Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the search of his residence was unreasonable, the trial judge failed to apply the rule in W.(D.), and the verdict was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Charter issue was not properly before the court and the trial judge correctly applied the relevant legal standards.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to credit the appellant for 48 days of pre-sentence custody, reducing his sentence on one count.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple child sexual offences, including sexual interference, sexual assault, possession of CSAEM, making CSAEM, and making CSAEM available, arising from abuse of children known to him and his role administering a dark web CSAEM website.

The Court of Appeal rejected the offender’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no reversible error in the sentencing judge’s treatment of intractability, burden of proof, or the expert evidence.

The court held, however, that the sentencing judge erred in principle in sentencing by failing to meaningfully account for the offender’s administrator role in a global CSAEM enterprise, by treating a prior comparator case as a sentencing ceiling, and by failing to impose some statutorily required consecutive sentences.

Re-sentencing afresh under the Bertrand Marchand approach and subject to totality, the court increased the global determinate sentence from 17 years to 25 years, with a net sentence of 20 years after presentence credit.

The appellant appealed his five-year sentence for firearms offences, seeking to admit fresh evidence of harsh pretrial detention conditions, specifically an incident involving excessive use of force by correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the sentencing judge would have given greater mitigating effect to the punitive character of the pretrial detention had she been aware of the incident.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by six months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a judge-alone trial.

The Crown had conceded it could not prove the appellant inflicted the fatal stab wound based on the evidence of a key witness alone, and advanced a theory of manslaughter.

The trial judge rejected this concession without notice and convicted the appellant of murder based on co-principal liability under s. 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's failure to clearly notify counsel that he was considering co-principal liability for murder, and his rejection of the Crown's concession without inviting submissions, deprived the defence of a meaningful opportunity to respond.

This lack of notice amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of intimidation by blocking or obstructing a highway under s. 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, arising from his leadership role in the 'Freedom Convoy' protests in Ottawa.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the offence required proof of threats or violence and an intent to intimidate individuals when occurring in the context of a political protest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by reading in elements not found in the text of the provision and by treating the political protest context as a defence to otherwise criminal conduct.

The Court substituted a conviction, finding that the respondent's conduct in blocking highways to compel the government to change its COVID-19 policies satisfied all elements of the offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence for multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

He argued the 14-year sentence was crushing and that the sentencing judge erred by treating his flight from police as an aggravating factor, given the presentence report detailed his negative experiences with police, including anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal rejected the first ground but agreed the trial judge's findings on flight were incongruent with her acceptance of his negative police experiences.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the net sentence was reduced from 11.5 years to 11 years.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple drug and firearms offences and was sentenced to a net term of just over 8 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that new evidence of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and triple-bunking, justified a reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had implicitly accounted for the likelihood of harsh conditions when imposing a sentence at the bottom of the proper range.

The court also rejected arguments that the sentencing judge misapprehended the appellant's drug addiction or his role as a street-level dealer.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a release order by communicating with the complainant in his pending human trafficking trial.

The communication occurred when third parties approached the complainant with a phone connected to a video call with the appellant, who smirked at her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the smirk was an intentional communication and that the appellant knew the complainant could see him.

The court also held that the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant was convicted of multiple charges of assaulting and threatening his children, and breaching bail orders.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge failed to consider that the youngest complainant's evidence might have been inadvertently tainted by her older sibling.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, noting that the trial judge was entitled to conclude there was no evidence of influence regarding the specific assaults that formed the basis of the convictions.

The court also declined to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings, which rejected the appellant's claim that he was framed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault arising from a coercive sexual encounter, arguing that the jury was inadequately instructed on the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending that a 20-month conditional sentence for sexual assault involving penetration was demonstrably unfit.

The court held that the jury charge, read functionally and as a whole, sufficiently guarded against impermissible propensity reasoning and punishment for bad character.

However, the sentencing judge failed to justify a major departure from the usual three-to-five-year range for serious sexual assault, and a penitentiary sentence of three years was substituted.

Because the offender had completed the conditional sentence and reincarceration would not serve the interests of justice, execution of the substituted sentence was stayed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and detained at CAMH, appealed a Review Board disposition continuing his detention despite being designated as alternate level of care.

The appellant proposed a conditional discharge with a Young clause and treatment compliance conditions, or alternatively, living with family due to a lack of community housing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board failed to properly consider the proposed safeguards, did not adequately inquire into family accommodation, and based its risk assessment on speculative concerns and unsupported assumptions.

The Court also overturned its previous decision in Negash regarding the enforceability of hospital readmission under section 672.93(2) of the Criminal Code.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related offences for firing shots at a female acquaintance, striking her twice.

The sole issues at trial were the identity of the shooter and intent to kill.

The trial judge rejected direct identification evidence and limited-weight photo identification evidence, instead relying almost entirely on circumstantial evidence including GPS data from the suspect vehicle, security camera footage with timestamps, and DNA evidence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in accepting the accuracy of security camera timestamps without proper authentication and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no legal error in the trial judge's application of the law regarding measurement devices in common usage and concluding that the verdict was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for serious sexual offences committed in 1986 against two women.

The Crown's similar-fact application was granted at trial.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding lost evidence, arguing that the loss of the Murdock investigative file constituted unacceptable negligence and that the trial judge failed to adequately address the integrity of the justice system regarding conceded negligent loss of evidence in the English file.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the governing legal framework, made findings supported by the record, and exercised her remedial discretion judiciously.

The court held that the trial judge's conclusion that the purging of the Murdock brief in accordance with retention policy was not unacceptable negligence was reasonable, and that even if error existed, it was harmless as the trial judge proceeded to a full remedial analysis.

Regarding the English file, the court found the trial judge adequately addressed the integrity issue and that proportionate alternatives to a stay of proceedings were appropriate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown’s appeal from a stay of proceedings entered after a trial judge found that correctional officers, including Officer Warburton, used excessive force and then colluded to cover up the incident by filing false reports and giving misleading testimony.

The trial judge found a violation of the respondent’s Charter rights and determined that a stay was the only appropriate remedy to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The appellate court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence, her legal analysis was correct, and her remedy was justified in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that overturned the respondent's conviction under the Endangered Species Act for damaging Blanding's turtle habitat.

The appeal judge had entered an acquittal after finding the circumstantial evidence of turtle sightings from prior and subsequent years insufficient to prove the land was habitat at the time of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge's conclusion raised a question of law alone, the Crown failed to demonstrate that granting leave was essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The decision below was highly fact-specific and unlikely to establish a binding precedent requiring direct evidence of habitat use.

Leave to appeal was denied, and the respondent's request for costs was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of two years less a day for break and enter and careless storage of firearms, seeking the substitution of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not manifestly unfit and rejected claims of reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the sentence by 41 days to account for pre-sentence custody credit.