Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the appellants to pay full indemnity costs to the respondents in the amount of $25,973.05, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The decision was made after the appeal from a Superior Court of Justice judgment.

The appellant, Anna Marlena Butryn, appealed a summary judgment order enforcing minutes of settlement in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

She argued she signed the minutes under undue influence and duress from her husband, John Chetti, and without independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidence the respondent had knowledge of the alleged undue influence/duress, that the minutes of settlement provided significant benefits to the appellant, and that she was represented by experienced litigation counsel, making independent legal advice from a separate lawyer unnecessary.

The court reiterated that a spousal relationship does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence requiring third-party inquiry unless coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.

The appellant, a speech language pathologist, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for intentional infliction of economic harm, interference with economic relations, PHIPA retaliation, and conspiracy, stemming from Sun Life's delisting of her services after an audit dispute.

The motion judge found the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, rejecting arguments for a rolling limitation period and that the discovery of the claim was contingent on a College investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing with the motion judge's analysis on the limitation period and the appropriateness of summary judgment.

This is a motion for leave to intervene brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) in an appeal concerning the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion.

The underlying dispute involves a defamation and harassment action by 40 Days for Life against Brooke Dietrich for online protest activities.

The CCLA sought to intervene to make submissions on the application of protest jurisprudence to online expressive activity and the development of the tort of internet harassment in light of freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the CCLA leave to intervene, finding that it could make a useful contribution on public policy issues without causing injustice or undue prejudice to the parties, despite the motion being brought at a late stage.

The moving party sought a panel review of a prior order by Pardu J.A. that dismissed her motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the moving party's delay or the lack of merit in the underlying appeal.

The appellant, Joan Holmes, appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondents, Aurelio and Maria Acquaviva, in a mortgage enforcement action.

Holmes had defaulted on a mortgage payment and subsequently alleged an elaborate mortgage fraud against the respondents and others in a separate action.

The motion judge found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that Holmes had not provided evidence to support her fraud claims and that the mortgage claims were severable from her fraud allegations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in his analysis or conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents on a full indemnity scale.

The appellant sought to appeal interlocutory orders from the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed her appeals of two Master's orders concerning security for costs and costs.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction, arguing that the orders were interlocutory and thus appealable to the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant also brought a cross-motion seeking leave to appeal two other costs orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed that all orders were interlocutory, quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed the appellant's cross-motion.

The appellants sought to overturn a jury verdict finding them negligent for a fatal fire and challenging the quantum of damages awarded for loss of care, guidance, companionship, mental distress, and future costs of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the jury's findings of negligence based on fire safety violations and affirming the damages awards, finding they did not "shock the conscience of the court" despite being high.

The court also clarified that Section 76 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act does not immunize landlords from negligence related to fire safety precautions, even if the fire's origin is accidental.

The appellant sought to overturn the denial of an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing the enforcement of a trespass notice issued by the respondent university.

The notice was impeding the appellant's studies and jeopardizing his student visa status, pending a Human Rights Tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's assessment of evidence or misapplication of the interlocutory injunction test.

The court upheld the finding that the balance of convenience favored the university, given the serious threats perceived and the inadequacy of the medical information provided by the appellant.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal from the dismissal of a motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the order dismissing the interlocutory injunction was interlocutory in nature and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

The court held that the characterization of an order as final or interlocutory depends on its legal nature rather than its practical effect.

The court also rejected the appellants' concern that the motion judge's reasons conclusively determined the issue of confidentiality, noting that the issue remained open for trial.

The appellants agreed to purchase a home from the respondent for $2.9 million, but the transaction failed to close.

The trial judge found that the appellants repudiated the agreement and forfeited their $75,000 deposit, declining to grant relief from forfeiture despite the property later selling for more.

On appeal, the appellants argued the respondent had repudiated the contract by failing to close on the required date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the contract remained alive until the appellants chose not to proceed, and that retaining the deposit was not unconscionable.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent $60,526.99 for unpaid work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent adduced evidence supporting the outstanding amount and the appellants failed to raise a triable issue.

The Court also upheld the judgment against the various corporate entities controlled by the individual appellant, clarifying the specific amounts recoverable against each entity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an appeal book endorsement awarding costs to the respondent.

The respondent was awarded costs in the amount of $3,500, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, agreed with the reasons of the motion judge, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Following the dismissal of the appeal, the court received written submissions on costs from the respondent.

The appellants did not submit costs submissions.

The court awarded the respondent costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $2,630.78 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The self-represented appellant appealed the dismissal of his action.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had repeatedly failed to comply with the Rules, ignored court orders, and misused court processes.

Finding no reason to interfere with the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent.

The respondent had a claim against a company that went into receivership.

A vesting order transferred the debtor's assets to the appellant, expunging the respondent's claim against those assets.

The appellant obtained an Order to Continue the proceedings under Rule 11 to pursue a counterclaim against the respondent.

The motion judge varied the Rule 11 order to allow the respondent to pursue its original claim against the appellant as a stand-alone claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a Rule 11 order is purely procedural and cannot create substantive rights that were expunged by the vesting order.

The respondent was limited to asserting its claim by way of set-off against the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action after an adjournment was refused.

The Court of Appeal found that in the exceptional circumstances of the case, an adjournment should have been granted.

The appeal was allowed and the order dismissing the action was set aside, subject to strict conditions including setting the action down for trial within 30 days, proceeding on a peremptory basis, and depositing $5,000 as security for costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for losses allegedly sustained due to misrepresentations by a municipal solicitor.

The trial judge found no evidence of misrepresentation, largely based on the credibility of the appellants' principal, and concluded that reliance on the alleged misrepresentation would have been unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in these findings and dismissed the appeal with costs.