Mary Lou Benotto

The appellant father appealed a Hague Convention decision that dismissed his application for the return of his child to Peru, despite the child being wrongfully removed.

The application judge had applied the grave risk exception (Article 13(b)) after a protracted 33-day hearing.

The Court of Appeal found the lower court's process led to unacceptable delay and contained analytical gaps, particularly regarding the Peruvian court's findings and the uncritical adoption of the mother's evidence.

While dismissing the appeal due to the child's estrangement and the passage of time, the Court ordered an expedited assessment and appointment of the Children's Lawyer for the ongoing parenting application, and requested case management by a single judge.

This appeal addressed whether Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) on attendant care benefits was included within the statutory maximums under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) for accidents occurring before June 3, 2019.

The appellant (insured) argued that HST should be payable in addition to the maximums, while the respondent (insurer) contended it was part of the maximums.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the relevant SABS provisions were unambiguous and that HST constituted a "reasonable and necessary expense" included within the $6,000 monthly and $1,000,000 total maximums for attendant care benefits.

The court emphasized that the same words in a statute must be given the same meaning throughout.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the order appealed from was interlocutory.

The underlying action involved claims of negligence and invasion of privacy following a human rights complaint.

The appellants had previously moved for summary judgment and to rely on two reports provided by the moving parties to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The motion judge refused the request to rely on the reports, finding they were subject to an implied undertaking.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order did not determine any substantive rights and was therefore interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed, as jurisdiction lies with the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant, a former head of the respondent union, was expelled from membership following an arbitration.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to enforce the arbitrator's awards.

The appellant attempted to appeal to the Divisional Court, which found the appeal frivolous and vexatious, and then appealed to the Court of Appeal seeking to set aside the awards, lay criminal charges, and claim $1 million in damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the proceeding under Rule 2.1.01(1) as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the appellant sought relief the court could not grant and failed to meaningfully respond to the court's request for submissions.

The appellants, franchisors of a vape store chain, appealed an application judge's decision ordering them to pay $100,000 to the respondents, former franchisees, pursuant to Minutes of Settlement.

The appellants argued the respondents breached the settlement by continuing to use proprietary store designs and branding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the agreements or his factual finding that the respondents' store design was sufficiently distinct to avoid customer confusion.

The appellant landlord appealed a declaration that its termination of a commercial lease was unlawful.

The tenant had failed to pay the first instalment of a security deposit, prompting the landlord to demand the entire deposit and subsequently lock out the tenant before the five-day notice period required by the lease had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the termination was premature and rejecting the landlord's argument that the missed instalment amounted to a repudiation of the agreement.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion by The Globe and Mail Inc. to quash an appeal brought by John Aquino.

The appeal challenged an order that set aside a sealing order previously obtained by Aquino.

The court applied principles for distinguishing final from interlocutory orders, affirming that an order is interlocutory if it does not determine the substantive rights in dispute.

The court found that the order setting aside the sealing order was interlocutory, as the alleged privacy rights were collateral to the main action (a family dispute over a real estate company, including claims for winding up and shareholder declaration).

The court rejected the argument that the nature of the underlying corporate proceeding changed the interlocutory character of the order.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants, who own most of the bed of Silver Lake, sought a declaration that the lake is non-navigable under the Beds of Navigable Waters Act to prevent other cottage owners from navigating vessels over their portion of the lakebed.

The application judge dismissed the application, applying the definition of 'navigable water' from the federal Canadian Navigable Waters Act (CNWA).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in applying the CNWA definition to a property dispute over lakebed rights.

However, the Court declined to grant the declaration sought by the appellants, noting that the application judge had not resolved the necessary factual issues and that a declaration would not resolve the underlying dispute regarding riparian rights and common law navigability.

The appeal was allowed, and the application was dismissed without prejudice to bringing a fresh application.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a real estate developer (appellant) and a home builder (respondent) arising from an agreement for the sale of land.

The appellant sought interest on the unpaid purchase price, alleging the respondent breached provisions related to commencing construction and failing to close the transaction by a stipulated outside date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of both claims.

The court found no evidence to support the appellant's claim regarding permit availability for construction delays and determined that the appellant's own breach in installing sanitary sewers prevented it from relying on the respondent's alleged delay.

The claim for 12% interest for delayed closing was also rejected due to a lack of proof of damages and the appellant's prior breach.

The appellant, Karen Irwin, sued her former employers for constructive dismissal.

The respondents moved to stay the action, arguing an arbitration clause in the employment contract required arbitration.

The appellant challenged the arbitration clause's validity due to unconscionability and inconsistency with the Employment Standards Act and Human Rights Code.

The motion judge stayed the action, deferring the validity question to arbitration.

The appellant appealed, arguing procedural unfairness and that the motion judge erred by not determining the arbitration clause's validity.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction under s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, as the motion judge was permitted to leave the validity question to the arbitrator, especially since it involved mixed questions of fact and law requiring more than superficial consideration.

The appellant, Ayerswood Development Corporation, appealed a Superior Court order directing that funds paid to Sirius Concrete Inc. shortly before its bankruptcy formed part of the bankrupt estate.

Ayerswood argued the funds were subject to a constructive trust due to Sirius's deceit and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal found the bankruptcy judge erred in summarily dismissing the constructive trust claim, holding that Ayerswood's uncontradicted evidence, if true, could legally support such a trust.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted for a proper determination of entitlement to the funds.

This is an appeal concerning the application of the doctrine of equitable contribution between two insurers, Northbridge and Aviva, for the defence and indemnification of a shared insured, Mr. Daneshvari, in an underlying professional misconduct action.

Both insurers' policies contained "other insurance" clauses purporting to be excess.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the policies were irreconcilable, requiring equal contribution.

The court affirmed that the standard of review for interpreting these specific "other insurance" clauses was palpable and overriding error, not correctness, as they were not standard form contracts with significant precedential value.

The appeal was dismissed, and Aviva was ordered to pay costs to Northbridge.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a vessel causing death and criminal negligence causing death after an incident where an eight-year-old boy drowned when their canoe capsized in dangerous river conditions.

The appellant appealed the convictions and sentence, arguing that a canoe is not a "vessel" under the Criminal Code, his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed, and expert evidence was required for the criminal negligence conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a canoe is a vessel, the s. 10(b) right to counsel was permissibly suspended for the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand even in a hospital setting, and expert evidence was not necessary for criminal negligence given the obvious risks.

The six-year sentence was also upheld as fit.

The moving parties, representing U.S. class action claimants, sought leave to appeal a supervising judge's order in a CCAA proceeding.

The supervising judge had dismissed their motion seeking to be treated as unaffected creditors or to have an expedited adjudication of their claims prior to a creditor vote.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and did not raise issues of significance to the insolvency practice.

The Court emphasized the high level of deference owed to a CCAA supervising judge's discretionary decisions balancing stakeholder interests.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the motion judge's alleged error in admitting gang evidence, a claimed miscarriage of justice due to trial severance and the jury being unaware of a co-accused's verdict, and the unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of gang evidence, no miscarriage of justice, and that the verdict was reasonable given the evidence of motive, animus, and association.

The appellant purchased a recreational trailer and left it for free storage with the respondents.

The trailer was stolen from the dealership.

The appellant sued for negligence, but the trial judge found the respondents were gratuitous bailees and met the standard of care, finding no negligence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in determining the standard of care, failing to consider foreseeability of theft, and misapprehending expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the respondents were not negligent under any standard of care, had addressed foreseeability of theft with security measures, and did not misapprehend expert evidence regarding security improvements.

This appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to the appellants' failure to appear at the scheduled hearing.

Despite the respondents seeking their full costs, the court awarded nominal costs, recognizing the appellants' inability to pay and to avoid a deleterious effect of a substantial award on them.

This appeal concerned whether public school teachers are protected from unreasonable search and seizure by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when the search is performed in the workplace by their employers.

The case involved a school principal reading and taking screenshots of a private, password-protected log maintained by two teachers on their personal Google account, accessed via a workplace laptop, which was then used by the school board for disciplinary action.

The Court of Appeal found that the labour relations arbitrator and the Divisional Court erred in their interpretation and application of section 8, concluding that the teachers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their log, which was violated by the principal's actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award was quashed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal concerning the valid exercise of a lease renewal option.

The appellant argued the tenant's notice was not clear and unequivocal because it included proposals for new terms.

The court affirmed the motion judge's finding that the tenant's explicit statement of intent to renew was sufficient, as the lease anticipated ongoing negotiations for rent, and the additional proposals did not render the notice conditional.

The appellant sought to continue the assessment of solicitor accounts, which the application judge dismissed due to a jurisdictional issue (late requisition under the Solicitors Act).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, emphasizing that courts should facilitate account assessment and that procedural defects should not be treated as nullities, especially when parties have consented and participated for years.

The court ordered the Assessment Officer to issue a decision on the merits without delay.