Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was subpoenaed to testify at a preliminary inquiry but refused to answer substantive questions.

He was subsequently charged with attempting to obstruct justice.

At trial, the judge admitted transcripts of his refusal to testify, finding they were not protected by s. 13 of the Charter, relying on the appellate decision in Schertzer rather than the coordinate decision in Seecharran.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the judge erred in her application of stare decisis and s. 13.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that vertical stare decisis bound the trial judge to follow Schertzer, and that s. 13 does not protect testimony that constitutes the actus reus of a new offence.

The applicant, sought for extradition by the United States on serious drug trafficking and money laundering charges, applied for a review of a detention order denying him judicial interim release.

The application judge had denied bail primarily on the primary ground, finding a high risk of flight due to the applicant's unexplained wealth and the unreliability of his proposed sureties.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence, including the applicant's finances, the bail letter, and the proposed sureties.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence of an arthritis diagnosis was also dismissed.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.

The appellant was convicted of procuring and advertising sexual services.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in applying the actus reus for procuring by failing to consider the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, as required by the interpretation of "control, direction or influence" under s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

Additionally, the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant for advertising on a theory of party liability that the Crown had disavowed, without providing the defence notice and an opportunity to respond.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered on both counts.

The appellant was convicted of multiple weapons offences based entirely on circumstantial evidence after a police officer witnessed a single gunshot and briefly chased the fleeing suspect.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant's DNA found on the recovered handgun, a fleeting description by the officer, and grainy surveillance videos showing the appellant in the vicinity over an hour prior.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's verdict unreasonable, concluding that the totality of the evidence was too generic to establish the appellant's identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, specifically challenging a condition in a s. 161 prohibition order that prohibited contact with the adult complainant's parents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the parents did not fall within the definition of a victim under s. 161(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code.

The prohibition order was amended to remove the parents, while all other aspects of the sentence remained unchanged.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board following a finding that she was not criminally responsible for uttering threats and assaulting a peace officer.

The Board ordered her detained in a Secure Forensic Unit due to active, untreated persecutory delusions and a significant threat to public safety.

On appeal, the appellant and amicus curiae argued the Board relied on inadmissible hearsay and failed to impose the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board is entitled to consider hearsay evidence such as police occurrence reports, and that the hybrid detention order was necessary, appropriate, and the least onerous option given the appellant's refusal of treatment and lack of insight.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing the deceased in the appellant's apartment.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's failure to retreat from his own home when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as there is no duty to retreat from one's own home when attacked, nor is it a factor for the jury to consider under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention with community privileges.

The respondents sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding recent events, which the Court of Appeal declined to admit to avoid delaying the hearing until the next annual review.

On the merits, the Court found the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety was supported by the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board directing his detention at a minimum secure unit, subject to living in the community at the hospital's discretion.

The appellant sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety was supported by evidence of his lack of insight, need for medication, and risk of drug use.

The Court held that a detention disposition was necessary to ensure the hospital's continued authority to manage his risk and compel his return if his condition deteriorated.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had drawn an impermissible adverse inference against the accused's right to silence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court justice misinterpreted the trial judge's reasons, which, when read in context, permissibly inferred that the accused and his wife manipulated the complainant into fabricating evidence.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, and attempted break and enter, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable basis for the convictions based on the evidence, including a telephone found at the scene.

However, the Crown conceded that the sentence imposed fell outside the appropriate range.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but leave to appeal the sentence was granted and the sentence was reduced to eighteen months concurrent on each count.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder after striking the victim with his car.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the distance and speed of the vehicle, relying on unadopted hearsay to conclude the appellant had the requisite intent to kill.

The Court set aside the attempted murder conviction and, with the Crown's consent, substituted a conviction for the lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence of two years less one day.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider evidence supporting his claim that he was an innocent bystander and erred in relying on the identification evidence of a specific witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the evidence was reasonable and supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the unprovoked, racially motivated, and gang-related machete attack warranted the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the issuance and execution of a search warrant for records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conditions imposed on the warrant's execution were sufficient and that the appellant failed to show a section 8 Charter violation affecting the issuing judge's jurisdiction.

The Court left open the possibility for the appellant to argue at trial that certain documents are inadmissible due to common-law privilege or a section 7 Charter violation.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of an unregistered handgun.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by combining a custodial sentence and a conditional sentence where the resulting total effectively amounted to a penitentiary sentence exceeding two years less one day.

However, the court also held that blended custodial and conditional sentences are legally permissible for multiple offences where the total sentence does not exceed two years less one day and the statutory preconditions in s. 742.1(b) are met.

In light of fresh evidence showing successful rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated, the court reduced the conditional sentence on the drug offence to sixteen months less one day and left the remaining terms intact.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable and sought to adduce fresh evidence.

The proposed evidence consisted of post-conviction recorded telephone conversations in which the complainant explicitly and implicitly admitted that her trial testimony was false.

The court held that, although inconsistencies in the Crown's case did not render the verdict unreasonable, the fresh evidence satisfied the Palmer requirement that it could reasonably affect the result.

The fresh evidence was admitted, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence from a custodial sentence of 15 months followed by 18 months probation.

The court was not persuaded that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle and held the sentence was entirely fit.

However, on the Crown's concession, the court varied the probation term requiring residence on a specified First Nations reserve and substituted a condition requiring residence at a residence approved by the probation officer.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted to give effect to that variation, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault, advancing grounds relating to limits on cross-examination, alleged misapprehension of evidence, the jury instruction on assessing the reliability of a young person's memory, and the admission and use of hearsay evidence.

The court held that the cross-examination directions were appropriate, the review of the evidence was fair and accurate, and the impugned instruction was proper when read in the context of the charge as a whole.

Although some evidence would preferably not have been elicited, the court found no reversible error and no miscarriage of justice, particularly given the absence of defence objections and the trial judge's limiting instructions.

The appellant challenged his conviction on two grounds: the admission of expert evidence from a police detective and an alleged misapprehension of another police officer's evidence.

The court declined to articulate a general rule on admissibility, holding that such determinations must be made case by case under the governing appellate framework.

Because defence counsel had not objected at trial, there was no record to assess relevance or necessity, and the expert evidence did not appear to have unduly influenced the result.

The court also found no misapprehension of the officer's evidence and dismissed the appeal.