Sara Blake

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace removed from office for misconduct, brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous Divisional Court order that had dismissed his judicial review application.

The applicant argued he was denied a fair hearing and alleged ineffective assistance by his former counsel.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and finding that the applicant's complaints did not fit within the narrow exceptions of Rule 59.06 for fraud or newly discovered facts.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

The Plaintiffs sought costs following their successful partial summary judgment motion, where the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims as statute-barred was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was granted.

The Plaintiffs requested $821,580.08 in costs and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The Defendants argued for a significantly lower award of $50,655, alleging over-lawyering and inclusion of costs unrelated to the specific summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $282,504.34, disallowing costs for an unsuccessful productions motion and reserving discovery costs for the final adjudication, while finding the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for the summary judgment motion reasonable despite the Defendants' "over-lawyering" argument.

The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' multi-plaintiff action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the Oak Ridge psychiatric facility, alleged they were subjected to abusive human experimentation and torture by the defendant doctors between 1966 and 1983.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiffs had a free-standing claim for breach of fiduciary duty that was not subsumed by the expired limitation periods for medical malpractice or tort claims.

The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, leaving issues of harm and damages for trial.

The Attorney General brought a motion to quash summonses issued by defendant Michael G. Engel to two Crown attorneys, John McMahon and Paul Amenta, for examination under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Engel sought to examine them as part of his response to the Attorney General's summary judgment motion to dismiss Engel's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity, which alleged that Crown attorneys failed to comply with disclosure obligations in the underlying wrongful conviction action.

The court found that Engel demonstrated a reasonable evidentiary basis that the Crown attorneys could provide relevant evidence on several specific disclosure topics and that the proposed examinations would not constitute an abuse of process.

The motion to quash was dismissed, allowing examinations on four of the five identified topics.

The requester sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) to records held by the Children's Lawyer relating to a custody and access dispute involving his children.

The Children's Lawyer refused, arguing the records were not in the custody or control of the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) when acting as counsel for a child.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordered MAG to issue an access decision, finding the records were under MAG's control.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, not correctness, as interpreting s. 10(1) of FIPPA is not a true question of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable and noting that solicitor-client privilege concerns could be addressed through FIPPA exemptions.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

Following a motion for summary judgment, the court raised the question of whether to make an order declaring a litigant vexatious under section 140(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, given a previous family court order limiting such a declaration to specific proceedings.

The court received submissions from the defendants and the Attorney General.

The court ultimately declined to answer the question, as the Attorney General indicated an intention to commence a formal application to declare the litigant vexatious, rendering the court's question moot.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when attacked by a rival gang member in a provincial jail.

The plaintiff sued Ontario and others, alleging that a correctional officer was negligent in placing the plaintiff and the assailant in the same unit despite the jail's policy of separating members of the same gang.

The trial judge found for the plaintiff.

On appeal, Ontario argued that the policy negated any duty of care and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of care and finding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the policy did not negate the common law duty of care, that the correctional officer breached the standard of care by failing to consider inmate incompatibility, and that the negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding a freedom of information request for an OPP investigation report.

The Commissioner had found that the Ministry repeatedly failed to properly exercise its discretion under the law enforcement exemption, but closed the appeal file claiming he was functus officio and had no further recourse.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding he erred in law by misapprehending the scope of a prior Supreme Court of Canada remittal order.

The Court remitted the matter back to the Commissioner and issued a declaration that the Ministry had disregarded the Commissioner's proper directions regarding its exercise of discretion.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order directing the disclosure of a draft prosecutorial guideline concerning HIV exposure.

The Commissioner found that while the draft guideline originated in solicitor-client privilege, the privilege was waived when an Assistant Crown Attorney shared it with a municipal public health manager.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Commissioner reasonably concluded the privilege was waived because the Ministry and the public health authority did not share a sufficient common interest.

The applicant sought to set aside an order quashing its application for judicial review of a renewable energy approval for a wind project.

The motions judge had quashed the application on the grounds of prematurity because the applicant had appealed the approval to the Environmental Review Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to set aside, agreeing that the application was premature as the administrative appeal process under the Environmental Protection Act had not yet been completed.

The applicant, a justice of the peace, sought judicial review of a Hearing Panel's decision removing him from office for judicial misconduct involving sexual harassment of female staff, and denying him compensation for his legal expenses.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of misconduct and the penalty of removal, finding the panel's decisions reasonable given the applicant's lack of insight and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary.

However, the Court set aside the decision denying compensation for legal fees, finding the panel erred by presuming that a judicial officer found guilty of misconduct should not be compensated, and remitted that issue for reconsideration.

The applicants, trustees of multi-employer pension plans, sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of confidential actuarial valuation reports to a representative of a rival union.

The applicants argued that disclosure would cause harm during the construction industry's 'raiding season'.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and set aside the commissioner's order, finding that the commissioner applied an overly burdensome standard of proof and an overly stringent test for causation of harm under s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court held that the applicants only needed to establish a reasonable expectation of probable harm, which was met given the highly competitive context of union raiding.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the deadline for setting the action down for trial.

The defendant opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to amend a previous order to reflect a consent agreement that the action would be dismissed with no reinstatement if not set down by October 30, 2014.

The court amended the previous order to reflect the consent agreement but exercised its discretion to extend the timetable, finding that the defendant had not established non-compensable prejudice and shared the blame for the delay by failing to produce its affidavit of documents.

The deadline was extended to October 30, 2016.

Following dismissal of a Rule 21 motion to strike the statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the successful plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs.

The responding party argued the requested amount was excessive given the straightforward nature of the pleadings motion, overlapping work among multiple lawyers and students, and hourly rates exceeding recommended partial indemnity guidelines.

The court accepted that the motion was significant and involved novel legal issues but found the plaintiffs had spent excessive time and improperly included hours related to amending the claim.

Applying principles of fairness and reasonableness in fixing costs, the court reduced the requested amount.

A lump sum costs award was granted to the successful plaintiffs.