Human Rights - SCJ

This endorsement addresses multiple motions for intervention by various public interest groups and a motion by the plaintiff for exemption from mandatory mediation and a blanket order regarding disclosure.

The court granted intervention status as "friends of the court" to the CCPI Coalition, Amnesty International, ESCR-Net, Colour of Poverty Coalition, and Migrant Worker Coalition, with varying rights including access to productions and attendance at discovery for some.

The court also granted the plaintiff's request to exempt the matter from mandatory mediation, citing the public interest nature and previous attempts at resolution.

The plaintiff's request for a blanket disclosure order to third parties was adjourned.

All intervenors were relieved from liability for costs.

The applicants sought to exclude evidence (firearms, ammunition, etc.) seized from their vehicle, arguing violations of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that the warrantless search of the vehicle and occupants violated ss. 8 and 9 due to the Crown's failure to prove reasonable grounds based on unreliable officer testimony regarding cannabis residue observations.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(a) or 10(b), deeming the delays in informing of detention reasons and rights to counsel justifiable for officer safety and operational requirements.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court balanced the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Despite the s. 8 and 9 breaches, which were not found to be wilful or deliberate, the court concluded that the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearm offences outweighed the breaches, and therefore, the evidence would not be excluded.

The defendant, Matthew Pecore, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of charges for sexual assault due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 27 months and 7 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The delay was primarily attributed to new memories from the complainant leading to further charges and a change in trial complexity and dates, including a direct indictment moving the case to Superior Court.

The court found that while the new disclosure inevitably caused delay, it was not attributable to the fault of any party, and the overall delay was not "markedly unreasonable" when balancing the interests of the accused, victims, and public confidence in the justice system.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The City of Toronto, as the improperly named respondent, sought to dismiss the applicant's proceeding under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The applicant's claim, while stemming from a driver's license suspension, also alleged broader issues including insufficient court staff assistance, lack of guidelines for administrative tickets, accessibility issues for persons with disabilities, and systemic discrimination violating human rights and the Charter.

The court, applying the standard that Rule 2.1.01(1) is not for 'close calls,' found the claim was not frivolous or vexatious on its face, despite raising complex issues of duty of care and proper forum.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and a case conference was directed for further submissions on the raised issues.

The defendant, Bombardier Transportation Canada Inc., brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Nicole Barrette, to answer certain discovery questions and undergo an independent medical examination (IME) by a psychiatrist.

The plaintiff was terminated from her employment and is seeking damages for wrongful dismissal, alleged refusal to accommodate disability, and discriminatory conduct under the Human Rights Code.

The court granted the motion in part, compelling answers to most outstanding discovery questions and ordering the plaintiff to attend the IME, finding her mental condition was in question.

The court also addressed the scope of expert opinion and rescheduled the trial.

The applicant, Michael Theberge, charged with drug and weapons offences, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

He argued that the police's use of a "dynamic entry" (battering ram, limited penetration) violated his section 8 Charter rights, contending it was an unwarranted and unreasonable use of force.

The Crown argued the entry method was justified by reasonable grounds concerning officer safety and the potential destruction of evidence.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Cornell and R. v. Pileggi, found that the police had reasonable grounds to depart from the "knock and announce" rule, made an individualized assessment, and did not act based on a blanket policy.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

This case concerns an action for wrongful dismissal, breaches of human rights legislation, and claims for moral and punitive damages.

The plaintiff, a former superintendent, alleged harassment and assault by tenants, leading to mental health issues and subsequent termination.

The court found the employer wrongfully dismissed the plaintiff, that the termination clause was unenforceable, and that the employer's defense of frustration of contract failed.

The employer was found to have breached its statutory obligations by failing to protect the employee from third-party harassment.

Damages were awarded for wrongful dismissal, human rights violations, and moral damages for the bad faith manner of termination.

Claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering and punitive damages were dismissed.

The applicant, Tiffani Martin, sought to exclude evidence (fentanyl, cocaine, and hashish) seized from her purse, arguing violations of her ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary prolonged investigative detention, arbitrary arrest for possession of a restricted weapon without reasonable and probable grounds, delayed notification and facilitation of the right to counsel, and an unlawful search of her purse (not incidental to arrest nor a lawful inventory search).

Applying the R. v. Grant factors for s. 24(2) Charter exclusion, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the police misconduct outweighed society's interest in admitting the reliable evidence.

Consequently, the drug evidence was excluded, which is anticipated to lead to the applicant's acquittal on the drug trafficking charges.

The defendant, IBM Canada Ltd., brought a motion to strike certain pleadings from the plaintiff's Second Amended Statement of Claim.

The impugned pleadings alleged systemic age discrimination by IBM U.S. and referenced employment circumstances of IBM U.S. employees, which the plaintiff claimed were connected to his wrongful dismissal and age discrimination by IBM Canada.

The court dismissed IBM Canada's motion, finding the pleadings relevant to the claims of systemic discrimination and punitive damages, particularly given the alleged operational connection between IBM U.S. and IBM Canada regarding the plaintiff's employment decisions.

The dismissal was conditional on the plaintiff making proposed amendments to narrow the scope of the allegations.

The court issued supplementary reasons clarifying its prior ruling on a Charter application.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence, including cell phones and their contents, arguing a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The court reiterated that no Charter breach was established regarding the search of the applicant's person incident to a lawful arrest for firearm offences, and therefore, there was no basis to exclude the seized phones or their information under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The initial ruling dismissing the application remained unchanged.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought a motion to be appointed to represent the child A.C. in a child protection proceeding concerning her twin brother, J.C. The biological parents, D.C. and N.C., opposed the motion, arguing they could adequately advocate for A.C. The court granted the OCL's motion, emphasizing A.C.'s right to independent legal representation under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The court found that A.C.'s interests, particularly regarding sibling access with J.C. and her communication difficulties, necessitated independent counsel, as the parents' advocacy, however well-intentioned, could not substitute for the child's own voice, especially where their interests might diverge.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, following a trial judge's finding of a s. 10(b) Charter breach and exclusion of breath results.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's testimony that her request to call her mother was "obvious" in its purpose to facilitate finding a lawyer.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to make a critical factual finding: whether the police officer knew or assumed the respondent's request to call a third party was for the purpose of facilitating her right to counsel.

Precedent requires the detainee to articulate this purpose, or for the officer to have such knowledge/assumption.

Without this finding, the s. 10(b) breach could not be established.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The applicant, a former employee, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the respondent employer's $1.5 million counterclaim for defamation, injurious falsehood, and unlawful interference with economic interests.

The counterclaim arose from the applicant's statements to CTV News regarding alleged workplace racism and his subsequent layoff.

The court found that while the respondent met the threshold for substantial merit regarding the defamation claim and the applicant's fair comment defence might not succeed, the public interest in protecting the applicant's expression on anti-Black racism in the workplace overwhelmingly outweighed the public interest in allowing the disproportionate and unsubstantiated counterclaim to continue.

The counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendant, 3M Canada Company, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim in its entirety, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The defendant contended that human rights claims fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and that there is no independent common law duty to accommodate.

The plaintiff's claim alleged constructive dismissal due to a poisoned work environment stemming from the defendant's failure to accommodate his disability and discriminatory treatment.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test, reading the statement of claim generously.

It found that the claim, in pith and substance, was for constructive dismissal arising from a breach of the employment contract, not solely an infringement of the Human Rights Code.

The court affirmed that allegations of discrimination and failure to accommodate can be relevant to a constructive dismissal claim, distinguishing it from actions based solely on the Code.

The motion to strike was dismissed, and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an impaired driving charge, which resulted from the trial judge's exclusion of breath test evidence.

The trial judge found two Charter breaches: arbitrary detention (s. 9) when the respondent was placed in a police vehicle for an ASD test without reasonable necessity, and unreasonable search/seizure (s. 7 and s. 8) due to video monitoring and recording of the respondent using the toilet in her cell, where the provided privacy gown was ineffective.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of Charter violations, affirming that the increased restriction on liberty required reasonable necessity and that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists even in police cell toilets.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a sufficient connection between the breaches and the evidence, and that the seriousness of the s. 8 breach warranted exclusion.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

A dispute between a condominium unit owner (Rahman) and the condominium corporation (PSCC No. 779) regarding accessible parking and alleged discrimination escalated into multiple legal proceedings.

In this action, Rahman moved for summary judgment, while the Corporation cross-moved to strike his claim as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, or alternatively, to stay the action pending other proceedings.

The court dismissed the Corporation's motion to strike but granted its motion to stay the action, rendering Rahman's summary judgment motion moot.

The court criticized the Corporation's aggressive litigation approach and Rahman's intemperate conduct, declining to award costs to the Corporation despite its partial success.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 9, 12) related to an unlawful arrest and excessive force by police.

The Crown conceded the unlawful arrest due to a deficient Feeney warrant.

The court found that police used excessive force, violating the applicant's ss. 7 and 12 Charter rights, particularly regarding a "shield takedown" and physical contact.

However, the court determined that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as it was not one of the "clearest of cases," and alternative remedies like sentence reduction and financial restitution were available to uphold the integrity of the justice system.

The applicant, Dontay Williams, brought Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

He alleged unlawful detention and arrest without reasonable grounds, insufficient grounds for a search warrant, an unreasonable strip search, and unreasonable delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, the search warrant was valid despite a technical error in its execution timeframe, the strip search was justified and conducted reasonably, and the delay in accessing counsel was reasonable given the circumstances.

The plaintiff, a 20-year employee, was terminated for just cause by the defendant after he twice deliberately deleted a company website he had created and engaged in insubordinate and dishonest conduct.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal, claiming damages for pay in lieu of notice, loss of benefits, breach of human rights, bad faith, and aggravated damages.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding that his actions constituted wilful misconduct incompatible with the fundamental terms of his employment relationship, thereby justifying summary dismissal.

The court also found no evidence to support claims for bad faith or human rights damages, concluding that the employer's investigation was adequate and that the plaintiff's mental health did not play a role in the termination decision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.