Marie Deschamps

The union filed a grievance against a decision not to renew the contract of a university professor, arguing it amounted to a dismissal without good and sufficient cause under the collective agreement and s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found the collective agreement established an equivalent remedial procedure and ordered the parties to proceed under it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the collective agreement's provisions regarding dismissal were sufficiently clear and provided an equivalent procedure to s. 124, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction to hear the grievance without incorporating the statutory provision.

The union filed a grievance against the Cégep's decision to withdraw employment priority from a teacher, alleging it constituted dismissal without good and sufficient cause under s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found she lacked jurisdiction to apply s. 124 as the collective agreement did not provide an equivalent remedial procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 124 is not implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, and where an agreement lacks adequate protection, the Commission des relations du travail has exclusive jurisdiction.

The appellant union filed grievances on behalf of two employees (one casual, one probationary) who were dismissed.

The collective agreement denied them access to the grievance procedure for dismissals.

The union argued that the public order standard in s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards, which prohibits dismissal without good and sufficient cause after two years of service, was implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the standard is not implicitly incorporated, the public order nature of the Act renders the collective agreement clauses denying arbitration absolutely null.

Consequently, the grievance arbitrator has jurisdiction to hear the complaints and provide a recourse equivalent to that of the Commission des relations du travail.

The respondent was mistakenly identified as a suspect, arrested, strip-searched, and his vehicle was seized.

The trial judge found breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights and awarded damages under s. 24(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada established a four-step framework for awarding Charter damages: (1) proof of breach, (2) functional justification (compensation, vindication, deterrence), (3) absence of countervailing factors, and (4) quantum assessment.

The Court upheld the $5,000 damage award for the strip search but set aside the $100 award for the vehicle seizure, finding a declaration sufficient for the latter.

The appellant appealed convictions for child luring arising from sexually explicit computer communications with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old.

The central issue was the interaction between the presumption in s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code and the reasonable steps requirement in s. 172.1(4).

The Court held that where an interlocutor is represented as underage, the accused is presumed to believe that representation unless rebutted by evidence that includes reasonable steps taken to ascertain age.

Because the appellant took no reasonable steps despite repeated assertions that the interlocutor was 13, the Court upheld the substituted convictions and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was convicted of sexual offences and sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction several years later.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, but a three-judge panel subsequently granted it.

The Crown applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to overturn a single judge's decision.

The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the leave application under section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act, overruling previous jurisprudence to the contrary.

However, the Court dismissed the application, finding that it raised no question of sufficient importance to warrant granting leave.

The appellants were stopped in a commercial truck during a random roadside check.

The police officer discovered regulatory violations and, during a search of the cab for documents, found $115,000 in a duffle bag.

The appellants were arrested for possession of proceeds of crime.

A subsequent search of the trailer revealed 392 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the initial stop and regulatory search were lawful and did not violate the Charter.

The arrest was based on reasonable and probable grounds, and the search of the trailer was a valid search incidental to arrest.

Although a later inventory search violated section 8, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and detained in a mental health facility, sought an absolute discharge and treatment orders as remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a new approach for determining whether an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1).

The Court held that the Ontario Review Board has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because it has the authority to decide questions of law.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific remedies sought by the appellant—an absolute discharge for a dangerous patient and a treatment order—were expressly precluded by the Board's statutory scheme under the Criminal Code.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

A confession made to police was ruled inadmissible at trial due to an improper inducement.

However, an e-mail sent by the accused to his former wife containing a second apology was admitted without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge should have held a voir dire on his own motion to determine if the e-mail was a derived confession or made to a person in authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a voir dire on his own motion, as the former wife was not a person in authority and there was no obvious connection between the police inducement and the subsequent e-mail to trigger the derived confessions rule, especially given defence counsel's consent to its admission.

The appellant, a Russian corporation, sought to enforce a foreign arbitral award against the respondent, an Alberta corporation, in Alberta.

The application was brought more than three years after the award was rendered.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards permits the application of local limitation periods.

In Alberta, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is subject to the general two-year limitation period under s. 3 of the Limitations Act, not the 10-year period for judgments under s. 11.

Consequently, the appellant's application was time-barred and the appeal was dismissed.

Appeal concerning whether a mining project in the James Bay Territory, approved under the environmental assessment regime in a modern treaty, was nevertheless subject to a further federal environmental assessment before a fisheries authorization could issue.

The majority held that the treaty is protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, but does not exclude the operation of federal laws of general application requiring CEAA compliance before issuance of a Fisheries Act permit.

The treaty's single-review provision governed internal treaty review processes only and did not eliminate the proponent's obligation to obtain necessary post-approval federal permits.

The Court varied the Court of Appeal's order to confirm that any fisheries authorization must comply with CEAA procedures and the Crown's duty to consult.

The appellants, a newspaper and its journalists, received an allegedly forged document from a confidential source implicating the Prime Minister in a conflict of interest.

The police obtained a search warrant and assistance order to seize the document and its envelope to identify the source through forensic testing.

The appellants challenged the warrant, claiming a constitutional or common law journalist-source privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 2(b) of the Charter does not provide a blanket constitutional immunity for journalists, a case-by-case privilege may be established using the Wigmore criteria.

On the facts, the public interest in investigating the serious crime of forgery outweighed the public interest in protecting the confidential source.

The search warrant and assistance order were upheld as reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellant, a Lieutenant-Colonel, was convicted of assault after pushing his wife during an argument where she threw his diploma on the floor.

He argued the force was justified under s. 39(1) of the Criminal Code as defence of personal property.

The military judge found the force used was excessive and disproportionate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military judge properly applied the principles of reasonable doubt and correctly assessed both subjective and objective factors in determining that the force used was more than necessary.

The appellant municipality abolished its business occupancy tax and restructured its property tax system.

The respondent federal Crown corporations, which previously made payments in lieu of property taxes but not business taxes, deducted an amount equivalent to the abolished business tax from their payments in lieu of taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents' decisions were unreasonable because they based their calculations on a fictitious tax system rather than the one actually in place.

The Court also found that the port authority's silos were not 'reservoirs' exempt from the calculation.

The appellant was charged with kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first degree murder as a party to the offences committed by a co-accused.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding he lacked the requisite knowledge of the co-accused's intention to commit the crimes.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that wilful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge and that the trial judge's failure to consider it constituted a legal error necessitating a new trial.

The accused was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first-degree murder.

At trial, the judge rejected the accused's testimony, citing his 'very great motive to be untruthful' to secure an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding this undermined the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while such language is concerning in isolation, the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole in the context of a trial where the accused challenged every witness's credibility based on their motives to lie, did not rely on an impermissible assumption.

The appellants alleged they were physically and sexually abused while residing in a privately operated children's home between 1928 and 1976.

The Lieutenant Governor in Council referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the Province owed duties to the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Province owed no duty of care, non-delegable duty, vicarious liability, or fiduciary duty to the children, as the home was privately operated and the Province had no statutory authority or control over its management.

The respondent, a criminal defence lawyer, sought to withdraw as counsel of record for an accused after his legal aid funding was suspended.

The Territorial Court refused her application to withdraw.

The Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory dismissed her application for certiorari.

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, finding the Territorial Court had no discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a court has the inherent or necessarily implied jurisdiction to refuse counsel's request to withdraw for non-payment of fees if allowing withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of justice.