Marie Deschamps

The accused was convicted of robbery based entirely on DNA evidence found on a Halloween mask left near the scene.

At trial, the investigating officer improperly gave bad character evidence about the accused, which the trial judge did not address in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the Crown had not proven the error was harmless.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's express statement that he relied 'entirely' on the DNA evidence meant the improper character evidence played no part in the convictions, making its admission a harmless error.

The respondent and his partner engaged in consensual erotic asphyxiation.

The partner consented in advance to being choked into unconsciousness and to the sexual activity that would occur while she was unconscious.

The trial judge convicted the respondent of sexual assault, finding that a person cannot legally consent to sexual activity while unconscious.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Criminal Code requires a conscious, operating mind throughout the sexual activity to provide valid consent, and advance consent to unconscious sexual activity is not recognized in law.

The appellant advanced funds to a corporation controlled by a fraudster.

The fraudster used the funds to purchase shares, which he and his spouse pledged to the respondent bank in exchange for an increased credit limit.

The appellant obtained a tracing order for the fraudulently obtained funds, excluding assets in the hands of bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank acquired a valid security interest under the Personal Property Security Act and qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, thereby defeating the appellant's equitable claim to the proceeds of the shares.

The Information Commissioner of Canada sought judicial review of refusals to disclose records located in the offices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Prime Minister's agenda held by the RCMP and PCO.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Ministers' offices are not 'government institutions' under the Access to Information Act.

The Court established a two-part test to determine if records in a Minister's office are 'under the control' of a government institution: whether the record relates to a departmental matter, and whether the institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy.

Applying this test, the requested records were not under the control of the respective government institutions.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is not an 'officer' of a government institution under the Privacy Act, meaning his agenda is exempt from disclosure as personal information.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant government appealed a decision upholding the certification of a class action brought by elderly residents of long-term care facilities.

The residents alleged the government artificially inflated accommodation charges to subsidize medical expenses, claiming breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and a section 15 Charter violation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, striking the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and bad faith, finding that the government did not owe a fiduciary duty or a private duty of care to the residents in these circumstances.

However, the Court allowed the unjust enrichment and Charter claims to proceed to trial, and declined to decertify the class action.

The appellant represented a class of investors who purchased strata lots in a Hilton hotel developed by the respondent.

The respondent also developed an adjacent Marriott hotel and offered different financial arrangements to the Marriott purchasers, including a guaranteed rate of return, which were not disclosed to the Hilton purchasers.

The appellant sued for misrepresentation under the Real Estate Act, common law negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to prove the omitted information was material to a reasonable investor.

The Court also found the respondent had a valid statutory defence, did not breach the standard of care for negligent misrepresentation, and did not breach its fiduciary duties as manager.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to explain why certain factors did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding fabrication.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to give adequate consideration to whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to Ontario’s separate labour relations regime for agricultural workers.

The Court held that s. 2(d) of the Charter protects a meaningful process of collective action toward workplace goals, including employee representations that employers must consider in good faith, but does not constitutionalize any particular model of labour relations.

The majority interpreted the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 as implicitly requiring good faith consideration of employee representations and concluded that the claimants had not established that the statutory scheme made meaningful association effectively impossible.

The s. 15 challenge also failed because the record did not establish substantive discrimination, and the claim was premature.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside the accused's convictions for obstructing justice.

The Supreme Court found that the appeal raised a question of law and that it had jurisdiction.

Adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal, the Court held that suggesting a false doctor's note was an integral part of an overall attempt to dissuade a witness from giving evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions restored.

The Province sought reimbursement of over $5.2 million paid to fund the respondent's defence in a criminal trial.

In granting an Anton Piller order to search the respondents' properties for evidence of concealed assets, the chambers judge relied on facts found against the respondents in prior judicial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order, ruling the prior findings inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a judgment in a prior civil or criminal case is admissible as evidence in subsequent interlocutory proceedings as proof of its findings and conclusions, provided the parties are the same or were participants in the prior proceedings on similar issues.

The Court found the stringent test for an Anton Piller order was met.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his wife.

At trial, a police officer gave lay opinion evidence that a mark on the appellant's finger was a bite mark, corroborating the complainant's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from a forensic dentist concluding the mark was not a bite mark.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the due diligence criterion was not met, the fresh evidence was sufficiently cogent that it could reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment and the ultimate verdict.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada that substituted a fine for a 30-day sentence of imprisonment imposed by a military judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right under s. 245(2)(a) of the National Defence Act, finding that the dissent in the Court of Appeal was on a question of law.

The Court agreed with the dissenting judge that the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge's decision, and restored the original sentence.

Consumer appeal concerning the enforceability of a mandatory mediation-arbitration clause and class action waiver in a mobile phone services contract.

The Court held that the competence-competence principle generally requires arbitral jurisdictional challenges to be decided first by the arbitrator, but the statutory interpretation issue raised a pure question of law that the court could decide.

Interpreting ss. 3 and 172 of British Columbia's consumer protection legislation textually, contextually and purposively, the majority held that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under s. 172 were non-waivable and could proceed in Supreme Court notwithstanding the arbitration clause.

Other statutory, repealed statutory, and common law claims remained subject to a stay in favour of arbitration, and the class action waiver fell with the invalid portion of the arbitration clause.

The respondent was charged with sexual interference with his daughter.

The indictment alleged the offence occurred between April 1 and May 31, 2002.

The trial judge convicted the respondent based on an incident occurring after September 22, 2002.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, finding trial fairness was compromised.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the exact time of the offence was not material and the defence, which was based entirely on credibility, was not prejudiced.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting a victim during a physical altercation and immediately fleeing the scene.

At trial, the appellant conceded to manslaughter but claimed the shooting was accidental, lacking the intent for murder.

The Crown argued the appellant's immediate flight without hesitation indicated murderous intent.

The trial judge instructed the jury to be careful with the post-offence conduct evidence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge should have given a 'no probative value' instruction regarding his flight.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence of lack of hesitation was relevant to intent and the jury charge was adequate.

The Court further held that even if there was an error, it was harmless and saved by the curative proviso.

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in two class actions, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Public Service Superannuation Act and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act that reduced the supplementary death benefit payable to surviving spouses based on the age of the deceased plan member.

They argued this constituted age discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reduction provisions did not violate s. 15(1).

The Court clarified that a formalistic 'mirror comparator group' approach is not required for a s. 15(1) analysis.

Instead, a substantive equality approach must be taken, considering the full context of the legislative scheme.

Viewed contextually, the benefit scheme met the actual needs of the claimants and did not perpetuate disadvantage or negative stereotypes.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision dismissing its claim that the federal government was required to share in the costs of social services provided in schools and support services provided to persons with disabilities under the Canada Assistance Plan.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that social services in schools were not 'welfare services' because their primary object was to support the educational mission of schools, not to fight poverty.

Furthermore, the Court held that the federal government was already sharing the costs of support services for persons with disabilities requiring continuous assistance under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act, 1977, which triggered the residual exception in the Canada Assistance Plan.

The appellant brought a class action in defamation on behalf of Montreal taxi drivers whose mother tongue is Arabic or Creole, following racist and offensive comments made by a radio host.

The trial judge allowed the action, but the Court of Appeal set it aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the comments were wrongful and racist, an ordinary person would not have believed they damaged the personal reputation of each individual driver in the large, heterogeneous group.

Therefore, the requirement of personal injury for a defamation claim was not met.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, he admitted guilt to manslaughter but argued he lacked the mental state for murder.

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to explain the difference between manslaughter and second degree murder and to provide a specific definition of manslaughter.

The trial judge explained the difference lay in the mental state but declined to provide examples or a specific definition of manslaughter.

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge responded correctly to the jury's questions and there was no reasonable possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for a conviction.

The appellant landowner sought compensation from the respondent pipeline company for reclamation work on an expropriated easement.

After a protracted dispute involving two arbitration committees and a discontinued court action, the second Arbitration Committee awarded the appellant his costs for all proceedings.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside this award.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for the Committee's interpretation of its home statute regarding costs is reasonableness.

The Court found the Committee reasonably interpreted section 99(1) of the National Energy Board Act to award costs for both arbitration proceedings and the related court action, consistent with the principle of full compensation in expropriation law.