Naomi M. Lutes

The appellant lawyer appealed findings of professional misconduct and a six-month suspension imposed by the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The misconduct arose from his representation of a severely injured client and the client's spouse amidst family conflicts over care and property.

The lawyer was found to have acted in a conflict of interest, breached court orders, commissioned a misleading affidavit, and delayed a settlement to prevent a Law Society complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Law Society Appeal Panel's decision reasonable and the penalty well within the appropriate range for the serious departure from professional standards.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence arising from historical sexual assault allegations involving two complainants in a family context.

The court held that, although the reasons were capable of appellate review and the correct W.(D.) framework was identified, the trial judge committed reversible errors by misapprehending evidence of animus, misapprehending the appellant's evidence concerning an earlier allegation, and improperly treating a prior disclosure as negating the defence theory of collusion.

The prior disclosure was not sufficiently consistent with the later allegations to function as a prior consistent statement rebutting fabrication.

The curative proviso was unavailable because the convictions were supportable but not inevitable.

A new trial was ordered on all counts, including those previously stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The offender pleaded guilty to production of marijuana contrary to section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

A Gardiner hearing was held to resolve factual disputes regarding the extent of the grow operation.

The offender acknowledged growing 250 marijuana plants in his residence.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence followed by 3 years' probation, with ancillary orders including a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA profiling order.

The sentencing considered the offender's chronic health conditions, medical authorization for cannabis use, lack of commercial motive, prior 1998 conviction for the same offence, and 14-year crime-free period since that conviction.

Appellants were convicted of two counts of hindering or obstructing a provincial offences officer contrary to section 42(1) of the Nutrient Management Act.

The appellants parked their truck directly in front of Ministry of the Environment inspectors' truck, blocking its exit, and refused multiple requests to move.

The appellants appealed their convictions arguing the actus reus was not proven and that they exercised due diligence.

The court dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the appellants' actions constituted obstruction and that they failed to establish a due diligence defence, as their belief that the officers were trespassing was based on a mistake of law and was not reasonably held in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the deaths of two men who were beaten to death.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including DNA, cellphone records, voice recognition, and eyewitness resemblance, to place the appellant at the scene.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence, viewed individually and collectively, was too frail to support the inference that the appellant was present at the scene.

The court concluded that the jury's verdict was unreasonable and entered acquittals.

This is a retrial following a successful appeal in a criminal case involving six charges of sexual assault and sexual interference against the defendant MCJ.

The charges involved three complainants: LJ (alleged offences between December 5, 1987 and December 5, 1992), KJ (alleged offences between June 15 and September 10, 2007), and LH (alleged offences in 1998 and July 23, 2005).

The defendant was the uncle of two complainants and the uncle of the mother of the third complainant.

The trial judge found that while the complainants were credible in their sincerity, their evidence was not reliable to the requisite degree due to numerous material inconsistencies, evolving allegations, and implausibilities.

All charges were dismissed.

The court determined the quantum of costs to be awarded to three innocent third parties following the Crown's unsuccessful forfeiture application under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown had sought forfeiture of two properties without evidence of complicity or collusion by the owners.

The court found the Crown's conduct constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards, including failure to conduct proper disclosure, misrepresentation to the Superior Court regarding mortgage law, and proceeding with a meritless application.

The court awarded substantial costs to FirstOntario and reduced costs to Fercan and GRVN, considering factors including proportionality, duplication of services, and the applicants' own litigation positions.

The Crown appealed acquittals on charges of acting as livestock dealers without a licence contrary to the Livestock and Livestock Products Act.

The accused purchased and sold approximately 2,156 cattle for $1,367,000 and sold 2,811 cattle for approximately $1,619,000 over an 11-week period in 2007.

The trial judge found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were engaged in the business of buying or selling livestock, as opposed to operating as livestock producers.

The appellate court upheld the acquittals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The two accused were charged with drugging and sexually assaulting two different complainants.

The first complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by one of the accused in 2003, but the court found reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the timeline and lack of corroborating evidence.

The second complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by both accused in 2011 after a night of heavy drinking.

The court found reasonable doubt that she was drugged, noting her ability to walk and send text messages during the alleged timeframe.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding her lack of consent, or alternatively, that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

Both accused were found not guilty on all charges.

Following the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal, the successful responding parties sought costs.

They submitted a joint draft bill of costs reflecting fees, disbursements, and HST, with a reduction applied for duplication of work between two law firms.

The court found the respondents entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis and held that the draft bill appropriately reflected the Rule 57.01 factors, including the complexity of the proceeding and late amendments to the grounds of appeal.

The moving party accepted the claimed amount but requested a deduction to account for an outstanding prior costs order.

The court fixed costs accordingly after deducting the outstanding amount.

The defendant tobacco companies brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' proposed class actions as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached their contracts by participating in smuggling duty-free tobacco back into Canada, avoiding higher domestic prices.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the alleged smuggling long before commencing the actions in 2009 and 2010.

The court dismissed the motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiffs discovered the constituent elements of their claims, particularly given the defendants' consistent denials of involvement in smuggling.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing a motion for the interim preservation of over $4 million under the Civil Remedies Act.

The funds were the proceeds of the sale of a commercial property previously housing an illegal marijuana grow operation and later leased to a company involved in a stock fraud scheme.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's finding that there were no reasonable grounds to believe the property was an instrument of unlawful activity.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The applicants sought costs awards against the Crown following the dismissal of the Crown's forfeiture applications under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown had sought forfeiture of two properties allegedly used in connection with marijuana grow operations.

The court found that the Crown's conduct in commencing restraint and forfeiture applications against innocent third parties, without evidence of complicity or collusion, constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution.

The Crown failed to properly assess available evidence before proceeding and maintained an intransigent "hardball" attitude throughout the proceedings.

The court determined that costs awards were warranted.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion under the Civil Remedies Act for an order to preserve over $4 million, representing the sale proceeds of a commercial property.

The property had previously housed a massive, concealed marijuana grow operation run by tenants, and was later leased to a company involved in a U.S. stock fraud scheme.

The court found no issue estoppel from prior unsuccessful federal criminal forfeiture proceedings against the property owner.

While the court found reasonable grounds to believe the property was an instrument of unlawful activity due to the grow operation, it ultimately dismissed the preservation motion.

The court concluded that preserving the funds would clearly not be in the interests of justice, as the owner had no knowledge of or participation in the unlawful activities, making a preservation order manifestly harsh and draconian.

The appellant, a former senior officer and director of a publicly held waste management firm, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and his sentence of eight years' imprisonment, a US $17.9 million restitution order, and a US $15.5 million fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from his undisclosed involvement in copper trading transactions that diverted millions of dollars from his employer to companies he controlled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on the duty to disclose, responses to jury questions, or the overall balance of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court affirming the fitness of the sentence and the appropriateness of the restitution and fine orders, subject only to a clarification that restitution payments would be credited against the fine to prevent double recovery.

The applicants sought revocation of two restraint orders issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and return of property proceeds held by the Seized Property Management Directorate Branch.

The Crown had previously dismissed its forfeiture application after over 35 days of hearings, finding no evidence of complicity or collusion on the part of the applicants.

The court granted the application, ordering revocation of the restraint orders and distribution of the remaining proceeds pursuant to a consent order among the interested parties.

The court rejected the Crown's request for a 90-day adjournment to allow the Civil Remedies Office to investigate whether to commence separate proceedings, finding such a referral constituted an abuse of process and an attempt to relitigate issues already determined.

The Crown sought forfeiture of two properties under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following the discovery of sophisticated marijuana grow operations.

The first property, a former Molson Brewery plant in Barrie, contained two large indoor grow operations operated by individuals convicted of production and trafficking offences.

The second property was a residential dwelling in Phelpston owned by a company controlled by the respondent's brother.

The Crown alleged that the property owners and their corporations were complicit in or colluded with the drug offences.

The respondents argued they were innocent third parties unaware of the illegal activities occurring on their properties.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his nieces and great-niece.

The trial judge had stated that allegations of sexual misconduct made against a family member are inherently more credible than those against a non-family member due to the explosive nature of such complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that this analytical framework was improper and constituted a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant mortgagee brought a motion to vary a restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit the sale of the subject property under power of sale.

The Crown consented to the sale, but the respondent owner opposed it, arguing the property had increased in value and disputing the mortgagee's claimed costs.

The court granted the motion to permit the sale, directing that the net proceeds be paid to the Crown.

The court declined to approve the mortgagee's claimed costs of over $388,000, directing that those funds be held by the Crown pending an assessment under Rule 58 and the final determination of the forfeiture proceedings.

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of counselling the commission of murder.

The respondent, a victim of severe spousal abuse, had attempted to hire a hit man to kill her husband.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis of the common law defence of duress.

The Supreme Court held that duress requires compulsion to commit a specific offence and is not available where threats were not made for the purpose of compelling the commission of an offence.

However, given the uncertainty in the law, the Crown's change of position between trial and appeal, and the exceptional circumstances, a stay of proceedings was entered rather than ordering a new trial.

Fish J. dissented in part, favouring a new trial over a stay.