Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant, Anna Barbiero, sought to overturn the dismissal of a 21-year-old certified class proceeding against Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack for unlawfully injecting Liquid Injectable Silicone.

The motion judge dismissed the action for inordinate and inexcusable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, emphasizing the need for a "culture shift" in civil justice to combat delay, finding the Langenecker approach to delay out of step with the Supreme Court of Canada's Hryniak decision.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, and the appellant failed to demonstrate error in the prejudice analysis or the exercise of discretion.

The plaintiff, Cary Beazley, brought a motion to review a single motion judge's order of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion for an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of his medical malpractice action.

Beazley alleged negligence by physicians for failing to timely diagnose and treat Lyme disease.

The Court of Appeal panel reviewed the motion judge's decision, applying a deferential standard of review, and found no legal error or misapprehension of material evidence.

The panel upheld the motion judge's finding that the proposed appeal lacked arguable grounds, as the expert evidence did not support Beazley's claims regarding Lyme disease testing accuracy or the standard of care.

The review motion was dismissed without costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for delay and the dismissal of his motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no reversible error in the motion judge's decision, which concluded that the appellant's more than five years of delay was inordinate and inexcusable, causing prejudice to the respondents and the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss the entire action, even though only one respondent had sought dismissal for delay.

The appellant appealed four summary judgments granted against him for various debts (mortgages, lines of credit, credit card).

The appellant's arguments, consistent with "pseudolegal" theories, asserted that he was not subject to Canadian law by attempting to separate himself from his legal personhood.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that no legally tenable defence was advanced.

The court reiterated that such arguments consistently fail and consume court resources.

The court also confirmed the admissibility of the bank's business records under the Evidence Act.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court of Justice that struck the appellant's statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissed the action.

The appellant had sued the respondent, a lawyer for an opposing party in separate litigation, alleging failure to respond to emails regarding mediation and constitutional rights violations due to a comment about his attire.

The motion judge found no duty of care, that the statement of claim was irremediably defective, and that the doctrine of absolute immunity applied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no errors of fact or law, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the application of established legal principles regarding striking pleadings and the standard of review for such decisions.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment of $102,862.95 plus interest, granted to the respondent based on a promissory note.

The appellant argued the note was unenforceable due to unfulfilled oral conditions and that the motion judge erred in denying an adjournment and in finding no evidence to support his claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's refusal of adjournment reasonable and his characterization of the appellant's evidence as "bald allegations" lacking credibility was supported by the record, especially given the appellant's inconsistent conduct.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to establish any agreement altering the promissory note's terms.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted against them in a failed real estate transaction.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial regarding defences of non est factum, failure to tender (due to anticipatory breach), and the appropriateness of summary judgment despite an outstanding third-party claim.

The appeal also challenged the assessment of damages, specifically the foreseeability of bridge financing costs and mitigation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings and reasoning.

The defendants (appellants) appealed a motion judge's order that dismissed their motion to dismiss a solicitor's negligence action for lack of legal capacity.

The plaintiff (respondent) had sued the appellants in his personal capacity, alleging negligence in an appeal they handled for his late brother's Estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by not addressing who retained the appellants; it was the Estate, not the plaintiff personally.

Therefore, the plaintiff lacked the personal capacity to bring the solicitor's negligence claim.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The Ontario-resident plaintiffs purchased Mexican vacation packages from the defendant Sunwing in Ontario.

The plaintiffs suffered serious injuries in a bus accident in Mexico caused by the negligence of the driver.

The bus was operated by Best Day, a Mexican company contracted by Sunwing.

Best Day entered into indemnity agreements with Sunwing agreeing to Ontario jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs sued Sunwing and Best Day in Ontario.

Best Day moved to dismiss or stay the action for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Best Day's appeal, finding a real and substantial connection to Ontario and that Ontario was the convenient forum.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision declining jurisdiction over the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the real and substantial connection test had not been met, whether under the Muscutt or Van Breda framework.

The Court also found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed four orders of the Superior Court of Justice that struck his applications and dismissed a motion for contempt against Crown counsel.

The applications sought to set aside prior criminal convictions, direct the Attorney General and the court to cease discriminatory practices, and have a judge withdraw from a proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the lower court decisions that the applications constituted improper collateral attacks on final criminal orders and required leave under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant, a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, suffered severe injuries resulting in lymphedema.

At trial, liability was admitted, and a jury awarded her $290,000 in non-pecuniary damages, $30,000 for past income loss, and $43,300 under the Family Law Act, but zero for future income loss.

The appellant appealed the zero award for future income loss, arguing it was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence of the appellant's successful employment and promotions post-accident, and that the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's expert evidence regarding her future loss of competitive advantage.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for the tort of deceit and ordering them to pay damages equivalent to US $7,832,083.00.

The trial judge found that the appellants falsely represented that computer equipment purchased from the respondents was destined for educational ministries in China and Australia in order to obtain special discounted pricing, when in fact the equipment was diverted to the grey market.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants made false representations, that the respondents relied on them, and that the deceit caused the respondents' loss.

The applicants sought to appeal a decision of the Divisional Court dismissing their application for judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Agriculture and Food.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that under section 6(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the matter was properly decided by the Divisional Court and could not be reconstituted as a Rule 14 application before a Superior Court judge.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding the costs of goods sold ratio in a contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to find negligent misrepresentation and detrimental reliance.

The Court further held that the misrepresentation did not fall within the contract's entire agreement clause and upheld the damages assessment.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action arising from a snowmobile accident where the plaintiff collided with the respondent's parked truck and trailer.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to consider that the respondent's vehicles were parked contrary to the Highway Traffic Act and were unilluminated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly concluded the accident was caused entirely by the plaintiff, who had consumed alcohol, was carrying a passenger on an unsuitable snowmobile, and was driving erratically up and down snowbanks at an unsafe speed.

The appellant pedestrian was struck by a vehicle and sued for damages.

At trial, the judge ruled on the section 266(3) Insurance Act threshold motion while the jury was deliberating, finding the appellant not credible and dismissing the action.

The jury subsequently returned a substantial damages award.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge was required to wait for the jury's verdict and follow its implicit credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislature left the threshold determination to the judge, who is not bound by the jury's verdict, and the timing of the ruling is within the judge's discretion.

The appellant sought to enforce child and spousal support arrears against the respondent, who resided in Egypt and had no assets in Canada.

The respondent was entitled to compensation funds from the United Nations Compensation Commission, which were to be distributed through the Government of Canada.

The motion judge initially restrained the payout but later ruled he lacked jurisdiction due to Crown immunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that under the Financial Administration Act, the funds belonged to Canada once received, and the Crown could consent to their distribution.

The Court appointed the appellant as a receiver under the Courts of Justice Act to receive the funds in satisfaction of the support arrears.

The insured claimed for the theft of a vehicle under his automobile insurance policy.

The vehicle was later found submerged in water, and the insured's mechanic retrieved and completely dismantled it before the insurer could inspect it.

The insurer denied the claim for breach of statutory conditions.

At trial, a jury awarded the insured compensatory and punitive damages, finding the insurer wrongfully refused to pay and acted reprehensibly.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, setting aside the punitive damages and costs, holding that the jury's verdict was unreasonable as the evidence clearly showed the insurer was denied a reasonable opportunity to inspect the vehicle and there was no evidence of malicious or high-handed conduct by the insurer.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment signed by the Registrar.

The Court of Appeal found that the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to sign the default judgment under Rule 19.04 because the claim for 'approximately $450,000' in damages for conversion and fraud was not a liquidated demand.

The default judgment was set aside with leave for the respondent to proceed before a judge under Rule 19.05.

However, the court refused to set aside the noting of pleadings closed due to the appellant's intentional refusal to defend.