecution did not depend solely on the undercover officer's evidence, given the seizure of a significant quantity of cocaine.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for the production of a Crown Disclosure Brief from the defendants Vasos Georgiou and John Aquino.

The original motion was adjourned sine die after the Attorney General provided key undertakings.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($20,000) but not on entitlement.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57, decided that no costs should be awarded to any party.

The decision considered the novelty of the issues, the timing of the Attorney General's undertakings, and the fact that the outcome was not primarily based on the arguments presented by the defendants seeking costs.

The plaintiff in a civil rescission action sought an order compelling the defendants to produce the Crown disclosure brief they received in related criminal proceedings concerning the same alleged fraud in a hospital procurement process.

The Attorney General opposed immediate production, arguing it could taint witnesses before they testified in the criminal trial.

The court balanced the interests under the Wagg framework and adjourned the motion sine die, accepting the Attorney General's undertaking to conduct a Wagg review and produce the documents within eight weeks after a verdict in the criminal proceedings.

The three accused were charged with conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime following an RCMP undercover operation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on voice identification evidence from intercepted communications to link the accused Shanker to the conspiracy.

The court found the voice identification evidence unreliable due to cross-racial identification issues, expectation bias, and the poor quality of the recordings.

Without reliable voice identification, the circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence at the warehouse was insufficient to prove their involvement in the drug trafficking scheme beyond a reasonable doubt.

All accused were acquitted of the cocaine-related charges.

Pawar conceded guilt to a separate charge of possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking.

The offender, a police officer, was found guilty of failing to provide necessaries of life after a conviction for criminal negligence causing death was quashed on appeal.

The court addressed the defence's application to re-open the case and decline conviction on the remaining charge, which was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.

The court then proceeded to sentence the offender for failing to provide necessaries of life, imposing an 18-month conditional sentence, considering the reduced moral blameworthiness after the criminal negligence conviction was overturned, and the offender's mental health and the harsher impact of custody on a former police officer.

The applicant, convicted of sexual exploitation and sentenced to 3.5 years, sought bail pending sentence appeal, leave to appeal sentence, and a stay of the SOIRA order.

The court dismissed the bail application, finding the appeal lacked sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship if detained.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted as it was not opposed and not frivolous.

The application for a stay of the SOIRA order was adjourned to the panel hearing the sentence appeal, as the jurisdiction of a single judge to grant such a stay was an open question.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a bid-rigging scheme, brought an application for the disclosure or third-party production of investigative files held by counsel for cooperating witnesses.

The cooperating witnesses had received immunity or leniency under the Competition Bureau's programs.

The applicants argued that the witnesses' lawyers acted as state agents when interviewing their clients and that solicitor-client privilege over those interview notes was waived.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the lawyers were not acting as state agents, the communications remained protected by solicitor-client privilege, and the privilege was never waived.

Consequently, the materials were not within the Crown's control for Stinchcombe disclosure and could not be produced as third-party records.

The applicants sought to quash charges of fraud on the public and conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the evidence identified 38 specific corporate victims, thus requiring individual naming in the indictment.

The Crown contended that the charges were properly framed against the public due to the impossibility of identifying all victims (e.g., individual condominium owners affected by increased fees) and the broad interpretation of "public" in the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were appropriately framed as offenses against the public, consistent with recent jurisprudence where a segment of the community or a regulated industry can constitute "the public" and where a ripple effect on unidentifiable parties exists.

The applicant sought bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada after his appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, finding that the application for leave was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

This decision considered the applicant's age, lack of criminal record, the lower end of seriousness for the firearm offences, and the significant portion of his 30-month sentence that the leave process would cover.

The application for bail was granted.

The appellant, Rene Hamouth, appealed convictions for multiple firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The appeal challenged the lawfulness of the search warrant (Garofoli issue), the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the exclusion of firearms and ammunition, and the finding of possession of firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, except for one count related to a non-restricted firearm (Winchester shotgun), which was substituted from s. 95(1) to s. 92(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court upheld the trial judge's Garofoli analysis, his s. 24(2) analysis (including the consideration of the Crown's concession to exclude incriminating statements and the lack of causal connection between the Charter breaches and the discovery of firearms), and the finding of possession.

The appellant, Matthew Priestley-Campbell, appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand under s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

He alleged errors by the trial judge regarding the proof of the ASD's possession, credibility assessment of witnesses, and a s. 10(b) Charter violation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the officer's testimony was sufficient to prove ASD possession, her credibility assessment was reasonable, and there was no Charter breach.

Allison Dent appealed her conviction for publishing defamatory libel against Troy Lalonde, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to misapprehensions of evidence and erroneous "profile" analysis.

The Crown cross-appealed her sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's decision reasonable and solidly grounded in evidence, despite a conceded error regarding an adopted admission by silence which was deemed harmless.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding the trial judge erred by giving undue weight to the impact of incarceration on the appellant's child and failing to adequately consider denunciation and deterrence for a "worst-case example" of criminal defamation.

The Court substituted the conditional sentence with a two-year less a day term of incarceration.

The appellant, convicted of importing methamphetamine, appealed his conviction and 12-year sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged Charter violations (detention, search, voluntariness of statements) due to a particularized drug lookout at the border, and a flawed jury selection process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, affirming that routine border inspections, even with a specific lookout, do not trigger Charter detention until a highly intrusive search or communicated subjective intent to detain occurs.

The court also found the appellant's statements voluntary and the jury selection process valid.

The 12-year sentence for importing 25 kg of methamphetamine was deemed fit and within the appropriate range for large-scale drug couriers.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter after finding a section 8 breach due to a dynamic police entry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and a motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding no error in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, reducing the concurrent sentence for possession of proceeds of crime from five years to two years to comply with the statutory maximum.

The applicants, two police officers charged with theft, obstruct justice, and perjury, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 41 months and 6 days.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including an implicit waiver by one co-accused, and delay caused by an inaccurate estimate for the preliminary inquiry.

The court also deducted 10 months as an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic backlog.

After deductions, the net delay for both applicants fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of breaking and entering, sought to re-open his dismissed appeal and admit fresh evidence, including his own and his co-accused's affidavits denying his participation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the fresh evidence not reasonably capable of belief due to inconsistencies, implausibilities, and contradictions with trial counsel's evidence and physical evidence.

The court emphasized the finality principle in re-opening appeals and the high threshold for admitting fresh evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a targeted shooting.

The Crown's circumstantial case relied on DNA evidence, video surveillance, and tracking data from the getaway vehicle's Infotainment system.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made multiple errors in the jury instructions, including cautions on exculpatory eyewitness evidence and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant also challenged the admission of the Infotainment system data, alleging a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

Furthermore, the Court held the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle's data because he had fraudulently rented the vehicle and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

This is an appeal from convictions for firearm offences.

The appellants argued Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, 10(b)) and unreasonable verdicts based on misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no Charter breaches, disagreeing with the trial judge's s. 8 finding.

However, it allowed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusion regarding an "exchange of gunfire" was based on a fundamental misapprehension of evidence, and that the use of cellphone photographs to infer possession was improper due to lack of similarity and risk of propensity reasoning.

Ahmed's convictions were quashed and acquittals entered, while Yusuf's convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.