Marie Deschamps

The appellants brought a civil liability action against the succession of a man who murdered his former spouse and their two children before committing suicide.

The trial judge awarded personal damages for solatium doloris but dismissed the successions' claims for compensatory and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that punitive damages under s. 49 of the Quebec Charter are autonomous and can be awarded even without compensatory damages.

The Court also held that the death of the wrongdoer does not preclude an award of punitive damages, as they serve a denunciatory purpose.

The Court awarded $10,000 in exemplary damages to the victims' successions.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the conduct of a police officer constituted entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the brief conversation between the police officer and the appellant did not ground a finding of entrapment.

The Court noted that the appellant was not induced to commit a crime but was already engaged in criminal activities when he allowed the officer to witness a drug transaction.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal on three counts of sexual assault and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the objective test for sexual assault.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal properly exercised its power under section 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to substitute a conviction, as the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature and the appellant would necessarily have been convicted but for the trial judge's error of law.

The debtor executed a General Security Agreement with the respondent credit union covering present and after-acquired property, but the credit union did not immediately register its interest under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The debtor subsequently granted a Bank Act security interest to the appellant bank, which was registered.

The debtor later acquired additional property, to which both security interests attached simultaneously.

When the debtor defaulted, the bank seized and sold the after-acquired property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank's security interest was subject to the credit union's prior unregistered PPSA interest.

Under the Bank Act, the bank could acquire no greater interest than the debtor held at the time the security was given.

Because the credit union had already acquired an inchoate proprietary interest in the after-acquired property upon execution of its security agreement, the debtor's title was already encumbered when the bank took its security.

The Bank of Montreal appealed a decision granting priority to Innovation Credit Union's prior unregistered security interest under the Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act over the Bank's subsequently acquired and registered Bank Act security interest in the same farm equipment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Bank Act, the Bank could acquire no greater interest in the collateral than the debtor had at the time the security was taken.

Because the debtor had already conveyed a statutory interest analogous to a fixed charge to the Credit Union, the Bank took its security interest subject to that prior interest, regardless of the fact that the Credit Union's interest was unperfected.

The appellant union applied to the Canada Industrial Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the employees of a children's aid society providing services to Aboriginal families in Toronto.

The agency challenged the application, arguing its labour relations fell under exclusive provincial authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential function of the agency is to deliver child welfare services, which is a provincial function.

The presumption of provincial jurisdiction over labour relations was not displaced by the Aboriginal aspects of the agency's operations.

The appellant, an Aboriginal child welfare agency, provides services to Aboriginal children and families in British Columbia.

The respondent union applied to the provincial Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the appellant's employees.

The appellant objected, arguing its labour relations fell within federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the essential nature of the appellant's operation is the provision of child welfare services, a provincial matter.

Applying the functional test, the Court concluded that the appellant is a provincial undertaking and its labour relations are subject to provincial jurisdiction.

The appellant filed a civil liability action for sexual assault more than 25 years after the alleged assault occurred.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was prescribed, and the Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal that the issue of when prescription started to run raised questions of fact that could not be resolved on the face of the record.

The case was remanded to the Quebec Superior Court to assess the evidence.

The government of British Columbia sought the British Columbia Utilities Commission's approval of a 2007 Energy Purchase Agreement between BC Hydro and Alcan.

The respondent First Nations asserted that the agreement should be subject to consultation under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, due to historical and ongoing impacts of the dam project on the Nechako River.

The Commission found it had jurisdiction to consider consultation but concluded the agreement would not adversely affect any Aboriginal interest, thus no duty to consult arose.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the Commission's decision, holding that while the Commission had the power to assess the adequacy of consultation, its finding that the agreement caused no novel adverse impacts was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a judge and jury.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could consider his post-offence conduct as consistent with a pre-existing plan and intention to kill.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, were fair, balanced, and accurate regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellant newspaper appealed orders compelling its journalist to answer questions that could reveal a confidential source, and a publication ban on reporting settlement negotiations in the Sponsorship Scandal litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no class-based constitutional privilege exists for journalists, the common law Wigmore framework applies in Quebec civil proceedings to determine journalist-source privilege on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also quashed the publication ban, finding it was improperly issued without notice and failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test, as the media was not bound by the parties' confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant sought recognition in Quebec of an English judgment ordering the Republic of Iraq to pay costs arising from litigation over aircraft seized during the invasion of Kuwait.

Iraq claimed state immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Act applies to applications for recognition of foreign judgments, Iraq's conduct in controlling the defence of its state-owned airline in the English commercial litigation fell within the commercial activity exception.

The Court allowed the appeal and permitted the application for recognition to proceed.

The respondents built an aerodrome on land zoned as agricultural in Quebec without obtaining prior authorization from the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec.

The Commission ordered the land restored to its original state pursuant to provincial agricultural zoning legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provincial legislation is valid as relating to land use planning and agriculture, it is constitutionally inapplicable to aerodromes under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because it impairs the core of the federal power over aeronautics.

The respondents operated a commercial float plane business on a lake in a municipality.

The municipality amended its zoning by-law to prohibit aerodromes on that lake, while permitting them on another lake.

The municipality sought an injunction to stop the respondents' aviation activities.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-law amendment was ultra vires the province because its pith and substance was the regulation of aeronautics, an exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the amendment was not saved by the ancillary powers doctrine because it was not rationally and functionally connected to the broader, valid municipal zoning scheme.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested for multiple assaults and asserted his right to counsel.

After failing to reach his lawyer of choice, he consulted with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

During the subsequent police interrogation, he repeatedly requested to speak with a lawyer and have one present, but the police denied these requests and continued questioning until he confessed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 10(b) of the Charter does not require the presence of counsel during an interrogation, nor does it require police to provide further opportunities to consult counsel absent a change in circumstances.

The appellant was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

After an unsuccessful attempt to contact his preferred lawyer, he spoke with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

He subsequently provided an incriminating statement to the police.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police did not breach the appellant's right to counsel, as he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and voluntarily chose to speak with duty counsel.

The appellant was arrested for murder, advised of his right to counsel, and spoke with his lawyer twice before being interviewed by police.

During the five-hour interview, the appellant repeatedly stated he had nothing to say and wished to speak to his lawyer again.

The police refused further consultation and continued questioning, eventually obtaining a confession.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 10(b) of the Charter does not mandate the presence of counsel throughout an interrogation, nor does it require police to provide multiple opportunities to consult counsel unless there are changed circumstances, such as new procedures, a change in jeopardy, or reason to believe the detainee did not understand their rights.

As no such circumstances existed, the appeal was dismissed.

The employer sold a division of its business, resulting in the transfer of employees to a new company.

The transferred employees were removed from the employer's defined benefit pension plan and incorporated into a new successor plan.

At the time of the transfer, the employer's pension plan had a significant projected actuarial surplus.

The employer transferred enough funds to cover the transferred employees' defined benefits but did not transfer any surplus funds.

The transferred employees argued the employer breached its fiduciary duty of even-handedness by not transferring a portion of the surplus and by improperly charging plan administration expenses to the fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the pension plan documentation allowed the employer to charge administration expenses to the fund and that the transferred employees had no equitable interest in the actuarial surplus, meaning the employer's obligations were satisfied by assuring their defined benefits.

The insured, a general contractor, was sued for negligence and breach of contract after water damage caused rot and deterioration in several housing complexes it built.

The insured sought a declaration that its insurer owed a duty to defend under its commercial general liability policies.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurer owed a duty to defend, finding that the pleadings revealed a possibility of coverage.

The Court clarified that 'property damage' is not limited to third-party property and that defective workmanship can constitute an 'accident' if the resulting damage was neither expected nor intended by the insured.

Furthermore, the 'work performed' exclusions did not clearly and unambiguously exclude the claims, particularly given the involvement of subcontractors.

The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.

The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.

Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.