Sara Blake

The proposed interveners, two unions, brought motions for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review concerning the payment of post-retirement benefits by a school board.

The judicial review was scheduled to be heard immediately after a related Stated Case in which both proposed interveners were already participating.

The court dismissed one union's motion to intervene, finding it could efficiently make its arguments in the Stated Case proceeding without prolonging the judicial review.

However, the court added the other union as a responding party because it was a joint signatory to the collective agreement at issue in the underlying arbitration.

The defendant Ministry moved to strike a negligence claim arising from the death of a child at an unlicensed private-home daycare after the Ministry had received multiple complaints about excessive numbers of children and had sent a warning letter but allegedly failed to follow up.

The court held that on a motion to strike it was required to accept the pleaded facts as true and determine only whether it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

Applying the duty of care framework and authorities on proximity in claims against public actors, the court found it was arguable that the pleaded facts could establish proximity and foreseeability sufficient to support a private law duty of care.

The claim was novel, but the uncertainties could not be resolved at the pleadings stage and required a full record at trial.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's interim procedural ruling that issued a summons compelling the production of a Wagg brief in a grievance arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that it is premature to judicially review interlocutory decisions of administrative decision-makers.

The court found that the arbitrator has the authority to rule on her own jurisdiction and procedural matters, and that fragmenting the arbitration process would frustrate legislative goals.

The plaintiffs brought a civil action in negligence against the defendant police officers following the fatal shooting of their family member.

The deceased, who was intoxicated and armed with knives, advanced aggressively toward an officer and refused commands to drop the weapons.

The court found that the officers acted reasonably and within the standard of care expected in such dangerous and rapidly unfolding circumstances.

The action was dismissed, though damages were assessed at $100,000 under the Family Law Act in the event of an appeal.

The plaintiff, who was wrongfully convicted of murder and later acquitted, brought an action against police officers and the Attorney General for malicious prosecution and negligence.

The plaintiff moved to amend his statement of claim to add allegations of negligence against Crown attorneys for failing to disclose evidence.

The court dismissed the motion with respect to the negligence claims, holding that Crown attorneys are immune from civil suits based in negligence, and that the only tenable cause of action against them is for malicious prosecution.

The applicant Ministry sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board regarding the expansion of the urban boundary of the Town of Fort Erie.

The Board had found that a transitional regulation under the Places to Grow Act 2005 applied because a valid 'request' was made prior to June 16, 2006, even though supporting documentation was submitted later.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness or reasonableness of the Board's interpretation of 'request' or its factual findings.

The plaintiff, who was previously investigated for stock fraud and entered into a settlement agreement with the Ontario Securities Commission, sued 67 defendants for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

Ten motions were brought by 64 defendants to strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions.

The court dismissed the action against the Attorney General of Ontario because the malicious prosecution claim could not succeed, as the criminal proceedings were stayed pursuant to a settlement and thus not terminated in the plaintiff's favour.

The actions against the remaining moving defendants were dismissed as an abuse of process because they attempted to re-litigate facts already settled or judicially determined in prior proceedings.

The moving party, Windlectric Inc., proposed a wind energy project on Amherst Island.

The Ministry of the Environment deemed the application complete, initiating the technical review phase.

The responding party, an association opposing the project, sought judicial review to quash the completeness determination, arguing the application lacked an adequate emergency response plan.

Windlectric brought a motion to quash the application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that a completeness check is an administrative step, not a statutory power of decision or a matter subject to public law remedies.

The court also held that the application for judicial review was premature, as the administrative process and available appeals had not been exhausted.

The Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services applied for judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordering the disclosure of dates when DNA samples were collected and reported.

The Divisional Court found that the IPC breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to give notice of the appeal to the victims or representatives of deceased victims, whose privacy rights were engaged.

The court allowed the application and referred the matter back to the IPC for reconsideration on notice to the affected parties, to allow for a complete balancing of interests.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus to compel the Ministry of the Environment to issue a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind energy project, or alternatively, to compel a decision.

The applicants argued they had a legitimate expectation of a decision within six months based on a Ministry service standard.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no clear legal duty to issue the approval and no enforceable right arising from the service standard.

The Court also held that the Director reasonably postponed the decision due to pending litigation regarding the Crown's duty to consult aboriginal people.

Declaratory relief was also denied.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution following a fraud charge that was later stayed.

The court held that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The conspiracy allegations lacked the necessary particulars regarding the alleged agreement and overt acts of the conspirators.

The malicious prosecution claim also failed because the pleadings did not adequately allege absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice, as required by the Supreme Court of Canada in Miazga v. Kvello Estate.

The statement of claim against the Attorney General was therefore struck.

Former psychiatric patients alleged that experimental ‘social therapy’ programs at a provincial psychiatric facility between 1968 and 1979 constituted torture and unlawful experimentation.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to add five additional former patients as plaintiffs decades after the events.

The defendants argued the claims were statute‑barred under historical limitation provisions in the Medical Act, Health Disciplines Act, Mental Hospitals Act, and Mental Health Act.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that those limitation provisions applied where the alleged conduct amounted to torture rather than professional services or treatment.

The motion to amend and add the additional plaintiffs was granted without prejudice to the defendants’ right to later raise limitation defences.

The appellant challenged a conviction for failing to report a blasting incident that propelled fly-rock into the air and damaged nearby property.

The Court held that the reporting duty under the Environmental Protection Act is triggered where a contaminant is discharged out of the normal course of events and there is or may be an adverse effect, without requiring proof of actual impairment to the natural environment.

It emphasized the statute’s broad remedial purpose and confirmed that each branch of the adverse-effect definition independently engages the duty to notify the regulator.

On the facts, the discharge caused significant property damage and potential serious harm, requiring immediate reporting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Special Investigation Unit (SIU), a non-party to the civil action, appealed an order requiring it to produce an unedited copy of its investigation file, specifically the SIU Director's Report to the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the report was relevant.

The court held that the information in the report was derivative of other sources in the file, and the Director's legal analysis and lead investigator's assessment were not relevant to any material issue in the action.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's alleged failure to intervene and enforce an approved waste management plan under s. 27 of the Waste Diversion Act, 2002.

The applicant argued that changes to tendering criteria constituted a 'material change' requiring the Minister's approval.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, finding that the Minister has no statutory duty to intervene or supervise operational decisions, and that the decision of what constitutes a 'material change' is a policy-laden function beyond the court's jurisdiction.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision finding that the OMERS Board and its wholly-owned subsidiaries were Crown agencies exempt from paying land transfer tax under the Land Transfer Tax Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the motion judge's conclusion that the government had de jure control over the OMERS Board, making it a Crown agency.

The Court also agreed that the statutory scheme allowed the OMERS Board to act through wholly-owned subsidiaries, which were therefore also Crown agencies entitled to the tax exemption.

The appellant Ministry appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of a record containing the first three characters of Ontario postal codes and the corresponding number of registered sex offenders residing in each area.

The Ministry argued the record was exempt from disclosure under s. 14 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming it could lead to identifying offenders' whereabouts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Divisional Court that the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable, as the Ministry failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its concerns.

Eight police officers sought judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Police Services Board allowing the Chief of Police to delay serving Notices of Hearing for public complaints arising from the G20 summit.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for prematurity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interlocutory administrative decision.

The court noted the officers had an adequate alternative remedy to raise the issue of prejudice caused by delay through an abuse of process motion before the hearing officer.

The appellant appealed an order striking its claim and dismissing its action.

The Court of Appeal had previously adjourned the appeal pending the outcome of related judicial review proceedings in the Divisional Court.

After the Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review application and leave to appeal was denied, the Court of Appeal dismissed this appeal, finding that the allegations in the appellant's pleadings were in substance the same as those rejected by the Divisional Court.

The court held that allowing the re-litigation of those allegations in a second proceeding would be an abuse of process.

The requester sought access to documents relating to advice given to the Minister of Finance regarding the effective date of amendments to the Corporations Tax Act.

The adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that the 'advice or recommendations' exemption under s. 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act did not apply because the documents did not suggest a single course of action and there was no proof they were communicated to the final decision-maker.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 13(1) was unreasonable as it failed to protect the deliberative process and the range of options presented to a decision-maker.