Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her appeal from a conviction for contravening a municipal zoning by-law regarding accessory structures.

The appeal judge had dismissed her appeal after she failed to file an abandonment of various grounds of appeal as ordered.

The moving party argued the appeal judge was biased and that the justice of the peace erred regarding the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no evidence of bias or denial of natural justice, and noting the limitation period issue was a factual finding rather than a question of law.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence for sexual offences and drug trafficking, and applied for release pending appeal, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and his health conditions.

The motion judge granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the application for release.

The judge found the appeal had little merit and would likely be determined before the sentence expired.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to show his detention was not necessary in the public interest, given his history of breaching recognizances, lack of insight into his offences, and the serious nature of the crimes against children.

The appellant, Brandon Morgan, appealed his sentence for aggravated assault and failing to comply with court orders, seeking a reduction due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his incarceration conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that while judicial notice could be taken of the pandemic's general impact, the requested sentence reduction would render the sentence disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's blameworthiness, even considering collateral consequences.

The court noted that the original sentence was already lenient and that parole authorities could consider the pandemic's impact.

Duane Anderson appealed a decision by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that continued his detention order and imposed a condition prohibiting non-medical use of alcohol or drugs, specifically recreational cannabis.

The appellant argued the condition was not the least restrictive and lacked sufficient evidentiary basis.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB was entitled to rely on expert psychiatric evidence that cannabis generally exacerbates psychotic symptoms, coupled with evidence of a prior aggressive incident linked to the appellant's excessive cannabis use.

Given the conceded significant risk to public safety, the Board was not required to wait for an actual adverse event.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the ORB's condition.

The applicant, J.J., sought a second bail pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new charges, including firearms and drug offences, and breaches of his recognizance.

The court considered the public interest criterion under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, focusing on public safety.

Despite a strict proposed bail plan involving new sureties and GPS monitoring, the court found a substantial likelihood that the applicant would re-offend, given his history of non-compliance and the nature of the new charges.

The court also considered the merits of the appeal and the COVID-19 pandemic but found these factors did not outweigh the public safety risk.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of break and enter of a dwelling house and other offences based primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove discovered at the crime scene.

The Crown admitted in an agreed statement of fact that the appellant's DNA was found in the glove but called no expert evidence regarding DNA transfer characteristics or whether the appellant's DNA was the sole profile on the glove.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts unreasonable, holding that the DNA evidence alone was incapable of bearing the burden of proving the appellant left the glove at the scene.

The convictions were set aside and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, breach of recognizance, breach of probation, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an altercation involving a purported cocaine sale.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery by stealing with violence contrary to s. 343(b) despite the Crown alleging robbery while armed with a firearm contrary to s. 343(d).

The appellant received a global sentence of 20 months in prison and 2 years probation, with 320 days pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1, resulting in a net sentence of 4 months.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in treating robbery with violence as an included offence in a charge of armed robbery, and whether the trial judge improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant regarding self-defence.

A youth appealed his sentencing on charges of unlawful possession of a loaded handgun, unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon (sawed-off shotgun), and breach of recognizance.

The appellant contended that the youth court judge erred by not respecting the joint sentencing submission on allocation of pre-sentence custody, by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing, by imposing a 15-month probationary sentence (which exceeded the statutory maximum of 12 months for the s. 95 offence), and by imposing a 7-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal, modifying the probationary sentence on the s. 95 offence to 12 months while upholding the other aspects of the sentence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, and assault arising from three separate incidents that occurred over a 30-minute period.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable, challenging the trial judge's findings on self-defence, identity, and common intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence, which established that the appellants acted together as common participants in all three incidents.

Leave to appeal sentence was also denied.

The appellant, a health spa owner, was convicted of unlawful confinement and assault after locking the door and pushing a client who tried to leave without paying.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected her defence of citizen's arrest under s. 494 of the Criminal Code, finding she did not subjectively believe the client had committed a crime.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing a translation error affected her testimony and raising the issue of citizen's arrest for non-payment of services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued the lower court erred in its characterization of the seriousness of a section 10(b) Charter breach under the Grant test.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the case did not raise an issue of law capable of supporting an order for leave.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her transfer to the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

She argued the order was unreasonable due to delays in the transfer and that it was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the transfer had recently occurred, rendering the delay arguments moot.

The Court found the Board's conclusion that the transfer was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, and her sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant poured scalding tea on the complainant, causing severe burns and permanent hearing loss.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying reasonable doubt, and reaching inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range for the vicious assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing and possessing opium.

A package containing opium concealed in a briefcase was delivered to his address, and he was arrested after accepting a controlled delivery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in relying on an out-of-court statement and that the finding of guilt was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in relying on the out-of-court statement, the error was not determinative.

The court further found that the circumstantial evidence, including the manner of acceptance and concealment of the package, reasonably supported a finding of knowledge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of theft over $5,000.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, primarily expert cell phone tracking data showing the appellant's phone was in frequent contact with his accomplice's phone and near the locations of the thefts.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by using evidence from each count as similar fact evidence for the other, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not use similar fact reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that the appellant was the accomplice.

The Crown appealed an acquittal from an in absentia trial.

The Court of Appeal held that both the trial judge and the summary conviction appeal judge erred by failing to consider section 24(2) of the Charter when addressing the Charter issues.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments below were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting a witness's out-of-court statement to police, made improper comments about the witness's reluctance to testify, and improperly challenged the appellant's credibility during his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearsay statement met the reliability requirements under the principled approach, the trial judge's comments on the witness's demeanour were permissible, and the comment during the appellant's testimony related only to a peripheral issue.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, who were charged with first-degree murder in the death of their infant daughter.

The trial judge stayed the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, largely caused by the failings of the Crown's pathologist.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in including pre-charge delay in his calculation as a remedy for the cremation of the child's remains.

However, the Court upheld the stay, concluding that the post-charge delay of 55 months for one respondent and 42.5 months for the other was unreasonable and severely prejudiced their liberty and security interests.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment careful and the verdict reasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found that despite a potential error in principle regarding conditional sentences based on pre-Proulx case law, the sentence of one year imprisonment and two years probation was fit given the breach of trust and the complainant's age.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed sentence after failing to disclose, at first instance, a breach of recognizance bearing directly on the offender's ongoing danger to young children.

The Court of Appeal accepted the fresh evidence, held that the six-month conditional sentence was unfit, and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the paramount sentencing principles in light of sexual abuse of a young victim, breach of trust, invasive conduct, and serious impact on the victim.

Although guilty plea and disclosure of a second incident were mitigating factors, they did not displace the need for custody.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a four-month custodial sentence was imposed effective immediately.