Human Rights - SCJ

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's constructive dismissal claim with leave to amend to provide full particulars, and sought a protective order over a diversity survey and an ombudsperson report.

The court dismissed the motion for particulars, finding the defendant had already filed a statement of defence and the existing pleadings provided sufficient detail to know the case to meet.

The court also denied the protective order, ruling it was premature and that the documents were relevant to the plaintiff's allegations of systemic gender discrimination and a toxic work environment.

The applicants brought a Charter challenge alleging that the Government of Ontario's cancellation of a joint task force violated their right to freedom of association under section 2(d).

The task force had been proposed during collective bargaining between the union and the college employer council to help resolve a strike, but no collective agreement was reached and the strike was ended by back-to-work legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the task force was not part of any collective agreement and its cancellation did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action on behalf of participants in the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), alleging that the program's tied employment provisions and compelled payment of Employment Insurance (EI) premiums infringe sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter and constitute unjust enrichment.

The Crown opposed certification, arguing that the SAWP is a voluntary program and pointing to an overlapping national class action already authorized in Quebec.

The court found that the plaintiffs pleaded tenable causes of action, noting the historical evidence of discriminatory intent behind the SAWP and the structural exclusion of SAWP workers from EI benefits.

The court concluded that the Ontario action was preferable as it focused specifically on the unique conditions imposed on SAWP workers and could proceed in parallel with the Quebec action.

The motion for certification was granted.

The applicants brought a constitutional application challenging PIPEDA provisions permitting voluntary disclosure of subscriber information to government institutions without prior judicial authorization and related veto provisions limiting disclosure to affected individuals.

They alleged infringements of Charter ss. 8, 7, and 2(b), arguing the scheme lacked oversight, accountability, and transparency.

The court held it was bound by appellate authority that PIPEDA does not itself confer search or seizure powers, so s. 8 was not engaged on this record, and further held the s. 7 claim was a repackaging of the s. 8 arguments.

The court also found no s. 2(b) breach because the veto provisions are discretionary, incorporate balancing, and did not substantially impede meaningful public discussion.

The plaintiff, who suffers from severe osteoarthritis, sued a supermarket for $35,000, alleging intentional infliction of mental distress and discrimination under the Human Rights Code after she was asked to leave the store for sitting too long.

The court dismissed the claim, finding the store owner's conduct in asking her to leave and threatening to call the police was not flagrant, outrageous, or calculated to produce harm.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that the plaintiff's disability was a factor in the store's decision to ask her to leave, as she was interfering with business and creating a safety concern.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the Rules of Civil Procedure that require a litigation guardian to be represented by a lawyer.

The plaintiff sought to act as litigation guardian for her 16-year-old daughter but was unable to retain counsel.

The court held that to avoid infringing section 15 of the Charter, the Rules must be interpreted to allow a mature minor the opportunity to establish their capacity to self-represent.

The court ordered the plaintiff to file evidence of her daughter's capacity and intentions, failing which she must seek representation from the Office of the Children's Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The accused was charged with firearm offences after a loaded prohibited firearm was discovered during a police traffic stop.

At trial, the accused brought a blended Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that the police conducted an arbitrary pre-text stop, unlawfully arrested the accused, failed to provide reasons for detention or rights to counsel, and used excessive force by deploying a taser.

The court also found the officers' testimony to be dishonest and symptomatic of an after-the-fact justification.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious police misconduct warranted the exclusion of the firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the Toronto Police Services Board and several Chiefs of Police regarding the practice of 'carding' or street checks.

The plaintiffs alleged that the practice disproportionately targeted Black and Indigenous individuals, violating their Charter rights and constituting systemic negligence and intrusion upon seclusion.

The court found that the plaintiffs met all the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including establishing a valid cause of action, an identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiffs.

The motion for certification was granted.

The applicant, a transgender female federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging her involuntary transfer from a women's institution to a men's maximum-security institution.

The applicant argued the transfer was an unlawful deprivation of her residual liberty.

The court declined to decide whether the transfer constituted a deprivation of residual liberty, finding that even if it did, the transfer was reasonable and lawful due to the applicant's disruptive and threatening behavior at the women's institution.

The application was dismissed, along with underdeveloped Charter claims.

The applicant unit owner sought oppression relief under sections 37 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging unfair and bad-faith conduct by the condominium corporation in relation to service-dog accommodation, noise and access disputes, counsel communications, and other governance conflicts, and also sought relief under section 76 concerning an allegedly deficient status certificate.

The court held that most allegations of bad faith, dishonesty, intimidation, and procedural unfairness were not established, and found the corporation generally acted reasonably, including in retaining counsel, pursuing entry relief, and addressing building and noise concerns.

However, the court found one breach of reasonable expectations: the corporation became too entrenched and insufficiently responsive in accommodating two service dogs, amounting to unfair prejudice and unfair disregard, though not oppression.

A declaration was granted on that limited basis, but no compensation was awarded because prior CAT damages had already compensated the same accommodation-related harm and double recovery would be inappropriate.

The status-certificate claim was dismissed for failure to prove a material misstatement or omission.

The respondent sought an extension of the suspension of the declaration of invalidity of certain provisions of the Citizenship Act.

The declaration was originally suspended for six months from December 19, 2023, and has been extended multiple times.

The respondent sought an extension to January 20, 2026 (reduced from April 22, 2026 by consent).

The court granted a two-month extension to January 20, 2026, noting significant progress in enacting replacement legislation with a reasonable expectation that it may come into force by the end of 2025.

The court adjourned the balance of the motion to January 13, 2026.

The respondent Law Society of Ontario brought a requisition under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the applicant's application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant sought declarations that the LSO violated his Charter rights under sections 24(1) and 15(1) by denying him access to court and discriminating against him based on race in connection with the revocation of his law licence in 2020.

The court found that the application was the eighth proceeding initiated by the applicant following the revocation and constituted a collateral attack on decisions that had been upheld through multiple levels of court, including the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant was charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000, and failing to comply with a release order on December 21, 2021.

The jury trial was scheduled to commence on February 23, 2026, more than 50 months after the charge.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application arguing that the delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under the Jordan framework.

The court found that after deducting defence delay and accounting for discrete events, the remaining delay of 34.14 months exceeded the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan.

The court concluded that the delay was not justified by case complexity and granted a stay of proceedings.

The Ontario Government moved to dismiss or stay a human rights action brought by a self-represented Crown lawyer alleging workplace discrimination and harassment based on race and gender.

The Crown argued that the plaintiff was bound by a collective agreement containing mandatory arbitration provisions.

The court dismissed the motion on two grounds: first, the plaintiff was not a unionized employee and therefore the Weber doctrine did not deprive the court of jurisdiction; and second, the Crown failed to establish on the evidence that the plaintiff was a party to the collective agreement.

The court also found that portions of the plaintiff's claim alleging systemic institutional racism fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement's subject matter jurisdiction, even if the agreement were binding.

A police inspector brought a defamation action against a law student for an X post commenting on allegations of discriminatory treatment of officers on mental health leave at the Thunder Bay Police Service.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion).

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the defendant established a valid defence of justification based on publicly available information from news articles and Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario proceedings.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression on matters of significant public concern outweighed any harm to the plaintiff's reputation.

The motion was granted and the defamation action was dismissed.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion claiming unreasonable delay and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm in relation to his ex-wife.

The total delay from the date of formal charges to the anticipated completion of trial was 1,179 days (approximately 38 months and 22 days).

The Crown failed to disclose critical evidence—video-recorded statements of the complainant and accused taken in Punjabi by police—and their translations for nearly two years.

The court found that the Crown's disclosure failures were unexplained and constituted a serious breach of its disclosure obligations.

After deducting legitimate defence delay periods, the net delay was 949 days (31.2 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The Crown did not establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness' decision to refuse an Interim Measures Request (IMR) from the United Nations Human Rights Committee and proceed with the applicant's removal to Somalia.

The applicant, a permanent resident with serious mental health issues and criminal convictions, had been found inadmissible to Canada and subject to a deportation order.

The court addressed justiciability and jurisdiction, finding concurrent jurisdiction between the Ontario Superior Court and Federal Court over Crown prerogative matters.

The court found the Minister's decision reasonable and not requiring reasons, as it involved an exercise of Crown prerogative regarding international treaty obligations that are not binding on Canada domestically.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant with Asperger's syndrome, challenged the constitutionality of the exclusion of mental illness from the medical assistance in dying (MAID) regime under the Criminal Code.

The court found that the claim lacked the necessary factual foundation, specifically the allegation that the plaintiff had undergone a MAID assessment and been denied based on mental illness.

The court struck the amended statement of claim but granted leave to amend within 90 days, requiring the plaintiff to adduce evidence of a triable issue relating to denial of MAID based on Asperger's syndrome.

The applicant, charged with offences related to a public protest, sought a bail review to vary a condition that broadly banned his use of social media.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the passage of time and the dropping of some charges.

Applying Charter principles and precedent, the court held that an absolute ban on social media use was overly broad and infringed on the fundamental freedom of expression.

The application was granted, and the condition was varied to only prohibit using social media to counsel others to break the law.

The Regional Municipality of Waterloo sought a declaration that its Site-Specific By-Law Number 25-021 regulating 100 Victoria Street North in Kitchener complies with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The by-law prohibits temporary structures and sheltering on the property, with a December 1, 2025 deadline for vacant possession to facilitate construction of the Kitchener Central Transit Hub.

Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, chronically homeless individuals sheltering at the encampment, sought an interlocutory injunction restraining enforcement of the by-law pending determination of their Charter claims.

The court granted the injunction, finding serious issues to be tried regarding violations of section 7 Charter rights (life, liberty, and security of the person) and potential illegality under the Municipal Act, 2001, irreparable harm to vulnerable homeless persons, and balance of convenience favoring the injunction.