Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 534 v. Antunes, 2025 ONSC 1998

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00726589-0000
DATE: 2025-04-07
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 534, Applicant
AND: Christine Antunes and Coralia Maria Antunes, Respondents
BEFORE: Parghi J.
COUNSEL: Megan Mackey, for the Applicant
Christine Antunes, Self-represented
Coralia Maria Antunes, Self-represented
HEARD: December 6, 2024, January 30, 2025, February 13, 2025

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] The Applicant, Halton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 534 (the “Condominium”), seeks an order directing the Respondent Christine Antunes (“Christine”) to permanently vacate the condominium unit in which she lives. Christine’s condominium building is located in Oakville. The unit is owned by her mother, the Respondent Coralia Antunes (“Coralia”). Christine used to live with Coralia in the unit but now lives alone. Christine’s evidence, corroborated by Coralia and by Christine’s sister, Diane Antunes, is that she suffers from an alcohol addiction and mental health issues.

[2] The Condominium asserts that Christine has, over a period of several years, made excessive noise in her Condominium unit and elsewhere in the building, and shouted at, sworn at, and intimidated Condominium residents, staff, and contractors. A consent order was issued by the Condominium Authority Tribunal in October 2023 (the “Order”), requiring Christine to refrain from making unreasonable or excessive noise, screaming, or causing a disturbance to residents or staff inside her unit, in the common elements, and/or on outside grounds. The Condominium now brings this application, asserting that Christine is in breach of the Order, and that she and Coralia are in breach of their legal obligations as the occupant and owner, respectively, of the unit.

[3] For the reasons below, I grant the application. I find that Christine is in breach of the Order and that her and Coralia’s conduct is contrary to the provisions of the Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19 (the “Act”) and the Condominium’s Declaration and Rules. I order that Christine permanently vacate the Unit within 120 days. I make no order on costs at this time, in order to enable the Respondents to provide me with their written submissions on costs.

Background

[4] The Condominium first commenced proceedings against Christine and Coralia in December 2021. At the time, Christine’s family came forward and the matter was resolved. Christine then left the Condominium for some months.

[5] The Condominium states that the problems resumed upon Christine’s return. The record indicates that, in August 2022, the Condominium’s legal counsel wrote to Coralia, describing a recent incident in which Christine approached the Condominium superintendent, pointed at her, and swore several times at her. The letter stated that Christine was creating “excessive noise disturbances” that were “seriously disturbing”. It listed dates and times of numerous reports of disturbances by Christine involving playing loud music, yelling, screaming, and banging. It directed Coralia to immediately ensure that Christine ceased her disruptive behaviour.

[6] In April 2023, the Condominium’s counsel again wrote to Coralia and Christine, stating that Christine continued to behave in a threatening and frightening manner and that she was creating noise disturbances. The letter advised them that the Condominium was bringing the matter before the Condominium Authority Tribunal (the “Tribunal”).

[7] The Condominium proceeded with its application to the Tribunal. The matter settled. On October 6, 2023, the Tribunal issued the Order.

[8] The Condominium submits that the problems persisted even after the Order was issued. In December 2023, the Condominium’s counsel sent another letter to Christine and Coralia identifying new incidents of disruptive or threatening behaviour by Christine. In August 2024, the Condominium brought this application.

Factual Findings

[9] The Condominium filed affidavit evidence from residents, a board member, and a staff member. Their evidence regarding Christine’s conduct between the issuance of the Order and the commencement of this application included the following:

a. In winter 2023, Christine had an episode of screaming and swearing outside the front door of the building.

b. In January 2024, Christine spoke loudly to and then swore at the building’s superintendent when the superintendent was meeting with a contractor. This was “very upsetting” to the superintendent.

c. In January 2024, Christine yelled and swore at another resident for several minutes, unprovoked, leading the resident to cry so hard that she could barely speak. On another occasion later that month, Christine again screamed at the same resident in the building lobby.

d. In January 2024, Christine screamed several times and swore at the superintendent in the lobby, retrieved a bottle of vodka from her bag, and “raised it to strike” the superintendent. Another resident intervened. The superintendent was “completely shaken up” by this. She was crying. The incident affected her health. Christine’s conduct has caused the superintendent “extreme stress and anxiety.”

e. In June 2024, Christine had a “screaming tantrum” and swore at two board members in the lobby. They were 69 and 80 years old. They found the incident “shocking and upsetting.”

f. In July 2024, Christine followed a resident out of the lobby and through the parking garage, swearing at her and threatening to get her license plate number, and leading the resident to hide in her vehicle for several minutes.

g. In July 2024, Christine had a screaming episode in the hallway of the 7th floor.

h. Christine’s next door neighbour and his wife no longer live in the Condominium because of Christine’s frequent screaming, door slamming, and loud banging sounds. They had bought their unit with the plan to eventually move there full-time and possibly raise their family there. They now have to carry two mortgages. They try to rent out their unit to make up some of the costs. Rental guests have commented on screaming and banging sounds from Christine’s unit. In June 2024, a guest complained of loud pounding, groaning, yelling, and arguing coming from Christine’s unit for several hours overnight and again early in the morning. The guest also complained of door slamming and yelling in the hallway.

i. Christine’s upstairs neighbour is awakened at least once a week, sometimes more, by Christine’s screaming. She says Christine “screams at a very loud volume” at “all times of the day, including late at night and in the middle of the night.” Her sleep is severely disrupted as a result. This has harmed her health and diminished her enjoyment of her unit.

j. As at September 2024, when the Condominium commenced this application, its board had received “countless complaints” from “[m]any residents” about Christine shouting and swearing at residents and intimidating them. Many residents were hesitant to make written complaints for fear or retribution from Christine.

[10] The Condominium’s affiants were not cross-examined on their evidence. Their evidence is uncontroverted. In my view, their evidence is credible. It is not over-stated. It is granular and detailed. It demonstrates a longstanding pattern of conduct by Christine that is distressing and harmful to residents, staff, and board members, and which has not abated over time, despite various efforts including the Order.

[11] Christine, Coralia, and Diane initially provided affidavit evidence. However, I declined to admit those affidavits into evidence and instead required that they each testify before me. In cross-examination on her affidavit, Coralia gave evidence that Christine’s affidavit was not based on Christine’s own recollection of events. Coralia further stated that she did not write all of her own affidavit, that she had only read “some of” her affidavit, and that “most of” the affidavit was “the truth” but she could not identify which portions were the truth and which were not. I therefore determined that the affidavits were unreliable and that it would be more appropriate to proceed via viva voce evidence.

[12] Christine, Coralia, and Diane disagree with many of the claims in the Condominium’s affidavits. Christine denies that she has screamed and sworn at people. Coralia and Diane testify that the Condominium’s superintendent and others have spread rumours that Christine is violent, and that there is no evidence that Christine screams in the middle of the night. Coralia says she spends several hours a day on the phone with Christine, and that although they “have a way” of talking “quite loud,” she tells Christine to try to keep her voice down. She says that Christine does not scream as loudly as is alleged. She describes the Condominium’s evidence as “rumours” and “false accusations”. She states that the noise that Condominium residents complain about is in fact coming from renovations carried out in the upper level of the building.

[13] I am, respectfully, not persuaded. Christine’s own evidence is that her memory is poor. She does not recall some of the incidents described in the affidavits. She denies others, saying, for example, that she would not have threatened to hit her superintendent with a bottle of vodka because she would not “waste a bottle of vodka on” her. I accept that there are some alleged incidents, not described above, that Christine genuinely views differently than her neighbours do. Even setting aside those incidents, however, the record points to a number of incidents, over a lengthy period of time, involving several residents, a staff member, and two board members.

[14] Nor am I persuaded by the evidence of Coralia and Diane. I do not question their love and concern for Christine. But I am unable to accept their evidence over that of the witnesses for the Condominium. Diane stays overnight in Christine’s unit roughly once every two weekends. Coralia comes for roughly two weekends a month. When they are with Christine, they consider her behaviour to be undisruptive. That may well be the case. Perhaps their presence helps Christine regulate her behaviour. But Diane and Coralia are unable to give evidence as to what Christine’s behaviour is like when they are not there, which is most of the time. The Condominium affiants are able to give such evidence. Their evidence is that Christine’s behaviour is quite unlike what Diane and Coralia describe.

[15] Moreover, Coralia’s suggestion that the Condominium’s affiants are simply spreading rumours and are uninformed stretches credulity. Most of the Condominium’s affiants describe incidents in which they interacted directly with Christine, or were directly affected by her noise or behaviour. That evidence is either uncontroverted or not persuasively contested. It cannot reasonably be dismissed as mere “rumour”.

Issues

[16] There are three issues before me:

a. Whether Christine has breached the Order;

b. Whether Christine and Coralia have breached the Act, the Condominium’s Declaration and Rules, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1990, R.S.O. 1990, c O.1 (“OSHA”); and

c. Whether the Condominium is entitled to an order directing Christine to permanently vacate the unit.

Whether Christine has breached the Order

[17] The Order requires Christine to refrain from making unreasonable or excessive noise, screaming, or causing a disturbance to residents or staff, inside her unit, in the common elements, and/or on outside grounds.

[18] Based on the record before me, I find that Christine has breached the Order. She has made unreasonable or excessive noise, screamed, and caused disturbances. She has done this to residents and staff. She has done it in her unit, in the common elements, and on the outside grounds.

Whether Christine and Coralia have breached the Act, the Condominium’s Declaration and Rules, and OSHA

Subsections 119(1), 117(1), and 117(2) of the Act

[19] Section 119(1) of the Act requires all unit owners and occupiers to comply with the Act and the declaration, by-laws and rules of the condominium.

[20] Section 117(1) of the Act prohibits a person from carrying on an activity in a condominium unit or common elements that “is likely to … cause an injury or an illness to an individual.” The “injury” may include psychological harm that is of more than a transient or trifling nature (MTCC No. 747 v. Korolekh, 2010 ONSC 4448, at para. 71).

[21] Section 117(2) prohibits a person from carrying on or permitting an activity in a condominium unit or common elements that results in unreasonable noise that is a nuisance, annoyance, or disruption to an individual.

[22] This court has observed that the interplay between sections 119 and 117 of the Act is “crucial to the orderly operation of condominiums and for the protection of condominium unit owners and occupiers.” The court explained it this way in Muskoka Condominium Corporation No. 39 v. Kreutzweiser, 2010 ONSC 2463 (at para. 8):

The owner of a condominium unit does not have a classic freehold. He or she is not at liberty to deal with property in the same manner as the owner of a single-family residential dwelling might be. The nature of a condominium is that in return for the advantages gained through common ownership of certain elements some degree of control over what can be done with those common elements is given up. The details of what is given up are set out in the condominium declaration and its bylaws and rules. It is both the right and obligation of a unit owner or occupier to see that these are obeyed.

[23] Similarly, in Re Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 279 v. Rochon et al (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 545 (C.A.), at p. 552, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined that a condominium unit owner must adhere to the requirements outlined in the Condominium’s declaration, description, bylaws, and rules, as these are crucial to the integrity of the title acquired by the unit owner.

[24] I find that Christine and Coralia have breached subsections 117(1) and 117(2) of the Act. Through her conduct, Christine has caused more than transient or trifling psychological harm to staff and residents of the Condominium. She has carried on, in her unit and the common elements, activity that has resulted in unreasonable noise that is a nuisance, annoyance, or disruption to fellow residents. Coralia has failed to prevent Christine from carrying on such activities. Coralia’s evidence is that she lives out of town but spends a great deal of time on the phone with Christine in an effort to help with her behaviour. Regrettably, it is clear from the record that Coralia’s efforts to assist Christine are inadequate, however diligent and sincere they may be.

Section 3.01 of the Declaration and Rule 2 of the Rules

[25] Section 3.01 of the Condominium’s Declaration states:

[E]ach Owner may make reasonable use of (and has the right to enjoy) the whole or any part of the Common Elements, … [N]o condition shall be permitted to exist, and no activity shall be carried on upon any portion of the Common Elements that: … (ii) is likely to damage the Property, injure any person, or impair the structural integrity of any unit or common element area; [or] (iii) will unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment by the other Owners of the Common Elements and their respective units;… .

[26] Rule 2 of the Condominium’s Rules provides that unit owners and tenants “shall not create nor permit the creation or continuation of any noise or nuisance which … may or does disturb the comfort or quiet enjoyment of the Common Elements by other Owners or their respective families, tenants, guests, visitors, servants and agents.”

[27] I find that Christine and Coralia have breached section 3.01 of the Declaration and Rule 2 of the Rules. Christine has carried on activity in the common elements that has unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment by other residents of those common elements and their condominium units. Christine has created, and Coralia has permitted the creation of, noise and nuisance that disturbs the comfort and quiet enjoyment of the common elements by other owners and tenants.

Subsection 119(1) of the Act

[28] By breaching these provisions of the Act and the Condominium’s Declaration and Rules, Christine and Coralia have breached subsection 119(1) of the Act, which obligates them, as the occupier and owner of the unit, respectively, to comply with the Act and the Declaration and Rules.

The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1990

[29] The Condominium further alleges that Christine’s conduct constitutes workplace harassment contrary to the requirements of OSHA. In light of my findings that her conduct is a violation of the Order and various provisions of the Act, the Declaration, and the Rules, I do not need to consider this additional claim here.

Whether the Condominium is entitled to an order directing Christine to permanently vacate the Unit

Generally

[30] The Condominium requests an order requiring Christine to vacate her unit. It seeks this relief pursuant to section 134 of the Act, which grants the court broad remedial powers to enforce compliance with the Act and a condominium’s declaration, rules, and regulations. Subsection 134(1) provides that a condominium may make an application to the court for an order enforcing compliance with any provision of the Act or its declaration, by-laws or rules.

[31] In Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 2136 v. Longhurst (May 22, 2024), Toronto, CV-24-00713169-0000 (S.C.), the court considered a request for a similar order in the face of ongoing disruptive behaviour by a condominium occupant. The respondent owned a condominium unit that was occupied by her son, his spouse, and their two children. The Tribunal granted an order directing the occupants to cease screaming, yelling, banging on walls and slamming doors. Despite the order, the occupants continued to create excessive noise. The Condominium wrote to the respondents but the noise disturbances continued.

[32] Chalmers J. held that the respondents’ conduct was a breach of the Tribunal order and section 117 of the Act. He found the respondents were “unable or unwilling” to comply with the order. Complaints about the respondents’ excessive noise had “persisted despite multiple warnings from the condominium.” The owner of the unit gave evidence that she had tried “everything she could” to have her son comply with the order and acknowledged that his noise had been an ongoing issue. Chalmers J. concluded that the only order available was an order directing the occupants to vacate the unit, as all other remedies had been unsuccessful (at para. 28).

[33] Similarly, in YRCC No. 794 v. Watson, 2021 ONSC 6574, the court considered the appropriate remedy where occupiers of a condominium unit had created excessive noise and harassed other residents, visitors, directors, management and staff. The court observed that the occupants had “been given repeated warnings” and had had 14 months in which to modify their behaviour. It held that it was necessary and appropriate to order the occupants to vacate the unit and permanently prohibit them from the property. They “appear[ed] to be unmotivated or unable to” modify their behaviour. The court held (at para. 50):

Whatever the reason may be behind their behaviour, their behaviour [is] unsuitable for living collectively within a condominium complex. It causes both actual harm and risk of harm. … I conclude that this is not a case in which the court should afford the occupants further time to show a change in conduct, as the evidence satisfies the court that that time would likely be spen[t] continuing the conduct.

[34] In my view, the same reasoning applies here. The only practical order at this stage is an order that Christine vacate the unit. Every other attempted remedy has proven unsuccessful. Christine’s noise and disruptive behaviour has continued over the course of more than three years. The Condominium commenced proceedings in December 2021. Its first cooperative resolution with the Respondents was reached soon thereafter. However, the problems persisted, even after Christine briefly moved outside of the Condominium, received warnings from the Condominium in August 2022 and April 2023, consented to the Order in October 2023, and received a further warning in December 2023. There is no reasonable basis on which to conclude that things will change if Christine remains in the unit. She is, regrettably, unable or unwilling to comply with the Order.

[35] Nor is there any basis for concluding that Coralia will be able to comply with her own obligations as unit owner, should Christine remain in the unit. Coralia is presently unable to ensure that Christine complies with the Order and her legal obligations as a tenant. She is unable to ensure her own compliance with her legal duties as a unit owner. There is no evidence before me to suggest that this stands to change with time.

The Duty to Accommodate

[36] The Respondents suggested that Christine’s alcohol addiction and mental health issues constitute disabilities that the Condominium is under a duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. As a consequence, they say, the Condominium cannot require Christine to vacate the unit.

[37] For the reasons below, I am unable to accept this argument. I find that the Condominium is not subject to a duty to accommodate, and that, even if it were, it has satisfied that duty.

[38] Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the “Code”) provides that everyone has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation without discrimination because of disability. Disability is defined to include “a mental disorder” (s. 10(1)) and alcohol addiction (Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (No. 6), at para. 24; Fleming v. North Bay (City), 2010 HRTO 355, at para. 68). Where a breach of section 2(1) of the Code would otherwise occur, an accommodation provider has a duty to accommodate the individual’s characteristic at issue to the point of undue hardship, having regard to such considerations as cost and health and safety requirements (Code, s. 17; Reisher v. Westdale Properties, 2023 ONSC 1817, at para. 17).

[39] Viewing the record as a whole, I am, on balance, persuaded that Christine has an alcohol addiction. There is no clinical documentation on this point in the record, and no evidence from any health care providers. However, I accept the viva voce evidence on this issue from Christine, Coralia, and Diane. I also note that many of the Condominium’s own affiants provided evidence that they frequently see Christine in an intoxicated condition. While that evidence is not, on its own, proof of alcohol addiction, it is certainly consistent with the fact of an addiction, and serves to corroborate the oral testimony of Christine, Coralia, and Diane.

[40] However, the record does not adequately support the claim of disability due to “mental disorder”. While there is evidence from Christine, Coralia, and Diane that Christine has mental health issues, there is no evidence of the nature or extent of her mental health issues. In the result, it is not clear what Christine’s alleged mental health issues are, whether they have been formally diagnosed, or how, if at all, they affect Christine day-to-day. In the absence of such evidence, I am not able to find that Christine suffers from a “mental disorder” that constitutes a disability for the purposes of the Code.

[41] Although I find that Christine does have an alcohol addiction, the record does not assist me in assessing whether her conduct is attributable to her addiction. There must be such a causal link in order for there to be a duty to accommodate (Walton Enterprises v. Lombardi, 2013 ONSC 4218, at para. 39; TSL-65446-15 (Re), at para. 40). Because there is no evidence on this point in the record, I am unable to find that the Condominium had a duty to accommodate Christine.

[42] Even if I did find there to be such a duty on the part of the Condominium, I am of the view that it has been satisfied, for two reasons.

[43] First, the proceeding now before me simply seeks to enforce the Order, to which the parties, fully cognizant of the duty to accommodate, consented almost a year and a half ago. It is appropriate for me to presume that the Order was “the conclusion arrived at between the parties of an accommodation they agree was practical, appropriate and without undue hardship” (Reisher, at para. 21). Put simply, any concerns the Respondents had about accommodating Christine should have been, and presumably were, advanced and addressed at the time the Order was negotiated. The Order accordingly factored in the Condominium’s duty to accommodate Christine to the satisfaction of the Respondents.

[44] Moreover, and in any event, I am unable to see what accommodation could be provided to Christine that would not constitute undue hardship for the Condominium. Although no specific accommodation is proposed by the Respondents, I assume that whatever accommodation they have in mind would entail Christine remaining in her unit. For the reasons discussed above, such an outcome is neither feasible nor appropriate. The evidence is clear that Christine has, over a protracted time period, engaged in conduct that has threatened, harmed, and interfered with the rights of condominium staff and residents. She continues to do so now. Allowing her to remain in her unit would accordingly substantially interfere with the rights of other Condominium residents and staff and thereby give rise to undue hardship (see, e.g., Connelly v. Mary Lambert Swale Non-Profit Homes, at para. 12). As this court has observed, “A demand for accommodation is only one side of the community living equation. … [T]he duty to accommodate does not eliminate altogether the other parties’ rights and the need for [the accommodated party] to obey the law and the rules of the condominium,” (Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 580 v. Mills, 2021 ONSC 2616, at para. 43).

Conclusion

[45] I have empathy for Christine. She suffers from an addiction. She believes that she has been targeted by Condominium staff and residents and that rumours are being spread about her. I do not doubt that she has had a difficult time of things.

[46] However, I am also of the view that Christine is, at present, not suited to live in a condominium. It is not a good environment for her. She is not good for the condominium environment. Perhaps, in time, this situation will change. For now, however, this is the unfortunate reality. Without in any way diminishing the significance of her addiction issues, they do not permit her to engage in such conduct that interferes with the rights of fellow Condominium residents (Longhurst, at para. 21).

[47] I order Christine to vacate the unit within 120 days of the date of this Endorsement. While this is a rather lengthy deadline, in my view, it is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. I consider it important to give Christine time to find suitable housing, particularly so that she may consider the option, to which Coralia referred in her testimony, of moving to a residential care facility where she could receive treatment or support for her addiction issues.

[48] The Condominium has requested its costs of the application from the Respondents if successful. It has outlined its position on costs in its factum and two costs outlines. The Respondents did not have the chance to address the Condominium’s claim for costs during the hearing. They should have the opportunity to do so now.

[49] The Respondents are accordingly granted 30 days from today in which to provide to my judicial assistant, via email, their written response to the Condominium’s position on costs. These submissions should be no more than five pages, double spaced. If the Respondents have difficulty obtaining the Condominium’s factum or costs outlines from Case Centre, they may contact counsel for the Condominium and obtain copies directly from her.

Order Granted

[50] I declare the following:

a. Christine has breached the Order;

b. Christine and Coralia have breached subsections 117(1), 117(2), and 119(1) of the Act; and

c. Christine and Coralia have breached Article 3.01(a) of the Condominium’s Declaration and Rule 2 of the Condominium’s Rules.

[51] I order the following:

a. Christine’s occupancy and tenancy of the unit is terminated;

b. Christine is to permanently vacate the unit within 120 days of the date of this Endorsement and is not to return to the Condominium once she has vacated the unit;

c. Until she permanently vacates the unit, Christine is to comply with the Order, the Act, and the Condominium’s Declaration and Rules at all times; and

d. Until Christine permanently vacates the unit, Coralia is to ensure that Christine complies with the Order, the Act, and the Condominium’s Declaration and Rules at all times.

[52] The Respondents are to provide their written submissions on costs within 30 days of this Endorsement. A separate endorsement on costs will follow thereafter.

Rohit Parghi
Date: April 7, 2025